予定表 -詳細情報-
| 件名 | WS Dinko Dimitrov氏 |
| 開始日時 | 2008年 10月 3日 (金曜日) 16時20分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 終了日時 | 2008年 10月 3日 (金曜日) 17時50分 (GMT+09:00) |
| 場所 | 1号館2階現代政治経済研究所会議室 |
| 詳細 | 報告者：Dinko Dimitrov (ミュンヘン大学) タイトル：Coalitional Matchings アブストラクト A coalitional matching is a two-sided matching problem in which agents on each side of the market may form coalitions such as student groups and research teams who - when matched - form universities. We assume that each researcher has preferences over the research teams he would like to work in and over the student groups he would like to teach to. Correspondingly， each student has preferences over the groups of students he wants to study with and over the teams of researchers he would like to learn from. In this setup， we examine how the existence of core stable partitions on the distinct market sides， the restriction of agents' preferences over groups to strict orderings， and the extent to which individual preferences respect common rankings shape the existence of core stable coalitional matchings. |
| カテゴリー | ワークショップ・セミナー |
