# The Logic of Persistence and Breakdown of Rigged Electoral System and Democratization: An Empirical Exploration

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# Theories of Democratization

- Economic development/growth
- Pact between ancient regime elites and opposition elites
- Opposition party's behavior
- International factors
- Too many path, thus almost impossible to specify...

# My Findings

☐ The larger selectorate size* promotes democratic transition, but not liberalization *within* electoral autocracy.

* the number of people who engage in the selection of leader

☐ The higher competitiveness between ruling party/parties and the opposition elites leads to both liberalization *within* electoral autocracy and democratic transition.

# Roadmap

- Show the general trend of political regime development.

- Examine the recent theoretical account.

- Generate my hypotheses.

- Test the hypotheses quantitatively.

- Brief case study.

# Do Elections are Stolen?

- Growing interests in election rigging.

- Democracy and nondemocracy with adjectives

  (Levitsky & Way 1997, McFaul 2002, Ottaway 2003, Schedler 2002, Zakaria 1997).


- Overview the trend around the globe

  (Przeworski et al. 2000; Seki 2007, 2008)

# Political Regime 1946-2000

# Political Regime 1972-2000

# Political Regime 1946-2000

# Recent Theoretical Accounts

- Refinement of Dahl's classical conceptualization of political regime (Dahl 1971)

- 1. The Inclusiveness Dimension:

  The number of those who select the leader

  (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003)

- 2. The Contestation Dimension:

  Establishing subcategories of nondemocracy

  (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007, Geddes 1999)

# My Approach

- Distinguishing democratic transition from liberalization *within* electoral autocracy.

| Politically Closed Autocracy | Competitive Autocracy | Gray-zone | Electoral Democracy | Liberal Democracy |
|---|---|---|---|---|

# My Approach

- Refine the operationalization of selectorate size.



- Incorporate the contestation dimension.

# Hypotheses

☐ **Hypothesis 1:**

The more the electorate participates in elections, the more probable the redistribution policy of the government is inclined to public goods provision. It would render the alternation in power more plausible due to the nature of redistribution policy, and therefore democratic change is likely to follow in electoral autocracy.

☐ **Hypothesis 2:**

When the government party's share of seats in Parliament is small, the present winning coalition would become dubious about the future goods provision. The increasing uncertainty about the implementation of future redistribution policy would make the winning coalition more opportunistic, leading to higher probability of incumbent turnover and democratic change.

# Quantitative Analysis

☐ Observation: 1975-2000, 118 countries ($N$=1,630)

☐ Fixed effect multinomial logistic regression

☐ Independent variables:

    1. Voter turnout (selectorate size)

    2. Government party's seat share (degree of competition)

☐ Control variables:

    1. logged GDP per capita (level of economic development)

    2. Natural resource wealth (dependence on natural resource of national economy)

| Change to | Model 1 (from PCA) | | | | Model 2 (from CA) | | | | Model 3 (from GZ) | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | CA | GZ | ED | LD | PCA | GZ | ED | LD | PCA | CA | ED | LD |
| Selectorate | + | + | + | + | − | + | + | + | − | − | + | + |
| Incumbent | + | − | − | − | + | − | − | − | + | + | − | − |
| LogGDP | + | + | + | + | − | − | + | + | − | + | + | + |
| NRW | − | − | − | − | + | − | − | − | + | + | − | − |

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# Case Study: Serbia in the 1990's

- Serbia as a "most-likely" case of democratization

- Serbian political regime:

  1990-1999: Competitive Autocracy

  2000: Gray-zone (Fall of Milošević)

  2001: Electoral Democracy

# GDP per capita in Serbia

# Observable Implications of Key Variables

# Conclusion

- Increase observations, especially that of elections.

- Incorporate the effects of electoral institutions, presidential elections.

- Examine the relationship between redistribution policy and regime outcome.