ͽÄêɽ -¾ÜºÙ¾ðÊó-
·ï̾ | BS ʬ²Ê²ñ |
³«»ÏÆü»þ | 2011ǯ 7·î 26Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 10»þ40ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
½ªÎ»Æü»þ | 2011ǯ 7·î 26Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 12»þ10ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
¾ì½ê | ²¼µ»²¾È¤Î¤³¤È |
¾ÜºÙ | ¢¡GLOPE¶À¯¼£·ÐºÑ³Ø´ðÁÃ¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼¡Ê¹ñºÝÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ³ØÀèü¸¦µæA¡Ë ¥°¥ë¡¼¥×1¡§¼Â¸³¡¦À¤ÏÀÄ´ºº¡¦Åý·×ʬÀÏ¡¢6¹æ´Û314¶µ¼¼ ¡Ö¸å´ü¤Î¼Â»ÜÆâÍÆ¤ò¸¡Æ¤¤¹¤ë¡× ¥°¥ë¡¼¥×2¡§»ý³²Äǽ¤ÊÀ©ÅÙÀ߷פȵ¬ÈÏŪɾ²Á¡¢6¹æ´Û317¶µ¼¼ TBA ¥°¥ë¡¼¥×3¡§¹ñºÝÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ¥â¥Ç¥ëʬÀÏ¡¢1¹æ´Û401¶µ¼¼ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û¡¡äÆÃ«¸ø»Ê»á¡ÊLecturer, Trinity College Dublin) ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡ÛSignaling, Trade, Alliance Commitment in Peacetime ¢¨»ñÎÁ¤È¤·¤ÆÅºÉÕ¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ë»²¾È¤Î¤³¤È ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û Alliance treaties survive when allies can successfully coordinate security policies to cope with changes in external strategic environments. However, since allies do not always have the same preference over the level of alliance commitment, an uncertainty about their partners' resolve can be an obstacle to achieving an agreement among allies. I explore when and how allies can use intra-alliance trade cooperation to overcome the uncertainty problem, resulting in the maintenance of the treaty. I present a negotiation model where leaders confront both domestic and international risks arising from intra-alliance trade cooperation. In the equilibrium, trade signaling can change leaders' beliefs and in turn reinforce alliance ties. The logic of trade signaling illuminates the importance of intra-alliance trade cooperation as a policy instrument to maintain the survival of alliance treaties and provides new insights for the trade-security linkage. ¥°¥ë¡¼¥×4¡§À©ÅÙ¤ÎÀ¸À®¤ÈÀ߷פοôÍýŪ´ðÁÃÉÕ¤±¡¢6¹æ´Û313-2¶µ¼¼ ¸ÍÅÄÀèÀ¸¤è¤ê¸¦µæÊó¹ð¤¬¹Ô¤ï¤ì¤ë |
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