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·ï̾ | LS Normizan Bakar»á |
³«»ÏÆü»þ | 2009ǯ 7·î 7Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 12»þ15ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
½ªÎ»Æü»þ | 2009ǯ 7·î 7Æü (²ÐÍËÆü) 12»þ50ʬ (GMT+09:00) |
¾ì½ê | 10¹æ´Û408¹æ¼¼ |
¾ÜºÙ | ¥é¥ó¥Á¥¿¥¤¥à¥»¥ß¥Ê¡¼ Æü»þ¡§7·î7Æü¡¡12:15-12:50 ¾ì½ê¡§10¹æ´Û408¶µ¼¼ Normizan Bakar»á¡ÊÁá°ðÅÄÂç³Ø·ÐºÑ³Ø¸¦µæ²Ê¡Ë ¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡§Optimal transport and industrial policy in the presence of restricted geographical condition ³µÍס§ Arguments for strategic trade intervention with Bertrand duopolists are reconsidered in a model where a landlocked firm competes with a coastal firm in the third market. Facing a geographical disadvantage, the landlocked has an incentive to investing and subsidizing a transport cost-reducing R&D. We assume that the coastal government imposes a toll fee on the landlocked firm for the movement of goods through its region. As a result, we find that both the landlocked R&D subsidy and the coastal toll fee work as strategic policies and that the optimal levels for these are both positive. |
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