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¾ÜºÙ | ¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡§Social and Economic Networks Êó¹ð¼Ô¡§Univerisity of Warwick ¶µ¼ø/ Bhaskar Dutta»á ¡Ú³µÍ×¡Û À©ÅÙ¹½ÃÛ¤ÎÀ¯¼£·ÐºÑ³Ø¤ÎÃæ¤Ç¹Í»¡¤¹¤Ù¤ÌäÂê¤Î1¤Ä¤Ë¡¢¿Í¡¹¤Î´Ö¤Ë·ÁÀ®¤µ¤ì¤ë¥Í¥Ã¥È¥ï¡¼¥¯¤ÎÀ¼Á¤ÈÌò³ä¤Î²òÌÀ¤¬¤¢¤ë¡£²æ¡¹¤Î¼Ò²ñ¤Ç¤Ï¡¢¤æ¤ë¤ä¤«¤Ê·ë¹ç¤«¤é¶ÛÌ©¤Ê·ë¹ç¤Þ¤Ç¡¢¤µ¤Þ¤¶¤Þ¤Ê¥ì¥Ù¥ë¤Î¥Í¥Ã¥È¥ï¡¼¥¯¤¬·ÁÀ®¤µ¤ì¡¢¤½¤ì¤¬À©Å٤ι½ÃۤδðÁäȤʤäƤ¤¤ë¡£¤·¤¿¤¬¤Ã¤Æ¡¢¼Â¾ÚÍýÏÀ¤Ç¤âµ¬ÈÏÍýÏÀ¤Ç¤â¡¢¥Í¥Ã¥È¥ï¡¼¥¯·ÁÀ®¤Î¾ò·ï¤È¡¢·ÁÀ®¤µ¤ì¤¿¥Í¥Ã¥È¥ï¡¼¥¯¤ÎÆÃÀ¤Ë¤Ä¤¤¤Æ¤ÎÃμ±¤Ï¡¢¤½¤ÎŸ³«¤Ë¤È¤Ã¤ÆÉ¬Í×ÉԲķç¤Ç¤¢¤ë¤È¤¤¤¨¤ë¡£Dutta»á¤Î¹ÖµÁ¤È¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼¤Ï¡¢¼Ò²ñŪ¡¦·ÐºÑŪ¥Í¥Ã¥È¥ï¡¼¥¯¤Ë´Ø¤¹¤ë¤³¤ì¤Þ¤Ç¤Î·ÐºÑ³Ø¤ÎÍýÏÀŪÃßÀѤòƧ¤Þ¤¨¤¿Å¸Ë¾¤òÍ¿¤¨¤ë¤â¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ë¤ÈƱ»þ¤Ë¡¢¿·¤¿¤ÊÌäÂê¤Îȯ·¡¤È¤½¤Î²ò·è¤ò°Õ¿Þ¤¹¤ë¤â¤Î¤Ç¤¢¤ë¡£ ¡Ú¥¹¥±¥¸¥å¡¼¥ë¡Û ¹ÖµÁ¡§ ¡¡8·î31Æü 9:00-12:10¡¡Bhaskar Dutta "Social and Economic Networks (Part 1 and 2)" ¡¡9·î2Æü¡¡9:00-12:10¡¡Bhaskar Dutta "Social and Economic Networks (Part 3 and 4)" ¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼¡§ ¡¡9·î4Æü¡¡16:30-18:00¡¡Bhaskar Dutta "Honest Implementation" ¡Ú¥ì¥¯¥Á¥ã¡¼¤Î¾ÜºÙ¡Û Lecture 1: One stage models of group formation 1. A uni¯ed framework for coalitional and network formation. 2. Stability and network formation. 3. Applications to connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky), Collaboration amongst Oligopolistic Firms (Goyal and Joshi). 4. The core and minimum cost spanning tree games. Lecture 2: Farsightedness in static and dynamic settings 1. VnM sets and Chwe's largest consistent set. 2. Dynamic network formation in real time. Lecture 3 General Tension between E¡Þcient and Stable Net- works 1. Examples showing that stable networks may not be e¡Þcient 2. Resolving the tension (i) Restricting the value function (ii) The Mechanism Design Approach (iii) Bargaining (iv) Pigovian taxes and transfers Lecture 4: Applications 1. Risk-sharing networks 2. The labour market |
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