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¾ÜºÙ | ¡Úȯɽ¼Ô¡Û¡§º´Æ£¼ç¸÷»á¡Ê°ì¶¶Âç³Ø ¶µ¼ø¡Ë ¡ÚÊó¹ð¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û: Ethical Voting and Political Competition ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û¡§1¹æ´Û2³¬¡¡¸½À¯¸¦²ñµÄ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û We study political outcomes in a party competition model in which voters attach some weight to their ethically preferred outcome as long as party platforms do not deviate too much from that outcome. In our basic model in which the value of voting for each party depends on the ethical value of the party platform, multiple stable equilibria in party policies can occur. Which outcome occurs depends on whether parties take as given the number of ethical voters or whether they behave strategically and choose to influence that number. These findings carry over to the case where ethical voting depends on the expected ethical value of the voting outcome given the probability attached by voters to each party winning. In a final case where political parties choose their platforms sequentially, vote cycling can occur with outcomes alternating between those in which some voters vote ethically and those in which they do not. ¢¨ÅºÉÕ¥Õ¥¡¥¤¥ë¤ò¤´³Îǧ¤¯¤À¤µ¤¤¡£ |
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