予定表 -詳細情報-
| 件名 | LS 梅田道生氏 |
| 開始日時 | 2011年 6月 21日 (火曜日) 12時15分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 終了日時 | 2011年 6月 21日 (火曜日) 12時50分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 場所 | 1号館401教室 |
| 詳細 | 【報告者】：梅田道生(日本学術振興会特別研究員（PD）／東京大学法学政治学研究科） 【報告タイトル】：Moving the Mountain: Strategic Small-Party Nominations to Shift Major-Party Policy Position under Plurality Electoral System 【日時】：6月21日（火）12:15〜12:50 【場所】：1号館401教室 *The talk will be given in English. 【概要】 This article demonstrates a practical purpose behind small partynominations under plurality electoral rule with two major centristparties. More specifically, I argue that the small party uses thenomination of candidates to blackmail the major centrist party to adopt policies more desirable to the small party, despite the risk of splitting votes and benefiting an ideological enemy. The small party may not win office, seats, or even votes, which are generally assumed as purposes of political parties (M醇・ler and Str遵km 1999). However, the party can achieve more desirable policy outcomes through a position shift of the major centrist party. The major party acts strategically to decrease the risk of nomination and potential electoral damage incurred by the nomination. This argument stands in contrast to previous studies regarding the small parties’ nomination that ascribe a purpose of nomination to ideological and/or long-term goals (Cox 1997). In the first part of the article, I present a model based on the chain-store paradox (Selten 1978; Kreps and Wilson 1982), in which a small radical party is able to exert policy influence in repeated negotiations with a major centrist party located on the same side of the ideological median. The model indicates that if the major party believes that there is even a small chance that the small party is ideological -- it prefers the defeat of the major party to victory, if the major party chooses too centrist position – a less ideological, more policy oriented practical small party takes a mixed strategy of nomination and acquiesce against the centrist candidate of the major party, and is able to persuade the major party to have a less centrist position. In the second part of the article, I show empirical evidence that a small leftist party and a major center-left party in Japan (the SDPJ and the DPJ for each) choose their strategies in accordance with the theoretical model, based on the candidate position and nomination data from the 2005 General Election of the House of Representatives. |
| カテゴリー | 政治経済学基礎セミナー・ランチタイムセミナー |
