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·ï̾ | WS ÃÝß·ÀµÅ¯»á |
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½ªÎ»Æü»þ | 2010ǯ 11·î 5Æü (¶âÍËÆü) 18»þ00ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡ÛÃÝß· ÀµÅ¯¡¡»á¡Ê¾åÃÒÂç³Ø ¿Í´ÖÁí¹ç²Ê³ØÉô¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û"Do people use the second-order information for forming reputation?: Memory-based indirect reciprocity" (Êó¹ð¤Ï±Ñ¸ì¤ÎͽÄê¡Ë ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û¡§1¹æ´Û2³¬¡¡¸½ÂåÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ¸¦µæ½ê²ñµÄ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û ¡¡Evolutionary game theoretical models revealed that the success of indirect reciprocity critically depends on how individuals evaluate recipients. Several strategies for forming reputation have been proposed. One major dimension categorizing the strategies is whether to use the second-order information (i.e., reputation / behavior of past recipients of current recipients) and theoretical analyses found that the information should be used for discriminating justified from unjustified defection. However, results of the experiments that investigated whether people actually use the second order information are rather mixed. In this study, we investigated the same question under a novel experimental setting where people need to store the information of the others¡Ç past actions in their memory. Differently from the previous studies where experimenters explicitly presented both the first and second order information to participants, participants in the current study need to recall the information from their memory when they need to evaluate others¡Ç reputation. Two hypothetical scenario experiments and one laboratory experiment revealed that, although people seem to be able remember both the behavior of the current recipient (first-order information) and the behavior of the recipient of the current recipient (second-order information), both participants judgments of reputation and actions in the repeated random-matching giving game (Bolton et al., 2005) are mostly based only on the first order information. |
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