ͽÄêɽ -¾ÜºÙ¾ðÊó-
·ï̾ | LS Luigi Curini»á |
³«»ÏÆü»þ | 2011ǯ 10·î 18Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 12»þ15ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
½ªÎ»Æü»þ | 2011ǯ 10·î 18Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 12»þ50ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
¾ì½ê | 1¹æ´Û401¶µ¼¼ |
¾ÜºÙ | GLOPE II ¥é¥ó¥Á¥¿¥¤¥à¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ ¡ÚÆü»þ¡Û 10·î18Æü¡Ê²Ð¡Ë 12:15¡Á12:50 ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û 1-401¶µ¼¼ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û Luigi Curini»á¡ÊGLOPE II ¹ñºÝ¸¦µæ°÷¡¿Universit½æA degli Studi di Milano¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛThe role of valence issues in party-competition focused on corruption issues: a (wide) comparative analysis using electoral manifestos ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û Abstract: Despite the growing interest in investigating the causes of political corruption, far less attention has been devoted to analyze the conditions under which political actors have an incentive to highlight corruption issues in electoral competition. Do parties talk about corruption just as a reaction to exogenous factors (i.e. scandals reported in the press)? Or are there explicable regularities in the way parties emphasize the issue during their confrontation? Assuming that corruption is a case of valence issue (i.e. an issue universally supported/disclaimed by electors) we put our investigation into the framework of a one-dimensional model. On this basis we are led to the hypothesis that, in the case of political corruption, such an incentive exists only for non-cabinet parties that are nearest neighbors of a cabinet party, and increases with their mutualproximity on the left to right space. Our empirical analysis, based on CMP data, nicely supports our intuition. *The talk will be given in English. |
¥«¥Æ¥´¥ê¡¼ | À¯¼£·ÐºÑ³Ø´ðÁÃ¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼¡¦¥é¥ó¥Á¥¿¥¤¥à¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ |