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The Logic of Persistence and Breakdown of Rigged Electoral System and Democratization: An Empirical Exploration

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1. Introduction

“Waves” of democratization from the nineteenth century to date have spread democratic regimes around the globe (Huntington 1991). One of the major characteristics of these regimes, especially in the recent decades, is that they continuously hold elections to directly or indirectly select the executive and legislative branches. The founding election has often been regarded as establishing democratic regime by outside observers. Nevertheless, it is also true that there have emerged regimes where rulers intend to exploit elections in order to obtain and maintain their legitimacy to govern. So-called “fallacy of electoralism” depicts the global phenomenon that elections are rigged in certain countries, denouncing democratic institutions in these regimes are merely nominal or façade (Schmitter & Karl 1991). Here, scholars acknowledge that election is a necessary condition for democracy, but not a sufficient condition (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 13).

Scholars of nondemocratic regime have concentrated on non-institutional characteristics of the regime (Arendt 1973, Linz 1975, Tullock 1987, Wintrobe 1998), because they defined dictatorships as regimes in which a single tyrant governs alone through the use of credible threats, exploits the inability of his¹ subjects to coordinate against him, and is not subject to any external constraint or influence (Boix & Svolik 2007: 1).² The strong assumption underlying their works is that rulers in nondemocracy have free-hand to arbitrarily nullify the institution in their countries, and therefore there is no room to think about the meaning of institution; i.e. constitution, parliament, and electoral law. This conceptual understanding, however, lacks explanatory rigor when considering new types of authoritarian rule in contemporary era.

Lacking the insight into the institutional aspects of nondemocracy undermines our understanding of authoritarian elections. They, in reality, vary country to country, year to year.

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¹ According to Gandhi and Przeworski, “except for women who served as interim leaders – Queens Dzeliwe and Ntombi in Swaziland during the early 1980s, Ertha Pascal-Trouillot in Haiti in 1990 and Ruth Perry in Liberia in 1996 – dictators are men (Gandhi & Przeworski 2006: 1).”

² As Boix and Svolik note, Linz is a partial exception since he also treats the regimes other than totalitarianism.

In some elections, authoritarian rulers cannot maintain the absolute majority,³ in others manage to possess slightly over the half of the seats,⁴ or in some others dominate almost all the seats in the legislature.⁵ Moreover, history witnesses that the survival of rigged electoral regime shows great variance across the globe. Mexico, Malaysia, and Egypt, for instance, experience long lasting authoritarian elections for decades, while countries such as Croatia and Serbia transited to democracy just after ten-year dictatorial period. The variation in authoritarian elections is counterintuitive, because we can easily ask why not dictators steal the elections and obtain an overwhelming majority in the legislature in order to secure their rule. It seems therefore reasonable to assume that even dictators have a limit of control to some extent. In other words, their domination is conditional upon exogenous factors.

Scholars have focused on socio-economic conditions favoring democratic transition (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006, Boix 2003, Moore 1966) or treated the interaction and agreement between political elites who induce the regime change regardless of these structural conditions (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, Rustow 1970). However, their insights fail to consider the dynamic working under authoritarian elections and its implication to regime change, i.e. transition to democracy. This article aims at getting elections back into the analysis of regime change, based upon the recent theoretical refinement of the classical conceptualization of Dahl's two dimensions of political regime, that is competitiveness and inclusiveness.

The argumentation proceeds as follows. First, I briefly exhibit the fact that the number of rigged electoral system increases around the globe. Second, competitiveness and inclusiveness dimensions of political regime are revisited and I hypothesize the logic of the collapse of electoral autocracy and democratic transition. Third, the hypothesis is

³ Examples are Brazil (1975-1976), Kazakhstan (2000-2004), Kuwait (1993-2003), Morocco (1982-1984), and Tajikistan (1996-2000) (Beck et al. 2001)

⁴ Examples are Azerbaijan (1996-1999), Belarus (1997), Cameroon (1993-1997), Kenya (1993-2001), South Korea (1982-1986), Morocco (1994-1997, 1999-2004), Togo (1995-1996), and Zimbabwe (2001-2004) (Beck et al. 2001).

⁵ Examples are Albania (1997), Burkina Faso (1998-2000), Cambodia (1999-2003), Cameroon (2003-2004), Egypt (2001-2004), Equatorial Guinea (1994-1999, 2000-2004), Ethiopia (1999-2000), Gambia (2002-2004), Haiti (2001-2003), Indonesia (1975-1977), Ivory Coast (1991-1996, 1997-1998), Jordan (1998, 2001-2003), Laos (2003-2004), Madagascar (1990), Mauritania (1997-2001), Morocco (1978-1981), Singapore (1993-1995, 1997-2004), Sudan (2001-2004), Taiwan (1984-1986, 1991), Togo (2000-2002, 2003-2004), Tunisia (1987-1989, 1995-1999), Vietnam (2003-2004), Zimbabwe (1991-1995, 1996-2000). The cases where all the seats are dominated by the government party/parties are excluded (Beck et al. 2001).

examined by quantitative analysis, suggesting that increase in the selectorate size and decrease in the ruling party's seat share in the legislature has a role to promote democratic transition and/or liberalization *within* electoral autocracy. Fourth, a case study of Serbia, which can be regarded as the most-likely case of democratization, but whose logic of authoritarian survival had not been explained yet, examines whether the hypothesized mechanism really worked out. The last section concludes.

2. The Facts: Emerging Rigged Electoral Systems around The Globe

Elections prevail around the world, be it a regime democratic or not. We can no longer be optimistic by saying that once elections are taken place, a regime is deemed as democratic. Growing number of literature add adjectives to the term, democracy or authoritarianism, in order to differentiate rigged electoral system from “real” established democracies. Names such as electoral or competitive authoritarianism and illiberal or partial democracy are stark examples (McFaul 2002, Ottaway 2003, Schedler 2002, Zakaria 1997). Is the shared perspective that rigged electoral system is haunting the world plausible? First agenda of the paper is to examine the proposition.


For that purpose, I consult two datasets of political regime both of which cover the countries around the globe. First one is the data collected by Przeworski and colleagues (Przeworski et al. 2000). Their data is updated and covers the countries from 1946 to 2002. It is one of the most referred materials in the studies of regime change. Their classification is dichotomous, and therefore a political regime is identified as either democracy or autocracy. Another regime data is derived from my own work which covers the countries from 1972 to 2004 (Seki 2007, 2008b). The dataset has five categories of political regime, including two subtypes of democracy and three subtypes of nondemocracy according to the degree of political liberalization. Here I employ the data only to determine whether a regime is democratic or not. In terms of dichotomous classification, the measurement of two datasets has 91% of correlation, thus the convergent validity of the measurement is sufficiently assured. As for elections, the database of International IDEA is employed to see whether legislative elections are held in a given country. Since the election date has missing values after the year 2001, for the sake of showing the global trend of emerging rigged electoral system, I use the date until 2000. Nondemocracy holding elections is named “Electoral

Autocracy” and the other autocracy “Other Autocracy.”⁶ Since no democracy is possible without elections, regimes classified as democracy in the two datasets are named “Democracy.”

Figure 1 shows the global trend of democracy (Democracy), rigged electoral system (Electoral Autocracy), and other types of autocracy (Other Autocracy). Until the end of 1960’s, the number of rigged electoral system had been fewer than twenty, while the number of other types of autocracy doubled or even tripled after 1960. In 1970’s and 80’s the trend had been stable and the number of Electoral Autocracy had been around twenty five and that of Other Autocracy around seventy, though we can see gradual development of democracy particularly in 1980’s. After the end of the Cold War, the world shows a quite different picture. On one hand, democracy flourishes. On the other hand, rigged electoral system outnumbers the other types of autocracy in the midst of 1990’s.

In sum, the observed rigged electoral regimes are not sporadic, but are systematically developed after the last decade. Electoral autocracy outnumbers the other types of autocracy. Thus, the facts call attention to the growing necessity of scrutinizing the logic of persistence of and democratic change from this particular type of regime, rigged electoral system.

Figure 1: Political Regime 1946-2000



⁶ The category includes countries such as military regime and monarchy, but some of them hold elections.

3. Theoretical Accounts

The above-mentioned evidence necessitates us to explain the logic of survival and demise of rigged electoral system. Even in autocracy, electoral dynamics are supposed to influence the fate of the regime, as history witnesses dictators are not only replaced by their death, but also overthrown via electoral process (Howard & Roessler 2006). Nonetheless, democratization literature has paid less attention to the role of elections, or more generally speaking the role of institutions, in autocracy, because some scholars have focused more on the non-institutional aspects of authoritarian rule. Modernization theory hypothesizes the level of economic development as the explanatory factor of political development (Lerner 1958, Lipset 1959). The actor-centric approach as a strong critique to the structuralist approach emphasizes that the interaction of political elites in the transition period determines the consequence of political regime (O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, Rustow 1970). This approach, however, often assumes that actors engaging in the process of regime change behave independently from any structural and institutional constraints, and consequently falls into the indeterminacy of the outcome. In other words, allegedly unconstrained nature of human behavior renders the prediction of regime outcome difficult (Bratton & van de Walle 1997: 26).

The present objective is to elaborate the logic of democratization from electoral autocracy and liberalization *within* electoral autocracy by taking into consideration whether this particular regime type preceding regime change affects the outcome. There are two strategies to tackle with the issue. One is to compare the regime change from electoral autocracy with that from other types of autocracy such as monarchy and military regime. Another is to take a closer look at the different degrees of liberalization *within* the category of rigged electoral system. This paper chooses the latter because the research interest is centered on the mechanism working in authoritarian elections *per se*. Moreover, it would be strong to assume that the mechanism of the survival of and regime change from rigged electoral system is uniform regardless of the level of liberalization. A comparative investigation of logic of regime change is an agenda for the future research. In such a way, the implication of theoretical account of this research would be in a middle-range (Sartori 1970), in a sense that it does not suggest the logic as broadly as studies of regime change from autocracy to democracy with dichotomous measure.

When we keep in mind the level of political liberalization, it is helpful to revisit the

classical conceptualization of Dahl's two dimensions of political regime: namely inclusiveness/participation and public contestation (Dahl 1971: 7). His proposition is that political regime is understood as an amalgam of these dimensions, though in some occasion they develop independently. Delimiting only two dimensions to grasp the nature of political regime constitutes a basis of procedural minimum definition of democracy, which has strong impact on subsequent studies of regime change (Huntington 1991, O'Donnell & Schmitter 1986, Przeworski et al. 2000).

However, the two-dimensional approach itself has lost attention and political regime has long been treated as unidimensional. The inclusiveness/participation dimension is perceived as marginal because we see almost no variation in the dimension across countries, particularly after the Second World War. As Przeworski and colleagues note, it is taken for granted that suffrage will be universal after the War (Przeworski et al. 2000: 16). Indeed, in terms of constitutional provision, most countries nowadays address that every citizen are granted right to vote, be the regime democratic or not (Przeworski 2007).⁷ Implicitly or explicitly accepting the view, subsequent research has concentrated on conceptualizing and measuring the contestation dimension of political regime. Although Dahl's proposition is to capture both dimensions by degree, many scholars shift to establish a carefully-crafted threshold which distinguishes democracy from nondemocracy, rendering the dichotomous classification the dominant way (Boix 2003, Przeworski et al. 2000). As a matter of fact, this strategy is advantageous in that it maintains the conceptual parsimony of regime type and simplifies the mechanism hypothesized in the empirical analyses.

However, there have recently emerged new insights into the both dimensions. The characteristics of those studies are that they incorporate institutional aspects of political regime in autocracy. In other words, they take into consideration endogeneity of actor's behavior to political institutions in the analysis of dictatorial survival and political liberalization. First, scholars realize that dictatorship can be classified into several subcategories. Linz would represent the first generation of this trend who establishes subtypes of autocracy such as totalitarianism, post-totalitarianism, authoritarianism, and sultanism (Linz 1975, Linz & Stepan 1996). Huntington and Geddes are in the next

⁷ Of course, there are scholars who argue, taking into account the practice of enfranchisement, that ignoring the dimension of inclusiveness has possibility to render the concept of democracy discriminative in terms of ethnicity and/or gender (Doorenspleet 2004: 321, Diamond 1996: 22).

generation who in turn categorize single-party, personal, military dictatorships and conduct systematic analyses of the logic behind the patterns of regime change (Geddes 1999, Huntington 1991). Geddes found, for example, that the average survival year of autocracy varies according to the regime category (Geddes 1999: 133). Most recently, Gandhi and Przeworski make use of three-fold subcategories of autocracy: monarchy, military dictatorship, and civilian dictatorship in the empirical analysis. Their findings suggest that the regime type and other factors such as resources available to the dictator determine their need to institutionalize/liberalize political arena in order to gain support from the outsiders in society (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007: 1287). Those researches are all aimed at identifying different nature of contestation found in subtypes of autocracy. In such a way, the contestation dimension is refined and it becomes possible to avoid overgeneralizing the mechanism of regime change by specifying the logic in accordance with each trajectory of authoritarian breakdown and democratization.

Second, the inclusiveness dimension is also reexamined in the recent theoretical exploration. In the seminal work on the logic of incumbent survival, Bueno de Mesquita and his collaborators underline the role of what they term “selectorate,” that is those who are qualified to select the leader. They argue that the size of the selectorate and/or the winning coalition conditions the leader’s choice of public and/or private goods provision. The more numerous the size of the selectorate (and therefore that of the winning coalition) is, the more political leaders are inclined to public goods provision to the people (which includes both the winning coalition and other citizens who support opposition elites). On the contrary, when the size of the selectorate is small, political leaders are more likely to shift to private goods provision exclusively toward a segment of people who in fact declare supports to the incumbent leaders, i.e. the winning coalition. The size of the selectorate and the winning coalition not only affects the redistribution policy, but also has implication to regime outcome. Since public goods are, by its own nature, provided to the citizens as a whole and cannot always oblige the winning coalition to support the government, the inclination to public goods provision increases the probability of incumbent turnover. Put in other words, since public goods are “publicly” provided, the selectorate is more likely to be indifferent about the choice of the leader and his/her policy, thus the incumbent can be fragile when an opposition leader is able to offer more attractive public policy to the people. (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003: 77-126). As the incumbent turnover in autocracy sometimes results in democratic

transition, the theory has an implication to regime change literature.

Hence, the recent theoretical accounts bring new perspective into Dahl's classical conceptualization of political regime. What is shared by the inquiries above is that they try to take a closer look at the variation existing in either contestation or inclusiveness dimension. There is, of course, a tradeoff to consider the difference in these dimensions by descending the ladder of abstraction, because it often prevents scholars from simplifying their theory, which sacrifices the applicability of the theory to some extent.

As for our purpose of this article, we need to investigate whether the works discussed above have explanatory rigor when thinking about the survival and collapse of rigged electoral autocracy. The answer is that they are still underway to reach the solution. On the one hand, establishing subcategories of autocracy in the light of public contestation certainly approaches to uncover the mechanism working in the electoral autocracy. However, its primary concern is comparing different types of system, thus the treatment of electoral dynamics under autocracy is still insufficient. Despite the possible decrease in the scope of theory, we need more to descend the ladder of generality and concentrate on the studies of electoral autocracy *per se*. Moreover, there are critiques such that setting nominally distinguished subtypes of autocracy sometimes undermines our understanding of authoritarian politics. For example, Lust-Okar claims that monarchies such as Jordan and Morocco have different structure of contestation. Thus, her research objective requires us to put aside the nominal categorization of autocracy (Lust-Okar 2005: 170). When we focus on rigged electoral system alone, it would be necessary to grasp the degree of liberalization which the regime enjoys until the regime change. In so doing, we can fulfill the gap in the previous literature of electoral autocracy. The measurement is possible by employing my dataset mentioned above which reflects the qualitatively differentiated level of political liberalization under autocracy.

On the other hand, the alternative assessment of inclusiveness dimension, namely the selectorate theory, should also be scrutinized. Although focusing on the size of the selectorate and the winning coalition rather than the constitutional provision is a breakthrough to reveal the electoral dynamic in autocracy, the operationalization of the concept by Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues is based on the political institutions. (Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003: 133-140). It is partly because their interest lies in not only rigged electoral system, but also the other types of dictatorship such as monarchy and military

Figure 2





Figure 3



regime. Hence, they operationalize the concept according to Polity IV data, coding the variable 0 for the regime without legislature, 1 the regime with legislature but it is chosen by heredity or ascription or chosen by the executive, and 2 the regime with legislature whose member are directly or indirectly selected by popular elections. However, once the research interest is specifically in the variation existing in rigged electoral systems, it would be an appropriate way to measure the variable by election results, which is not possible when autocracy without elections is encompassed in the analysis. This approach has a merit because it can observe the variation of the selectorate and winning coalition size among electoral autocracies. My alternative operationalization of the concept is drawn in Figure 3, while that of Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues is summarized in Figure 2. As is apparent in Figure 3, my approach distinguishes the selectorate from the electorate, because not all citizens granted right to vote participate in elections.⁸ Election data are derived from the record of legislative elections. The measurement of both the selectorate size is discussed in detail in the next section.

Another criticism to the selectorate theory is somewhat overarching the two dimensions of political regime, as they both constitute the nature of political regime. The view that the selectorate size affects the redistribution policy and the fate of regime is certainly based upon the strategic choice of those who select the leader. However, we also

⁸ In this article, I follow the usage of the term by Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues. However, scholars point out that the word, "selectorate," had been used to represent the group of people who are in charge of candidate selections for elections. In communist Poland, for example, the term was employed to refer to the top official of communist party (personal conversation with prof. Takayuki Ito, November.07.2008)

need to recognize the competition between candidates and/or parties when elections exist. Since the share of the seat in Parliament differs even in autocracy, it is supposed to provide an information shortcut to the electorate when they vote. If the ruling elites overwhelmingly dominate the legislature, the electorate will perceive that they win the next election with a high probability. The credibility of implementation of redistribution policy in favor of the winning coalition would depend on the extent to which the leadership of ruling elites is robust and stable. Hence, the degree of erosion in the incumbency needs to be taken into consideration in the analysis. In this sense, the ruling elites' share of seats in the legislature relative to the opposition camp is a variable worth examining, because the seat share is an indicator which represents at least the voter's subjective probability of stability of the present government. If the ruling elites dominate the legislature with enough margin their supporters are likely to vote for the incumbent in the next election.⁹

It seems that this perspective may contradict the implication of the selectorate theory, since the greater incumbent seat share would correlate to the larger size of the selectorate and the winning coalition. However, the correlation coefficient between the sizes of seat share and the selectorate is only -.233 in my large-N analysis below. Thus, it is plausible to investigate the extent to which a trade-off exists for the ruling party between diminishing the selectorate size and increasing the seat share in the legislature. Also, the level of incumbent's erosion can be a function of the regime type. In this regard, the more repressive the regime is, the less the opposition's seat share may be. This variable, by its own nature, would matter in more politically liberalized countries rather than highly oppressive states. It implies that the political institution behaves differently according to the regime types.

In sum, I suggest to revisit the recent theoretical accounts on regime change in the following three ways: First, political regime, the dependent variable of this study, is conceptualized in terms of the level of repression. Although the recent literature tries to establish subtypes of autocracy, I only focus on one type of it, that is rigged electoral system. However, as is put differently, the level of repression *within* electoral autocracy is measured. This approach descends the ladder of abstraction, but is pertinent to examine thoroughly the

⁹ Of course, my criticism to the selectorate theory is not sufficient yet in a sense that I do not formally describe the logic as is done by Bueno de Mesquita and colleagues. The construction of the hypothesis with game theory is a future research agenda.

electoral dynamics in autocracy and its implication to political liberalization. Second, the selectorate theory gives us a new insight into the study of regime survival and change. Again, in order to scrutinize the mechanism working in authoritarian elections, I make use of voter turnout as a measure of the selectorate size, which enables us to observe the variation in the sizes of selectorate across electoral autocracies. Third, the strategic interaction between political elites and the selectorate would be conditional upon the credibility of incumbent's implementing future redistribution policy. The subjective expectation of the electorate about incumbent reelection would be a function of the seat share realized in the present legislature, because it provides a heuristic to voters at the moment of elections. To sum up, my hypotheses are formulated as follows.

Hypothesis 1:

The more the electorate participates in elections (i.e. the larger the selectorate size is), the more probable the redistribution policy of the government is inclined to public goods provision. It would render the alternation in power more plausible due to the nature of redistribution policy, and therefore democratic change is likely to follow in electoral autocracy.

Hypothesis 2:

When the government party's share of seats in the legislature is small, the present winning coalition would become dubious about the future goods provision from the ruling elites. The increasing uncertainty about the implementation of future redistribution policy may make the winning coalition more opportunistic, leading to higher probability of incumbent turnover and democratic change.

In the following sections, I test these hypotheses both with quantitative and qualitative empirical analyses. We start from a large-N statistical test of causal effects in general and then proceed to a case study of electoral autocracy in the Republic of Serbia during the 1990's.

4. Quantitative Analysis

The purpose of the statistical analysis is to test whether the hypotheses constructed above are valid. I test the hypotheses by employing a dataset which captures the different degree of liberalization *within* electoral autocracy and democracy. Before proceeding to the tests, I briefly explain the variables incorporated in the analyses.

The dependent variable of the analysis is political regime. I use a dataset which classifies political regime into five qualitatively distinguished categories, including two subtypes of democracy and three subtypes of nondemocracy, by introducing latent class analysis of structural equation modeling (see Seki 2007, 2008b for detail). In terms of the level of liberalization, *Liberal Democracy* (LD) represents the most democratic regime. *Electoral Democracy* (ED) is another category of democracy which satisfies the procedural minimum definition of democracy, but lacks some aspects of contestation and/or inclusiveness dimension. The other three categories are fallen in nondemocracy. Among others, *Gray-zone* (GZ) is a regime which is perceived as “diminished subtype” of democracy which does not assure some aspects of the procedural minimum definition of democracy (Collier & Levitsky 1997). A less liberalized nondemocracy than *Gray-zone* is then named *Competitive Authoritarianism* (CA) which still exhibits competition among political elites and/or assures right to vote to some segments of citizen. The most repressive nondemocracy is identified as *Politically Closed Authoritarianism* (PCA).

The statistical model employed in the analysis is fixed effect multinomial logistic regression. The choice of the model depends on the theoretical interest. The reason why multiple regression and ordered logistic regression are not adopted is that we have a threshold between democracy and nondemocracy in the spectrum of political regime. If we use statistical models other than multinomial logistic regression, we assume that any one unit change in the dependent variable such as change from PCA to CA and change from GZ to ED is treated as the same. In other words, we must ignore the threshold between democracy and nondemocracy, presupposing as the same democratic transition, further democratization *within* democracy, and liberalization *within* autocracy. Also crucial is that regime change is not always from a category to its contiguous category in the unidimensional spectrum of political regime in terms of the degree of liberalization: not only a regime change from GZ to ED, but also that from CA to ED, for instance, occurred often in history (Seki 2007: 27). In this regard, it is better to consider regime change as discrete

choice between several categories. When estimating parameters, we need to take into account the lagged regime type. Since we are assessing the causal effects of regime change, the information about the former regime type is necessary. In the multinomial model, the lagged regime type is introduced as a dummy variable which corresponds to the base category. In such a way, we can estimate the causal effects of independent variables to choose a regime type at a time t relative to the base category which continues from a time point $t-1$. Also, the data has panel structure, thus fixed effect model is introduced to control country specific effects. As this paper is interested in the electoral dynamics of authoritarian elections and its implication to the regime change, we estimate following three models in which the base category is one of the subtypes of autocracy. They are formally described as below.

Model 1: Regime Change from *Politically Closed Authoritarianism**

$$\log (P(\text{REGIME}_{i,t}) / P(\text{REGIME}_{\text{PCA},t})) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 * X_{t-1} + \beta_3 * \text{REGIME}_{\text{PCA},t-1}$$

Model 2: Regime Change from *Competitive Authoritarianism**

$$\log (P(\text{REGIME}_{i,t}) / P(\text{REGIME}_{\text{CA},t})) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 * X_{t-1} + \beta_3 * \text{REGIME}_{\text{CA},t-1}$$

Model 3: Regime Change from *Gray-zone**

$$\log (P(\text{REGIME}_{i,t}) / P(\text{REGIME}_{\text{GZ},t})) = \beta_1 + \beta_2 * X_{t-1} + \beta_3 * \text{REGIME}_{\text{GZ},t-1}$$

*All models are estimated by fixed effect multinomial logistic regression where the base category coincides with the $\text{REGIME}_{j,t-1}$. X_{t-1} is the vector of independent variables.

We have two independent variables and two additional control variables. The first independent variable to test the Hypothesis 1 is voter turnout (S). It is a proxy of the selectorate size. The data is from International IDEA (Parvap), which records the turnout in parliamentary elections measured as the total number of votes cast divided by the voting age population. The hypothesis claims that the larger the selectorate size is, the more probable democratic change from a subtype of electoral autocracy. Ideally, we also need a measure for the size of winning coalition, but the systematic collection of that data is not

available yet. If the ratio of voters who cast their votes to the government party in relation to the total number of electorate is available, we can incorporate the role of winning coalition in the analysis. Measurement of this variable is an issue for the further examination of the selectorate theory. The second independent variable for the Hypothesis 2 is the share of legislative seats of ruling party (INCUMB_SHARE). This is the fraction of seats held by the government. It is calculated by dividing the number of government seats by total seats (Beck et al. 2001). It is hypothesized that the greater the government party's share of seats in Assembly is, a subtype of electoral autocracy would sustain and its democratic change be impeded.

The two control variables are the level of economic development (LOGGDP) and the dependence of national economy on the revenue from natural resource (NRW). The effect of economic development is measured by natural logarithm of GDP per capita (Penn World Table 6.2). The reason why we introduce the variable is that the proposition of modernization theory is still plausible in the studies of democratization (Epstein et al. 2006), though the role of economic prosperity is underspecified and multiple causal mechanisms would be elaborated. If modernization theory is valid, the variable contributes to enhance democratic change. Another control variable, NRW, is the abbreviation of Natural Resource Wealth. This variable is incorporated because the unearned income via natural resources is conceived as a strong indicator explaining the capacity of redistribution of a country. It is often stated that the dependency on NRW is an obstacle to democratization (Ross 2001). The variable is calculated by four variables collected by World Development Indicators: fuel exports (% of merchandise exports), ore and metal exports (% of merchandise exports), merchandise exports (current US\$), and GNI (current US\$).

Table 1 summarizes the result.¹⁰ The observation is from 1975 to 2000. Due to missing data, 118 countries and 1630 country-years are analyzed here. First, the table shows that the selectorate size certainly affects the democratic transition of rigged electoral system. In all three models, the larger selectorate size contributes to promote democratic transition, that is transition which transcends the threshold of procedural minimum definition of democracy. However, as for liberalization *within* autocracy, this variable does not have

¹⁰ Since the regime change from *Electoral Democracy* and *Liberal Democracy*, namely the regime change *within* democracy and democratic breakdown, is not an issue of the present study, I do not report the parameter estimates here. The results are available upon request.

Table 1: Regime Change from Electoral Autocracy, 1975-2000

REGIME _t	Model 1 (from PCA)				Model 2 (from CA)				Model 3 (from GZ)			
	CA	GZ	ED	LD	PCA	GZ	ED	LD	PCA	CA	ED	LD
S_{t-1}	1.09 (1.35)	1.30 (1.89)	4.25* (2.23)	8.09*** (2.80)	-.40 (1.64)	.37 (.77)	3.16** (1.42)	5.58** (2.50)	-2.15 (1.73)	-1.02 (1.27)	1.79* (.99)	5.56** (2.24)
INCUMB_SHARE _{t-1}	1.39 (1.70)	-.46 (1.71)	-2.76^ (1.81)	-1.88 (2.28)	1.46 (1.86)	-1.56^ (1.02)	-3.63*** (1.26)	-2.76^ (1.84)	3.84** (1.94)	2.47** (1.00)	-1.90** (.86)	-.28 (1.67)
LOGGDP _{t-1}	1.14*** (.39)	1.07*** (.41)	1.07*** (.41)	4.67*** (.64)	-1.22*** (.43)	-.02 (.24)	.32 (.28)	3.71*** (.64)	-1.32*** (.40)	.17 (.23)	.50** (.86)	3.61*** (.54)
NRW _{t-1}	-1.06 (2.94)	-2.70 (3.04)	-2.70 (3.04)	-7.35* (4.17)	1.90 (2.85)	-.74 (2.18)	-3.24* (1.90)	-4.81* (2.73)	5.04* (2.58)	1.27 (1.91)	-4.09* (2.26)	-4.72^ (2.93)
REGIME _{t-1}	-4.59*** (.65)	-5.68*** (.93)	-5.68*** (.93)	-42.14*** (.73)	-4.60*** (.70)	-5.62*** (.49)	-7.57*** (.80)	-40.89*** (.90)	-4.59*** (.81)	-5.23*** (.47)	-4.88*** (.31)	-37.11*** (.49)
Constant	-7.10* (3.81)	-5.03 (4.03)	-8.09** (4.02)	-40.05*** (6.76)	8.93** (3.99)	3.80* (2.17)	1.17 (2.61)	-31.52*** (6.34)	8.09** (3.18)	-.76 (1.96)	-1.38 (2.14)	-32.84*** (5.94)
N	1630				1630				1630			
N of cluster (country)	118				118				118			
Log pseudolikelihood	-1353.93				-1039.70				-1047.06			
Prob > Chi^2	.00				.00				.00			
Pseudo R^2	.39				.53				.52			

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$, ^ $p < 0.15$, Fixed effect multinomial regression. Robust standard error is in parenthesis.

PCA: Politically Closed Authoritarianism, CA: Competitive Authoritarianism, GZ: Gray-zone, ED: Electoral Democracy, and LD: Liberal Democracy.

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statistically significant effects, while the direction of coefficients is all compatible with theoretical expectation. Second, the role of incumbent's domination of legislature presents different results. In most cases, the direction of parameter estimates is in line with the theoretical expectation. Larger seat share of the ruling elites in Parliament undermines democratic change. However, their statistical significance is conditional upon the patterns of regime change. In regime changes from PCA (Model 1) the variable has almost no statistically significant effect. It is tentatively interpreted that the most repressive sort of electoral autocracy reduces the role of political institutions. In contrast to Model 1, regime changes from CA exhibit a different picture. Although the statistical significance of coefficients is relatively weak, the variable influences the regime outcome. Democratic transitions to ED and LD depend on the performance of the incumbent's seat share. Moreover, liberalization *within* autocracy, namely regime change from CA to GZ, is fostered by the variable. In Model 3, it is shown that the variable explains democratic transition from GZ to ED. In addition to that, authoritarian reversal such as regime changes from GZ to both CA and PCA is the consequence of legislative seat share of the government party. Hence, even though the role of these two independent variables is not uniform in every transition pattern, they are estimated as indicators which support our theoretical account, at least on the ground of estimating causal effects.

The causal effect of economic development synthesizes the propositions of modernization theory and its critiques. The direction of the coefficient, which the variable estimates, is consistent with the expectation of modernization theory; more prosperous country tends to be liberalized. However, taking into consideration statistical significance, we can see the variation between parameter estimates. In two patterns of liberalization from CA to GZ and ED and one pattern of authoritarian reversal from GZ to CA, the level of economic development does not promote regime change. These findings are partly consistent with the criticism to modernization theory which is represented by Przeworski and colleagues; democratic transition is not a consequence of economic development (Przeworski et al. 2000).¹¹ Dependence on natural resource revenue, in turn, shows a weak

¹¹ For the thorough examination of modernization theory and its critiques, we need to investigate regime change from ED and LD. I have conducted the statistical analysis in the other paper.

statistical significance level, but suggests that it is a factor undermining democratic transition. What is remarkable is that the variable hardly affects liberalization *within* autocracy. Even though the belief in oil curse is prevalent in conventional wisdom, the result underpins that natural resource wealth is an obstacle of democratic transition, but not of the erosion *within* electoral autocracy.

In sum, a quantitative analysis confirms the hypotheses discussed above. Parameter estimates are statistically significant and their direction is consistent with theoretical expectation after controlling the effects of other indicators such as the level of economic development and dependence on natural resource wealth of national economy, suggesting that the effects of key independent variables are robust. Note that the performance of the selectorate size and the ruling party's share of legislative seats are conditional upon the patterns of regime change. The next section conducts a brief case study in order to investigate whether the logic discussed above is supported in a qualitative manner.

5. Case Study: the Republic of Serbia in the 1990's

Case Selection

In the course of "revolutions" spread thorough Eastern Europe in the early 1990's, all countries abandoned the rule of communist party and introduced multiparty elections. The Republic of Serbia, which had been one of the republics constituting Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, was no exception. However, unlike Slovenia and Macedonia which were also the republics of Yugoslavia and immediately transited to democracy in the course of the dissolution of the Federation in 1991, electoral autocracy emerged in Serbia and Croatia. Serbian electoral autocracy represented as the dictatorship of Slobodan Milošević finally collapsed in 2000 and democratic transition followed.

However, the ten-year of authoritarian rule in Serbia emerged and sustained in the detrimental environment. First, the demonstration effect of democratization due to the

The result confirms the proposition that economic prosperity functions to prevent a democratic regime from breaking down (Seki 2008b: 16).

successive revolutions in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union and geographical proximity to democracies in Western Europe fail to predict the reason why Serbia did not transit to democracy in the early 1990's (Huntington 1991).¹² Second, the dissolution of the socialist federation and dreadful wars against Croatia and Bosnia brought serious economic downturn in the 1990's, because the trade with former republics were in a rupture and international community decided economic sanction against Serbia (Šuković 1997: 124). Moreover, partly due to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, isolation from the outside of the world, and the "defeat" in the wars would have undermined the legitimacy of the political leader, Milošević, in the country. Hence, Serbia in this period can be depicted as a "most-likely case" of democratic transition. (George & Bennett 2004: 80).¹³ However, the fact that the Serbian electoral autocracy survives in 1990's requires us to uncover the mechanism by taking distance from conventional explanation. In this sense, it is justifiable to choose Serbia as a case to examine our hypotheses on the electoral dynamic of authoritarian survival and transition to democracy.

Empirical Evidence

In terms of the level of liberalization of the Serbian electoral autocracy, the regime is classified as *Competitive Authoritarianism* in 1990's. The turnover of Milošević at the moment of presidential election in 2000 and the alternation in power to so-called "democrats" represent the process of democratic change. In 2000, the Serbian political regime is classified as *Gray-zone* despite that shift to democratic government because of some discrepancy in the electoral results. The reelection in several polling stations was smoothly completed in the early 2001 without quarrel, thus the regime has been perceived as *Electoral Democracy* since then. Hence, Serbia is a case to examine the dynamic behind

¹² Hagimori found through his empirical exploration that those international influences such as demonstration effect and geographical proximity decrease after the Cold War (Hagimori 2008).


¹³ There are also arguments that depict Serbia as a "least-likely case" of democratization. They suppose so because of, for instance, geopolitical factor, anti-democratic nature of political culture among citizens, and its attachment to Russia which is represented as a massive authoritarian state. Nonetheless, in my view, these statements are more impressionistic than those which regard Serbia as a "most-likely case." Indeed, an analysis of survey data which sheds light on the popular support for democracy in Serbia observes the great variation among citizens attitude. Explanatory factors found in the study are people's religiosity, anti-immigration attitude, and national pride in the context of post-Dayton Serbia (Seki 2008a).

one type of regime change, that is liberalization process from CA to GZ.

Economic condition in this country cannot account for the regime change. Figure 4 shows GDP per capita in Serbia from 1989 to 2001. Although the data for the year 1993 is missing, it is obvious that the most prosperous period in Serbia is the early 1990's and not in the year just before the regime change. In fact, the year 2000 when the regime changed was one of the most difficult time in Serbia. Thus, the proposition of modernization theory does not hold, which is compatible with the quantitative analysis in the previous section. In a pattern of regime change from CA to GZ, the level of economic development is not a factor predicting regime outcome.

How is, in turn, the state of key independent variables? Table 2 and Figure 5 summarize them. In Serbia, legislative elections are taken place in 1990, 1992, 1993, 1997, and in 2000. Proportional Representation system has been adopted, except for the year 1990. In 1990, Single Member District system was employed. Ruling party had been either the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) led by Slobodan Milošević or the coalition of SPS and Serbian Radical Party (SRP) headed by Vojislav Šešelj. Figure 5 presents that the voter turnout, which is equivalent to the selectorate size in the statistical analysis above, shows gradual decrease. Since the selectorate theory predicts that its decrease favors the

Figure 4: GDP per capita in Serbia




The data is missing in the year 1993 (Jovanović & Vukotić 2005: 88).

Table 2: Description of Key Variables in Serbia

Year	Political Regime	Electorate Size	Selectorate Size	Voter Turnout	Ruling Party's Vote Share	Size of WC	Ruling Party's Seat Share	Ruling Party/Parties
1990	CA	6,276,460	4,487,669	.715	.517	2,320,587	.776	SPS
1992	CA	5,429,910	3,784,647	.697	.641	2,425,851	.696	SPS, SRP
1993	CA	6,079,146	3,744,754	.616	.434	1,623,991	.504	SPS, ND
1997	CA	6,897,212	3,965,897	.575	.649	2,575,324	.768	SPS, SRP
1999*	CA	6,897,212	3,965,897	.575	.357	1,415,456	.440	SPS
2000	GZ	6,570,568	3,784,647	.576	.657	2,404,758	.704	DOS
2001*	ED	6,570,568	3,784,647	.576	.657	2,404,758	.584	DOS

In Serbia, political regime is identified as *Competitive Authoritarianism* from 1990 to 1999, *Gray-zone* in 2000, and *Electoral Democracy* from 2001 to 2004 (Seki 2007). Results of legislative elections are reported (Goati ed. 1998: 195-196, Sekelj 2000: 71, Milošević 2000, Milošević 2003). * Years when elections are not held.

Figure 5: Observable Implications of Key Variables



incumbent survival, it would partly explain the survival of Milošević as dictator during the 1990's. Diminishing electoral participation along with economic downturn would be advantageous for the government, because the government has less resources to redistribute in this period. In other words, lower level of turnout has a role to alleviate the pressure for public good provision. On the contrary, the level of electoral participation fails to account for Milošević's overthrow from the office and liberalization of electoral autocracy realized in 2000. However, according to the statistical analysis, the variable is not a relevant explanatory factor in the transition pattern from CA to GZ. Thus, we are required to find another factor which explains the regime outcome.

As the systematic data of the size of the winning coalition is available for the case study, we then proceed to examine its role. Here I plot the variation in the ratio of the size of winning coalition (the number of vote casts to the ruling party/parties) relative to the electorate size (the number of registered voters). The selectorate theory assumes that the larger the size of winning coalition is, the more the government faces the pressure of public goods provision, rendering the member of winning coalition indifferent about who occupies the government position. The variance explains the regime survival, but has more information than the selectorate size about the hard time for the Milošević government. A formation of coalition government with SRP in 1992 resulted in its immediate dissolution of parliament in 1993, because the SRP strived against the SPS, knowing that they have casting vote in the legislature. Similarly, reformation of coalition with SRP provided conflicts again for the SPS in 1997, resulting in the SRP's breaking away from the government in 1999. The variable, however, has less explanatory rigor when expecting liberalization toward GZ.

Lastly, the examination of ruling party's seat share in Parliament has a role compatible with the quantitative analysis. When the seat share is quite high as was the case in the early and the late 1990's, the government is perceived as stable. In contrast to that, when the SPS dominated the legislature with a very small margin of seats in the midst of 1990's, it encountered more problems than before such as the landslide winning of opposition parties in the 1996 municipal election. More importantly, when the SRP split from the coalition in 1999, it provided a serious obstacle to rule the country, especially because

the SPS turned out to constitute the minority government. Finally, the popular upheaval emerged and Milošević was overthrown at the momentum presidential election in 2000.

Hence, as far as briefly examining the variation found in the initial variables, we can see that the hypotheses and empirical tests are also supported. Throughout liberalization from *Competitive Authoritarianism* to *Gray-zone* in the context of electoral autocracy, the seat share of government party/parties can be dealt with as an explanatory factor of political change, while the effects of the size of selectorate and winning coalition are ambiguous in order to account for the regime change as is also examined in the quantitative exploration. Nonetheless, it is still necessary to trace the mechanism discussed in the theoretical accounts in detail, which is the task of the following section.

Causal Mechanism

This section examines causes of variation in the initial independent variables. First, I briefly point out the reason why its gradual decline happened in the 1990's, because this variable plays relatively a minor role to predict the Serbian regime change. The first multiparty election was realized in 1990 with 71.5% turnout. The next election slightly after two years from the founding election also marked a high turnout as 69.7%. As was prevailed in many countries in Eastern Europe, it is said that first multiparty elections are often taken place in a euphoria, which generally led to higher turnout than successive elections. The cause of turnout decrease in the Serbian 1997 election is due to major opposition parties' boycotting the election. It is readily expected that many citizens who supported the opposition parties had no way to vote, thus some of them are forced to abstain.

Then, what is the determinant of the variation in WC, the ruling party's share of seat in Parliament, and their effects on the regime outcome? They are the product of coalition formation by ruling parties. First, the impact of electoral institution is the source of the odd difference between the turnout and WC/S in the early 1990's. Since the SMD was employed in the 1990 election, the proportionality of representation was low. In contrast to that, the introduction of PR system corrects the discrepancy after 1992, bringing parallel move of the values of two variables. Second, the high values of these two variables in the 1992 and 1997 elections are explained by the formation of coalition government by SPS and

SRP. The fact that SPS could not form the government alone necessitated the SRP to be a coalition partner. In comparison with the other states in Eastern Europe, Serbia is one of the rare cases where the successor of the communist party, the SPS, continue to be in power when inaugurating multiparty elections. It was possible because the SPS controlled the design of electoral institution, which in fact fostered criticism from the opposition elites (Thomas 1999: 70). Also prevalent was vote fraud and control over the media campaign which privileged the SPS (Goati 2003: 207). Therefore, Milošević attempted to avoid providing an image to the international community that Serbia had not transited to democracy by dominating the seat share of a party other than the SPS. The choice of the SRP as the partner was also a good strategy because Milošević could demand the party to engage in the “dirty work” such as organizing militia and deploying it to the battlefield in Croatia and Bosnia. In turn, the merit of the SRP to approach to the SPS was to have an access to media campaign for elections, which consequently brought significant vote and seat share in the 1992 election (Pribićević 1999: 197-199). However, the unintended election result in which the SPS gained only 101 seats, but the SRP obtained 73 seats over 250 in the legislature gave the SRP unignorable voice. The dark cloud was cast over the friendly relationship between Milošević and Šešelj, resulting in the dissolution of Parliament initiated by Milošević in order to hold another election in 1993 and secure the majority without the SRP (Goati 1997: 162-163, Pribićević 1999: 204).

In 1996, the Milošević government faced a serious challenge because the municipal election of that year spread mayors from opposition parties even in Belgrade, the capital of the Republic. The ruling party tried to nullify the result since it would certainly affect the election expected to take place in the following year. The government behavior led to a massive popular upheaval and demonstration lasted for three months. Milošević finally accepted the result. At the same time, the opposition parties had their own problem to confront the SPS together. Thus, the only strategy they could take was to boycott the legislative election, expecting that it would undermine the popular legitimacy of authoritarian elections (Goati 2003: 210, Sekelj 2000: 67-70). It allowed Milošević to take another mandate even though his party could not stand by itself as the dominant party: the SPS occupied only 110 seats over 250 and was again obliged to form a coalition with the SRP

which gained 82 seats. The coalition was not stable because the SRP was frustrated by the fact that Milošević marginalized the party in both Parliament and media broadcasting. In 1999, the SRP launched negative campaign against the SPS in order to improve their popularity, which stands for the serious rupture between the parties came to the fore again (Vasović 2000). The erosion within the government parties as such provided a chance for the opposition parties to unite and overthrow the dictator. Then, at the moment of 2000 presidential election that was aimed at reelecting Milošević as President, got together to back up Vojislav Koštunica, the deputy of Democratic Party of Serbia (DPS). As was in the 1996 municipal election, when the election result was found to dismiss Milošević, he tried to steal the election by controlling the electoral commission. Nonetheless, popular demonstration reemerged and Parliament building and TV station were occupied by citizen. Finally, Milošević accepted the result and he was overthrown from the office after the ten years of dictatorial rule (Lučić 2000: 25, Thompson & Kuntz 2004: 167-168.).

6. Conclusion

The purpose of this study is to scrutinize the logic of democratic change of rigged electoral system, which has become numerous in the last decade. The inquiry of democratization faces challenge along with the theoretical development of mechanism working in political regime. In my perspective, evolving theoretical accounts can be understood as revisit of Dahl's classical conceptualization of political regime, namely public contestation and inclusiveness. The refinement of the contestation dimension sheds light on the need to grasp the degree of liberalization, while that of the inclusiveness dimension provides a clue to elaborate electoral dynamics in autocracy in the light of the size of the selectorate and the winning coalition. Moreover, the degree of competitiveness in electoral autocracy gives an idea that the strength of the incumbent functions as heuristic. Since the electorate behaves with their subjective expectation about the incumbent's redistribution policy, the credibility of the policy implementation would matter.

I formulate two hypotheses in the light of the criticism discussed above and examine them both quantitatively and qualitatively. The working hypotheses to be tested in

quantitative analysis are the role of the selectorate size and the ruling party's seat share in the legislature. The quantitative exploration suggests that the larger selectorate size promotes authoritarian survival and democratic transition, while the smaller seat share of the government party is an impetus to the democratic outcome in electoral autocracy. The case study of Serbia in the 1990's also confirms the findings of statistical tests. In particular, it explains the reason why liberalization of electoral autocracy was possible in 2000, but not in the other moment. Since the large-N empirical analysis examines several patterns of regime change, only one case study of Serbia is not sufficient to account for the causal effects and mechanisms behind political regime change. Further research is required to explain the whole story of democratization and authoritarian reversal.

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