予定表 -詳細情報-
| 件名 | WS 別所俊一郎氏 |
| 開始日時 | 2010年 10月 12日 (火曜日) 13時00分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 終了日時 | 2010年 10月 12日 (火曜日) 14時30分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 場所 | 現代政治経済研究所 会議室 （１号館２階） |
| 詳細 | 政治の経済分析ワークショップ 【講師】 別所俊一郎氏（一橋大学 大学院経済学研究科 専任講師） 【報告タイトル】 Fiscal Adjustments by Outsiders 【要旨】 This paper investigates the role of fiscal advisors in maintaining fiscal discipline of the governments when the appointment of fiscal advisors is determined endogenously. We formulate a mechanism to determine how external advisors serve as a commitment device for politicians who attempt re-election. We also test our hypothesis empirically using the Japanese panel data of prefectural governments. An incumbent local politician makes a decision on the appointment of an external agent as his advisor before he knows the type of his competence in the policy field in which he has to work. If the incumbent politician can commit to the fiscal discipline set by the external advisor, and if his competency level is ex post low, he can avoid wasteful expenditure subject to the fiscal constraint, and be re-elected. If the incumbent politician has a high competency level, the scale of his public good provision is suppressed by the fiscal constraint below the level that he could choose without the constraint, though he can then also be re-elected. Our empirical analysis supports this hypothesis in the sense that the local governments with directors from the central government accumulate less local debt and spend less. Our results also show that they reduce investment in infrastructure so as to scale down both the total expenditure and local debt without decreasing personnel expenses or subsidies and grants. |
| カテゴリー | ワークショップ・セミナー |
