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¾ÜºÙ | ¡ÚÊó¹ð¼Ô¡Û¾®ÅçÉð¿Î¡ÊStanford University, Assistant Professor¡Ë ¡Ú¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡Û"Implementing Random Assignments: A Generalization of the Birkhoff-von Neumann Theorem" ¡Ú¾ì½ê¡Û ¸½ÂåÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ¸¦µæ½ê²ñµÄ¼¼ ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û ¾®ÅçÉð¿Î»á¤Ï¥²¡¼¥àÍýÏÀ¡¢¥Þ¡¼¥±¥Ã¥È¥Ç¥¶¥¤¥ó¤òÀìÌç¤È¤¹¤ë¼ã¼ê¸¦µæ¼Ô¤Ç¤¢¤ê¡¢¶áǯ¡¢Â¿¿ô¤ÎÏÀʸ¤ò¹ñºÝººÆÉÉÕ¤ÃøÌ¾³Ø½Ñ»¨»ï¤Ë·ÇºÜ¤·¤Æ¤¤¤ë¡ÊAmerican Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Economic Theory, International Journal of Game Theory, Games and Economic Behavior¤Ê¤É¡Ë¡£º£²ó¤Ï°Ê²¼¤Ëµó¤²¤ë¡¢Æ±»á¤Î³ä¤êÅö¤ÆÌäÂê¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤ÎºÇ¿·¸¦µæ·ë²Ì¤òÊó¹ð¤·¤Æ¤¤¤¿¤À¤¯¡£¤³¤ì¤ÏGLOPE£²¤ÎËÜ¥×¥í¥¸¥§¥¯¥È¤Î¸¦µæ¤È¤â´ØÏ¢¤¬¿¼¤¤¡£ ³µÍס§The literature on random mechanisms often describes outcomes incompletely as ``random assignments'' - expressing the probabilities that individual items are assigned to different agents - and the joint constraints that a feasible assignment must satisfy. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition (the ``bihierarchy'' condition) for the set of constraints to have the property that if the random assignment satisfies the constraints in expectation, then it is a randomization over pure assignments that each satisfy the constraints. The sets of constraints generalize those allowed by the celebrated Birkhoff-von Neumann theorem. We also provide a random algorithm to implement any such random assignment. Several applications are described, including (i) single-unit random assignment, such as school choice; (ii) multi-unit random assignment, such as course allocation and fair division; and (iii) two-sided matching problems, such as the scheduling of inter-league sports matchups. The same method also finds applications beyond economics, generalizing previous results on the minimize makespan problem in the computer science literature. |
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