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¡ÚÊó¹ð¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û School choice with degrees of freedom
¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡ÛYajing CHEN (Waseda University)
¡Ú³µÍסÛIn school choice problems, schools are pure public goods to be allocated and only students are related with strategic behavior and welfare issues. However, the priority orders which assign ranks to students according to their priority for schools are exogenously determined and may not reflect the true preferences of schools overs
students. This paper aims to design the mechanism which considers the welfare and strategic behavior of schools while does not hurt students too much. On the basis of student-proposing deferred acceptance mechanism, we offer three alternatives which not only adopt the priority structure but also respect the true preferences of schools
through giving schools limited degrees of freedom to choose students. These mechanisms all lie between pure centralized and pure decentralized school choice mechanisms.

*The talk will be given in English.
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