予定表 -詳細情報-
| 件名 | WS 田中知美氏 |
| 開始日時 | 2011年 12月 15日 (木曜日) 16時40分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 終了日時 | 2011年 12月 15日 (木曜日) 18時00分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 場所 | 1号館401教室 |
| 詳細 | 【報告者】：田中知美氏（アリゾナ州立大学准教授） 【タイトル】：”Does Marriage Work as a Savings Commitment Device? : Experimental Evidence from Vietnam” 【場所】1号館401教室 【概要】： We conducted a time discounting experiment with married couples, and examined how time preferences, particularly time inconsistency, affect intrahousehold financial decision making. Our experimental results suggest people are more patient when they make decisions jointly with their spouses. The analysis of survey data shows time-inconsistent individuals turn over smaller percentages of their earnings to their spouses. Time-inconsistent husbands are more likely to keep cash within households compared with time-consistent husbands. Time-inconsistent individuals are given smaller amounts of allowances, but they tend to conceal money to compensate. In addition, time-inconsistent subjects choose not to ask their spouses to keep their experimental earnings and save it for them in the experiment. This study shows marriage does not function (or may counteract) as a savings commitment device, especially for time-inconsistent individuals. This implies households need external savings commitment devices such as ROSCAs to protect money from spouses who have hyperbolic preferences. |
| カテゴリー | ワークショップ・セミナー |
