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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û»û°æ¸ø»Ò»á(Ë¡À¯Âç³Ø·Ð±Ä³ØÉô¶µ¼ø) ¡ÚÂê̾¡ÛInternational Coordination and Domestic Politics ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û1¹æ´Û401¶µ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û We examine how international coordination between countries generates a trend to establish an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating international agreement are a politician's motive for re-election, his expectation of the other country's consent on agreement, and enforceable punishment for non-compliance. If a politician expects another politician in a neighboring country to signal his good performance to his citizen by participating in the agreement and his ex post deviation to be deterred by a threat of punishment, he also decides to participate in the agreement, which then brings benefit spillovers to his country |
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