予定表 -詳細情報-
| 件名 | LS 三谷羊平氏 |
| 開始日時 | 2008年 10月 14日 (火曜日) 12時10分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 終了日時 | 2008年 10月 14日 (火曜日) 12時50分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 場所 | 1号館3F 307教室 |
| 詳細 | 報告者：三谷羊平 (University of Colorado， Boulder) 発表タイトル：Public Goods Referenda without Perfectly Correlated Prices and Quantities (joint work with Nicholas Flores) 概要： Recent experimental economic studies of the validity of dichotomous choice contingent valuation (CV) indicate that consequentiality of a referendum vote is an important element for making the CV referendum be incentive compatible. In these previous studies， possible economic outcomes of a referendum are limited to only two outcomes: (1) the referendum is binding and therefore the good is provided and the payment is collected or (2) the eferendum is not binding and neither the good is provided nor is the payment collected. In these experiments， provision and payment are perfectly correlated when there is uncertainty over whether the referendum is binding. While studies to date provide important insights into CV referenda， a fundamentally important feature of CV referenda is overlooked. In instances where we typically need to apply CV referenda， prices (amount paid) and quantities (provision of the good) are rarely， if ever， perfectly correlated. Our research relaxes this assumption in an induced-value experimental setting as well as theoretical analysis and we gain new insights that are contrary to results from studies that utilize a perfectly correlated design. First， we explore the incentive properties of probabilistic referenda with and without a perfectly correlated design. Then， we provide an induced-value experimental test of our theoretical predictions. The results suggest that moving away from perfectly correlated prices and quantities undermines the incentive compatibility result found in other studies. The experimental results are consistent with choices made by risk-averse agents in our theoretical analysis. Our results in standard perfectly correlated induced-value experiments confirm previous findings of probabilistic referenda. Our results also suggest that a negative hypothetical bias possibly occurs even in consequential probabilistic referenda if there are four possible outcomes in respondents' cognitive processes and respondents have concave utility functions， implying that dichotomous choice CV possibly underestimates true values. Keywords: probabilistic referenda， incentive compatibility，hypothetical bias，contingent valuation，induced-values JEL Codes: C91(Laboratory， Individual behavior)， H41(Public goods)， Q51(Valuation of environmental effects) 【補足】 ※本研究は、大規模サンプルの世論調査において、いかに回答者のインセンティブをコントロールすることができるかという問いに対して、その可能性を示している。 実験室における被験者実験の要素を、インセンティブのコントロールが難しい世論調査（survey）に導入する際に幾つかの重要な示唆を与えると考えられる。 ・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・・ この研究会は参加資格を限定しないオープンなものであり、皆様の積極的なご参加をお待ちしております。 当日は昼食（ご飯弁当）をご用意させていただきます（限定45食）。お飲み物は各自ご持参ください。 なお，GLOPE IIプロジェクト参加学生は，授業等で出席できない場合を除き，本セミナーに参加することが求められます． |
| カテゴリー | 政治経済学基礎セミナー・ランチタイムセミナー |
