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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÆü»þ¡Û¡§11·î19Æü¡Ê¶â¡Ë ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û¡§ÅÄÃæÃÎÈþ»á¡ÊUniversity of Arizona, Assistant professor¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û¡§Committing the Uncommitted: Rosca as a Saving Commitment Device for Sophisticated Hyperbolic Discounters ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û¡§1¹æ´Û2³¬¡¡¸½ÂåÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ¸¦µæ½ê ¡¡ÅÄÃæ»á¡ÊUniversity of Arizona, Assistant professor¡Ë¤Ï¡¢¿·¿Ê¤Î¼Â¸³·ÐºÑ³Ø¼Ô¤Ç¤¢¤ê¡¢¼Â¸³¼Ò²ñ²Ê³Ø¥³¥ó¥Õ¥¡¥ì¥ó¥¹¤Ë¤ª¤¤¤Æ¾·ÂÔ¹Ö±é¼Ô¤Ë¤Ê¤ë¤Ê¤É¡¢¤½¤Î¸¦µæ¤¬ÃíÌܤµ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡£¸½ºß¡¢ÅìµþÂç³Ø¤ËµÒ°÷¸¦µæ°÷¤È¤·¤ÆÂÚºßÃæ¤Ç¤¢¤ê¡¢¤½¤Îµ¡²ñ¤òÍøÍѤ·¤ÆºÇ¶á¤Î¸¦µæÀ®²Ì¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤´Êó¹ð¤¤¤¿¤À¤¯¡£ROSCA¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤Î¼Â¸³¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤ÎÊó¹ð¤Ç¤¢¤ë¤¬¡¢À©ÅÙÀ߷ׯó¤â´ØÏ¢¤·¤¿¸¦µæ¤Ç¤¢¤ë¡£ ¢¨¡¡Êó¹ð¤Ï±Ñ¸ì¤Ç¹Ô¤ï¤ì¤ëͽÄê¤Ç¤¹¡£ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û This paper investigates whether the participation in rotating savings and credit associations (roscas), an informal financial institution-like arrangement found in many developing countries, is correlated with time discounting, risk aversion, and the level of trust and reciprocity measured in experiments. Our experimental results show people who participate in fixed roscas are less present-biased, have lower discount rates and are often aware of the self-control than those who participate in bidding roscas. The members of fixed roscas are also more trustworthy, and less prone to default. Our results suggest designing financial institutions requires some knowledge about the preferences and motives of potential participants, and preference measurement can provide insights into institutional design. |
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