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·ï̾ | WS Amihai Glazer»á |
³«»ÏÆü»þ | 2010ǯ 12·î 17Æü (¶âÍËÆü) 17»þ00ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
½ªÎ»Æü»þ | 2010ǯ 12·î 17Æü (¶âÍËÆü) 18»þ30ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÊó¹ð¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û¡§How to avoid rent seeking ¡Úȯɽ¼Ô¡Û¡§Amihai Glazer»á¡Ê¥«¥ê¥Õ¥©¥ë¥Ë¥¢Âç³Ø¡¡¥¢¡¼¥Ð¥¤¥ó¹»·ÐºÑ³ØÉô¶µ¼ø¡Ë ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û3¹æ´Û¡¡Âè3²ñµÄ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û ¡¡The majority of self-control models have been considered in the context of single-person decision making. However, one's propensity to resist temptation may well depend on others' behavior, as observed in smoking, overeating, and overspending behavior. This paper introduces a new class of normal form games in which players have self-control preferences (Gul and Pesendorfer, 2001), and player's ability to resist temptation depends on the other players' actions. We propose an equilibrium concept and establish the existence of equilibria. In addition, we discuss how strategic interaction matters in games with self-control preferences by examples such as consumption-savings decisions under bandwagon effects. |
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