予定表 -詳細情報-
| 件名 | BS 栗崎周平氏 |
| 開始日時 | 2009年 7月 7日 (火曜日) 10時40分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 終了日時 | 2009年 7月 7日 (火曜日) 12時10分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 場所 | 10号館408号室 |
| 詳細 | 日時：7月7日 10:40-12:10 場所：10号館408教室 栗崎 周平 氏（Texas A&M大学） タイトル："Diplomacy, Precrisis Communication, and War" 概要： During the 2008 Presidential election campaign, publication candidate John McCain argued that diplomatic talks with foreign adversaries risks American security and interests, criticizing Democratic candidate Barak Obama's commitment to the use of diplomatic dialogue in dealing with foreign affairs. Recent rationalist models address this issue in the context of cheap-talk communication prior to crisis bargaining, where two kinds of equilibria are shown to exist: (i) diplomacy is "irrelevant" in that it has no effect on the subsequent crisis and (ii) diplomacy is "dangerous" in that it increases the risk of military confrontation in a crisis that follows. Analyzing an infinitely repeated crisis bargaining game with cheap talk shows that there is yet another equilibrium, where diplomatic arrangements can be made so that diplomatic talks convey much greater credibility than the previous models predicted, and, more importantly, reduces the risk of war in the subsequent crises. If the conventional "dangerous diplomacy" equilibrium captures John McCain's claims that Obama's diplomatic initiative would be naive and dangerous, this new equilibrium provides a rational underpinning for his strategy for diplomacy. As time permits, I will also discuss my research design for testing empirical implications of the theoretical model. |
| カテゴリー | 政治経済学基礎セミナー・ランチタイムセミナー |
