予定表 -詳細情報-
| 件名 | LS 竹内あい氏 |
| 開始日時 | 2011年 11月 1日 (火曜日) 12時15分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 終了日時 | 2011年 11月 1日 (火曜日) 12時50分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 場所 | 1号館401教室 |
| 詳細 | GLOPE II ランチタイムセミナー 【日時】 11月1日（火） 12:15〜12:50 【場所】 1-401教室 【報告者】 竹内あい氏（早稲田大学政治経済学術院助手） 【タイトル】Learning away from the dominant strategy: experimental analysis of a public goods game with punishment institution 【概要】This study investigates a condition in which subjects’ choices may diverge from the equilibrium in the long run. The condition of focus is whether an equilibrium strategy is a finite population evolutionary stable strategy (FESS). We study this condition in a linear public goods game with a centralized punishment institution. By varying one parameter, we compare treatments in which a dominant strategy is and is not a FESS by using a laboratory experiment. In both treatments, subjects’ choices bifurcate to the dominant strategy and the FESS. Although the dominant strategy is played more frequently, in a treatment where the two are different, the number of FESS choices gradually increases with repetition. In the game considered, this implies a decrease in efficiency as the FESS outcome is Pareto dominated by the dominant strategy equilibrium. The increase in the frequency of FESS choices is reduced by limiting the available feedback information to an aggregated measure (the sum of contributions), rather than individuals’ choices and payoffs. *The talk will be given in English. |
| カテゴリー | 政治経済学基礎セミナー・ランチタイムセミナー |
