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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û·ªºê¼þÊ¿»á¡Ê¥Æ¥¥µ¥¹A&MÂç³Ø ½Ú¶µ¼ø¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛDetecting Audience Costs in International Disputes ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û4¹æ´Û301¶µ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û ¡¡Determining the existence and size of audience costs is critical for understand- ing their causal effects and behavioral implications, but also challenging because strategic selection bias can truncate their observable distribution. We use strategic structural estimation to obtain direct evidence of audience costs with observational data on international crises. In our estimation, when a state makes a threat and then backs down, the state incurs a negative payoff, strictly less than the payoff it would have obtained had it not threatened. This payoff difference, which defines audience costs, is shown to exist for any regime type. We also show that democratic leaders incur greater audience costs than do autocrats. Further, by estimating the amount of belief updating that occurs, we present the first evidence that audience costs improve the ability of countries to signal their intentions and hence facilitate communication through threats. These results establish an empirical foundation for the audience costs proposition. ¢¨ 1 ¥ï¡¼¥¯¥·¥ç¥Ã¥×»²²Ã´õ˾¼Ô¤Ï¡¢»öÁ°¤Ë²ÏÌîÀèÀ¸¤Ë¤´Ï¢Íí¤¯¤À¤µ¤¤¡£ ¢¨ 2 3¸Â¤Ï·ªºê»á¤Ë¤è¤ê¥Æ¥¥µ¥¹ A&MÂç³Ø¤Î¾Ò²ð¤ò¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿¤À¤¤Þ¤¹¡£ |
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