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·ï̾ | WS Dimitry Rtischev»á |
³«»ÏÆü»þ | 2011ǯ 10·î 13Æü (ÌÚÍËÆü) 16»þ30ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
½ªÎ»Æü»þ | 2011ǯ 10·î 13Æü (ÌÚÍËÆü) 18»þ00ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
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¾ÜºÙ | ÌÚÍË¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡ÛDimitry Rtischev»á¡Ê³Ø½¬±¡Âç³Ø·ÐºÑ³ØÉô¶µ¼ø¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û Evolution of preferences, mindsight, and cooperation ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û Even in anonymous one-shot interactions humans often do not behave as if each is maximizing his own payoff while assuming others do the same. This propensity to sidestep the logic of Nash equilibrium and the common knowledge of rationality can lead to more cooperation and economically better outcomes in social dilemma situations. But can such a propensity evolve among self-interested agents? Taking hints from evolutionary psychology and interpersonal neurobiology, we focus on mindsight, the capability to perceive how another person is disposed to behave. We model the evolution of preferences and mindsight in a population of self-interested agents living in an environment that requires team production for survival and reproduction. We show that if agents are randomly matched to play a two-agent team production game, preferences and mindsight may evolve, allowing agents to partially overcome the social dilemma within each dyad and produce significantly more than in Nash equilibrium, but not as much as under full cooperation. |
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