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¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û¡§Walking After Midnight: Measurements and Pricing Implications of Market Liquidity on Corporate Bonds
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¡ÚAbstract¡Û¡¡ This paper proposes a theoretically motivated proxy for the degree of market liquidity in corporate bond market (GAP: the highest minus lowest simultaneously reported spreads among multiple market makers), and studies its pricing implication by quantifying the correlation between GAP and the median reported spreads, which presumably approximate market prices conjectured by market makers. We find that (i) inclusion of the lagged GAP to the standard multi-factor model significantly improves the explanation power, (ii) the quantitative impact of such an illiquidity measure on bond spreads becomes larger as credit ratings get worse, (iii) the GAP proxy is valid even after controlling the persistency on spreads, which has been considered as another proxy for illiquidity in the extant literature
(i.e., resiliency), and (iv) the degree of such persistency increases as the credit ratings of corporate bonds deteriorate.

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