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·ï̾ | WS ÉðÃÒ°ìµ®»á |
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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û:ÉðÃÒ°ìµ®»á¡ÊË¡À¯Âç³Ø¡¡½Ú¶µ¼ø¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û:Cross-Border Alliances and Market Competition ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û:£±¹æ´Û401¶µ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û This paper investigates the relationship between cross-border alliances and market competition. I estimate demand for pharmaceuticals in Japan, derive implied marginal costs and margins, and examine the relationship between alliances and firms¡Ç costs and pricing behavior. The estimation results show that the marginal costs of products gained through alliances are lower than those for firms¡Ç own products in the early stages of an alliance, suggesting that low cost partners are chosen as licensees. Furthermore, my test results indicate that firms are not colluded and per-unit royalty rates may be low. Because high per-unit royalty rates are related to high market markups, the anticompetitive effects of alliance caused by collusion or high markups can be small in this market. |
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