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·ï̾ | LS Xiangfeng Yang»á |
³«»ÏÆü»þ | 2011ǯ 10·î 11Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 12»þ15ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
½ªÎ»Æü»þ | 2011ǯ 10·î 11Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 12»þ50ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
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¾ÜºÙ | GLOPE II ¥é¥ó¥Á¥¿¥¤¥à¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ ¡ÚÆü»þ¡Û 10·î11Æü¡Ê²Ð¡Ë 12:15¡Á12:50 ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û 1-401¶µ¼¼ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û Xiangfeng Yang»á¡ÊGLOPE II ¹ñºÝ¸¦µæ°÷¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û Abundant Peace/ODA, Absent Democracy: The Developmentalist Logic of Japanese Approach to Global Governance ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û This paper highlights the unusual character of the Japanese approaches to global governance, i.e., an emphasis on peacekeeping and economic development on one hand, and its ideological affinity with the West¡½the United States in particular¡½notwithstanding, its lack of interest thereof in democracy assistance on the other hand. Combining elite interviews with contextual and historical analysis, I begin by surveying the Japanese idealpolitik trajectories in the last 2 decades in three phrases: financing the economic transitions of those new democracies in the wake of the end of the Cold War, enthusiastically promoting the Japanese version of Human Security since the mid-1990s, and the short-lived ¡ÈArc of Freedom and Prosperity¡É initiative. Finally, in investigating the democracy deficit in Japanese foreign policy, I present, compare, and contrast four competing thesis, and explain why a development-centered logic is best understood as an intellectual framework for Japan¡Çs involvement in global governance. *The talk will be given in English. |
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