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How can the adversaries detect the opportunities to challenge the target? The belief update in the challenger's side has not been carefully examined in the literature. We explore how political dynamics in the target side can affect the likelihood of deterrence failure. To investigate the details of security environments, we focus on Northeast Asia and conduct a time-series analysis of Japan's deterrence against its potential adversaries. With the data of scrambles by the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, the results show that Japan is more likely to fail to deter challenges from China, North Korea, Russia, and South Korea when Japanese prime minister changes. In contrast, the movements of public opinions and business climate in Japan do not affect deterrence failure. The results provide some implications for the deterrence literature, especially, the selection mechanism behind conflict initiation from the view of the challenger's belief update.
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