

Expections, Institutions, and Global Society -An Economist's Comments on Political Scientists' Views -

Kaz Kiyono <sup>a</sup>

**Faculty of Political Scince & Economics** 

January 23, 2009

 $^{\mathrm{a}}$ Waseda University Global COE GLOPE-II Symposium



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist: (\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist: (\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - (-1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - (-1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Tomz's paper  $\rightarrow$  War! (^\_^;)
- Yasui's paper  $\rightarrow$  War!! (-\_-;)
- Naoi and Kume's paper  $\rightarrow$ Trade (^o^)/
- Questions of An Amateur Politcal-Economist:(\*o\*)!
  - -1) Why are political scientists so much interested in wars?
    - \* Any more words on peace and mutual prosperity?
    - \* Any ideas for preventing and terminating wars?
  - 2) Are questionnaires enough for international comparison of people's policiy evaluations?
    - \* Any need to account for differences in the economic structures?



- Is the War the War?
  - So many types of wars or conflicts
  - Any increasing trend today in local or domestic internal strifes?
  - Who are the leaders and what are the audience costs in those internal strifes?
    - \* Spontaneous formation of an aggressive group to trigger wars
    - \*  $\rightarrow$  Any theoretical contribution to explain and solve those wars?



### • Is the War the War?

- So many types of wars or conflicts
- Any increasing trend today in local or domestic internal strifes?
- Who are the leaders and what are the audience costs in those internal strifes?
  - \* Spontaneous formation of an aggressive group to trigger wars
  - \*  $\rightarrow$  Any theoretical contribution to explain and solve those wars?



- Is the War the War?
  - So many types of wars or conflicts
  - Any increasing trend today in local or domestic internal strifes?
  - Who are the leaders and what are the audience costs in those internal strifes?
    - \* Spontaneous formation of an aggressive group to trigger wars
    - \*  $\rightarrow$  Any theoretical contribution to explain and solve those wars?



- Is the War the War?
  - So many types of wars or conflicts
  - Any increasing trend today in local or domestic internal strifes?
  - Who are the leaders and what are the audience costs in those internal strifes?
    - \* Spontaneous formation of an aggressive group to trigger wars
    - \*  $\rightarrow$  Any theoretical contribution to explain and solve those wars?



- Is the War the War?
  - So many types of wars or conflicts
  - Any increasing trend today in local or domestic internal strifes?
  - Who are the leaders and what are the audience costs in those internal strifes?
    - \* Spontaneous formation of an aggressive group to trigger wars
    - \*  $\rightarrow$  Any theoretical contribution to explain and solve those wars?



- Is the War the War?
  - So many types of wars or conflicts
  - Any increasing trend today in local or domestic internal strifes?
  - Who are the leaders and what are the audience costs in those internal strifes?
    - \* Spontaneous formation of an aggressive group to trigger wars
    - \*  $\rightarrow$  Any theoretical contribution to explain and solve those wars?



- Is the War the War?
  - So many types of wars or conflicts
  - Any increasing trend today in local or domestic internal strifes?
  - Who are the leaders and what are the audience costs in those internal strifes?
    - \* Spontaneous formation of an aggressive group to trigger wars
    - \*  $\rightarrow$  Any theoretical contribution to explain and solve those wars?



- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - **ANALYSIS DONE** by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence
  - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON
    - \* Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
      - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
    - \* Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
    - \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - **ANALYSIS DONE** by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence
  - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON
    - \* Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
      - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
    - \* Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
    - \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - ANALYSIS DONE by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence
  - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON
    - \* Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
      - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
    - \* Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
    - \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - ANALYSIS DONE by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence
  - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON
    - \* Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
      - as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
    - \* Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
    - \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - ANALYSIS DONE by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence

### - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON

- \* Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
  - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
- \* Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
- \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - ANALYSIS DONE by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence
  - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON
    - $\ast\,$  Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
      - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
    - \* Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
    - \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - ANALYSIS DONE by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence
  - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON
    - \* Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
      - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
    - \* Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
    - \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - ANALYSIS DONE by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence

### - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON

- $\ast\,$  Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
  - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
- $\ast\,$  Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
- \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace

- Any possible role of a global institution for peac keeping?
  - ANALYSIS DONE by Tomz and Yasui
    - \* Mechanism for a war to break out in its absence

### - WE WANT DISCUSSIONS ON

- \* Any difference between inter-country wars and civil wars
  - $\cdot$  as well as possible involvments by other countries or groups
- $\ast\,$  Occurrence and duration of a war in its presence
- \* Requisites for the global institution to "effectively" keep global peace



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



#### • Audience-cost argument

- No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
- provided that people can express their ideas
  - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
  - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - $-\,$  provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - $-\,$  provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - $-\,$  provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - $-\,$  provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - $-\,$  provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?


- Audience-cost argument
  - No difference both in democracies and autocracies I agree (Tomz)
  - $-\,$  provided that people can express their ideas
    - \* Legitimacy hinges on people's accepting the current polity
    - \* Risk of revolutions  $\leftrightarrow$  Costs of King's patternalism
- Informational assymetry between the leader and the people ... Really a problem? even in democracies with diverse information networks?
  - American dissatisfaction with the US involvement in Iraq
    - \* Any theory to explain the leader's retreat?
  - What robust theories of war for what countries in what period?



- **Question** Audience costs are exogenous?
  - May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
    - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
    - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
      - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
      - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
      - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



**Question** Audience costs are exogenous?

- May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
  - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
  - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
    - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
    - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
    - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



- **Question** Audience costs are exogenous?
  - May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
    - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
    - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
      - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
      - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
      - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



- **Question** Audience costs are exogenous?
  - May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
    - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
    - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
      - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
      - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
      - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



- **Question** Audience costs are exogenous?
  - May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
    - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
    - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
      - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
      - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
      - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



- **Question** Audience costs are exogenous?
  - May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
    - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
    - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
      - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
      - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
      - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



- **Question** Audience costs are exogenous?
  - May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
    - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
    - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
      - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
      - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
      - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



- **Question** Audience costs are exogenous?
  - May be endogenous to some extent I agree (Yasui)
    - \* Effects of a Leader's commitment
    - \* Effects of other structural (social, economic, and historical) factors?
      - German's acceptance of Nazi and Hitler (Gellately (2001))
      - Japanese acceptance of the Asian expansionary policy (Kato (2007))
      - Any roles by the mass media? education or ways of "enlightenment"?



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet~$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $-W_i$  = gains when country *i* wins
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games

- Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $-W_i$  = gains when country *i* wins
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet~$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet~$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet~$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i$  wins
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Standard or traditional view ... Zero-sum games
  - Really proper model formulation?
- $\bullet~$  War  $\leftrightarrow$  Conflict to have a full command over a certain resource
  - Incentive to make a war  $\Uparrow$ 
    - \* More gains from the full command
- A MODEL 2 countries (A & B) in a conflict
  - $W_i = \text{gains when country } i \text{ wins}$
  - $L_i$ =gains when country i loses
  - $C_i$ =maximum costs for war by country  $i = W_i L_i$
  - $C_A > C_B \iff W_A L_A > W_B L_B$
  - $-\iff W_A+L_B>W_B+L_A$
  - The world is better off (?) when country A wins.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Starting point: Finding of Hiscox (2007) that American citizens are protectionist
- Puzzle proposed
  - What interests are revealed by American citizens in Hiscox's research?
    - \* Producers?, Consumers?, or Individuals?
  - $\leftarrow$  Questionnaire by priming
- Interesting Finding
  - Japan-US difference: The US citizens are more protectionist,
    but the Japanese citizens (as consumers) are less protectionist.



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



- Two countries trade only when there is a difference in their comparative advantage
- HO Factor-Proportion Theory based on a 2-factor-2-good model
  - The country exports the good using more inensively the factor more abundant than the other country.
  - **Examples** 1) Capital (or land) and labor, 2)Skilled labor and unskilled labor
  - The holders of the less abundant resource dislike free trade, but the others welcome free trade.
- US=capital abundant, Japan=labor abundant
  - The US workers dislike free trade but the Japanese workers love free trade.
- Need to consider the differences in their trade & industrial structures



#### Reference

### References

GELLATELY, R. (2001): Backing Hitler, Oxford University Press.

KATO, Y.(加藤陽子) (2007): *Pre-modern and Modern Japanse Hisotry of Wars*(戦争の日本近現代史),Kodan-sha.

POAST, P. (2006): *The Economics of War*, McGraw-Hill Companies.