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¾ÜºÙ | Êó¹ð¼Ô¡§ÃÝÆâ ¤¢¤¤ (Áá°ðÅÄÂç³Ø·ÐºÑ³Ø¸¦µæ²Ê¡¿ÆüËܳؽѿ¶¶½²ñÆÃÊ̸¦µæ°÷) Êó¹ð¥¿¥¤¥È¥ë¡§ Experimental Results on Sponsored Search Auction: Comparison of GSP and VCG ³µÍס§ Sponsored links are a kind of Internet ads and its market has grown rapidly in recent years. This paper compares, using laboratory experiment, the performance of two auction rules for sponsored links; Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG), which is an incentive compatible mechanism with dominant strategy equilibrium; and ¡Ègeneralized second price¡É auction (GSP), which is commonly used by the major search engines. In the experiment, we observed no difference in the distribution of the revenues for a search engine in VCG and GSP, and equilibrium outcomes resulted more frequently in VCG. Furthermore, outcomes in VCG were more efficient than the outcomes of GSP. ¢¨¤Ê¤ª¡¤³«ºÅ¾ì½ê¤¬1¹æ´Û310¶µ¼¼¤ËÊѹ¹¤Ë¤Ê¤Ã¤Æ¤ª¤ê¤Þ¤¹¡¥ ¤ª´Ö°ã¤¨¤Î¤Ê¤¤¤è¤¦¤´Ãí°Õ²¼¤µ¤¤¡¥ |
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