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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÆü»þ¡Û¡§2010ǯ7·î26Æü¡Ê·î¡Ë¸á¸å16»þȾ¡Á18»þ ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û¡§¾®ÅçÉð¿Î»á¡Ê¥¹¥¿¥ó¥Õ¥©¡¼¥ÉÂç³Ø¡Ë ¡ÚÊó¹ð¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û¡§"Improving Efficiency in Matching Markets with Regional Caps: The Case of the Japan Residency Matching Program" ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û¡§1¹æ´Û¸½À¯¸¦ ²ñµÄ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍס۾®ÅçÉð¿Î»á¤Ï¿·¿Êµ¤±Ô¤Î¥¹¥¿¥ó¥Õ¥©¡¼¥ÉÂç³Ø¤Î¸¦µæ¼Ô¤Ç¤¢¤ê¡¢¥Þ¥Ã¥Á¥ó¥°¤Ë´Ø¤·¤Æ¶áǯ¿¤¯¤Î¸¦µæ¤ò¤µ¤ì¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡£º£²ó¤ÎÍèÆü´ü´ÖÃæ¤Ë¡¢Áá°ðÅÄÂç³Ø¤Ç¤â¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼¤ò¹Ô¤Ã¤ÆÄº¤¯¡£³µÍפϲ¼µ¤Î¤È¤ª¤ê¤Ç¤¢¤ë¡£ ¡¡In an attempt to increase the placement of medical residents to rural hospitals, Japanese government recently introduced ``regional caps" which, for each prefecture of the country, restrict the total number of students matched within the prefecture. This paper shows that the current mechanism with regional caps may result in avoidable inefficiency and instability and proposes a new mechanism that improves efficiency and generates stable matchings while meeting the regional caps. We find that different stable matchings can have different sets of hospitals with vacant positions, implying that the rural hospital theorem fails in our context. Thus there may be room for government to select a particular stable matching based on its welfare and distributional goals. More broadly, the paper points a direction of matching/market design theory to accommodate problems arising in practical matching problem. |
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