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¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û¡§äÆÃ«¸ø»Ê»á¡ÊTrinity College Dublin, Department of Political Science¡Ë
¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û¡§Signaling, Trade, and Alliance Commitment in Crisis

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Successful deterrence occurs when alliance relationships are reliable. However, while allies worry about treaty abrogation by their partners, they try to avoid getting themselves involved in an unnecessary war. Deterrence works when allies simultaneously solve these strategic interaction problems. I explore when and how intra-alliance trade cooperation enables allies to convey their intentions; not only to each other but also to potential challengers, thus making deterrence work. I present a crisis bargaining model where leaders confront both domestic and international political risks arising from intra-alliance trade cooperation. The equilibrium analysis suggests that trade signaling can promote deterrence and prevent crisis escalation. The logic of trade signaling sheds light on the importance of intra-alliance trade cooperation as a policy instrument to maintain peace and proposes a new microfoundation for the trade-security
linkage.

* The talk will be given in Japanese.
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