{"id":12930,"date":"2026-09-07T14:28:30","date_gmt":"2026-09-07T05:28:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/?p=12930"},"modified":"2026-09-07T14:28:30","modified_gmt":"2026-09-07T05:28:30","slug":"%e6%97%a5%e6%9c%ac%e6%b3%95%e3%83%88%e3%83%94%e3%83%83%e3%82%af%e3%82%b9%e3%80%8c%e9%87%8d%e8%a6%81%e5%88%a4%e4%be%8b%e3%80%8dno-2-supreme-court-judgement-on-the-constitutionality-of-article-750-of-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/news\/2026\/09\/07\/12930\/","title":{"rendered":"\u65e5\u672c\u6cd5\u30c8\u30d4\u30c3\u30af\u30b9\u300c\u91cd\u8981\u5224\u4f8b\u300dNo. 2026-1 “Can a Same-Sex Partner Qualify as Being in a \u201cDe Facto Marital Relationship\u201d under the Japanese Act on Support for Crime Victims?\u3000” \uff08\u6a4b\u672c\u6709\u751f\uff08\u6cd5\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662\u6559\u6388\uff09\uff09"},"content":{"rendered":"

\uff0a<\/span>NOTE<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The following decision\u00a0is\u00a0among the most significant judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan on family\u00a0issues\u00a0delivered in 2024 that could not be included in the\u00a0Waseda\u00a0Bulletin of Comparative Law, No. 44, published by the Institute of Comparative Law, due to space limitations.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Can a Same-Sex Partner Qualify as\u00a0Being in\u00a0a\u00a0<\/span><\/b>\u201c<\/span><\/b>De\u00a0Facto\u00a0Marital\u00a0Relationship<\/span><\/b>\u201d<\/span><\/b>\u00a0under\u00a0the\u00a0Japanese<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/b>Act on Support for Crime Victims<\/span><\/b>?\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000\u3000<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

X v. Aichi Prefectural Public Safety Commission<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The Third Petty Bench of the Supreme Court, March\u00a026, 2024<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

2022<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>(Guo Tsu)<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>318<\/span>,\u00a0<\/span>78 (1)\u00a0Minshu\u00a099<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Summary:<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The appellant X,\u00a0lost his cohabiting same-sex partner<\/span>,<\/span>\u00a0A in a homicide incident.\u00a0X\u00a0applied for\u00a0crime\u00a0victim benefits under Article 5, Paragraph\u00a0<\/span>(<\/span>1<\/span>)<\/span>, item (i) of the\u00a0Act on Support for Crime Victims, etc. Such as Payment of Crime Victims Benefit<\/span>\u00a0(<\/span>hereinafter referred to as\u00a0\u201cthe Act\u201d), claiming that he qualified as\u00a0<\/span>\u201c<\/span>a person who has not registered\u00a0their\u00a0marriage but has been in a de facto\u00a0marital relationship\u00a0with the crime victim\u201d.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

However, the Aichi Prefectural Public Safety Commission denied the application on the grounds that X and A were of the same sex. X filed a lawsuit seeking revocation of that\u00a0decision, but both the district and high courts dismissed his claim. On final appeal, the Supreme Court\u00a0quashed\u00a0the lower court\u2019s ruling and remanded the case, holding that a person\u00a0of\u00a0the\u00a0same sex as\u00a0the crime victim\u00a0may\u00a0fall within the category of “a person who has not registered marriage but has been in a de facto\u00a0marital relationship\u00a0with the crime victim”<\/span>,<\/span>\u00a0as referred to in the parenthetical phrase\u00a0in Article\u00a05, Paragraph\u00a0<\/span>(<\/span>1<\/span>)<\/span>, item (i) of the Act.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Nonetheless, a dissenting opinion was also appended to the judgment, expressing the view that the legal protection of same-sex couples should be approached with greater caution within the framework of the current legal system.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

References:<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Act on Support for Crime Victims, etc. Such as\u00a0the\u00a0Payment of Crime Victims Benefits\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u30fb<\/span>Article 5 (Scope and Order of Bereaved Family Members)<\/span>
\nA bereaved family member who is eligible to receive survivor benefits shall be a person who, at the time of the death of the crime victim, falls under any of the following items:<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

(i)<\/span>\u2003<\/span>The spouse of the crime victim (including a person who has not registered a marriage with the crime victim but was in a de facto marital relationship with the crime victim).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Facts:<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Appellant X’s same-sex partner A, with whom X was cohabiting, was killed by B. X applied for the\u00a0crime\u00a0victims benefits under Article 4, item (i) of the Act, claiming to qualify as “the\u00a0spouse of a crime victim (including a person who has not registered a marriage with the crime victim but was in a de facto marital relationship with the crime victim)\u201d as stipulated in Article 5,\u00a0Paragraph 1, item (i) of the Act.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>However, the Aichi Prefectural Public Safety Commission rejected the application on the grounds that X and A were of the same sex.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>X filed a lawsuit seeking revocation of this\u00a0ruling, but both\u00a0the\u00a0court of district\u00a0and the high court dismissed the claim. Then X filed an appeal to the Supreme Court.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Opinion:<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The judgment in\u00a0the\u00a0prior instance is quashed.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The case is remanded to the Nagoya High Court.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    \n
  1. Majority Opinion<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

    The crime victim benefits payment system is intended to alleviate the mental and economic damage of the surviving family members at an early stage. In light of this purpose, the term\u00a0<\/span>\u201c<\/span>spouse of the crime victim<\/span>\u201d<\/span>\u00a0as used in Article 5, Paragraph 1, item (i) of the Act should be understood to include\u00a0a person\u00a0who has not registered a marriage but has been in a de facto\u00a0marital relationship\u00a0with the crime victim. Whether the person living together with the victim is of the opposite sex or the same sex does not create a significant difference in the level of emotional and financial distress suffered or in the necessity of benefits.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

    Accordingly, the determination by the court of prior instance that is contrary to the above\u00a0contains\u00a0a violation of law or regulation that has clearly influenced the judgment. Since further examination in terms of whether the appellant, in his relationship with the victim, falls within the category of “a person who has not registered marriage but has been in a de facto\u00a0marital relationship\u00a0with the crime victim” is necessary, the case is remanded to the court of the prior instance.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Dissenting Opinion by\u00a0Supreme Court\u00a0Justice IMAZAKI\u00a0Yukihiko<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      The final appeal should be dismissed.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        \n
      1. Potential disadvantages to other surviving families in the order of payments of\u00a0victims\u00a0benefits<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

        The crime\u00a0victims\u00a0benefits system is positioned as a highly policy-oriented framework that encompasses not only social welfare policy, but also elements of tort law supplementation and criminal policy, reflecting an intersection of multiple public policy\u00a0objectives. As the system serves two core functions, providing livelihood security and compensating damages for the surviving family members, any consideration of whether same-sex partners should be included as eligible beneficiaries must\u00a0take into account\u00a0both of these\u00a0aspects.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

        From the standpoint of livelihood security, while the Act does not require surviving families to have maintained their livelihood with the crime victim’s income in order to be eligible to receive benefits (Article 5, Paragraph 1), it does prioritize those who were financially supported by the victim (item (ii)). If same-sex partners are recognized as eligible beneficiaries, there is a risk that children or parents who were\u00a0actually financially\u00a0dependent on the victim\u2019s income would be subordinated to the same-sex partner and become ineligible to receive benefits. Such an outcome would undermine the fundamental purpose of the system, which is to provide\u00a0livelihood\u00a0security.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          \n
        1. Inconsistency with civil substantive law<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

          From the perspective of compensating damages, in order to adopt an interpretation that allows victims benefits to be granted to same-sex partners, it must be premised on the assumption that the same-sex partner of a crime victim has the right to claim compensation for damages against the perpetrator.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

          While there may be room to recognize a same-sex partner\u2019s right to claim compensation for mental damage, under Article 752 (which imposes a duty of mutual support between spouses) of the current Civil Code, compensation for property damage is not applied mutatis mutandis to same-sex couples. Thus, any compensable damage for same-sex partners would\u00a0likely be\u00a0more limited than that for opposite-sex partners. Nevertheless, under the majority opinion, same-sex partners are treated as equal to opposite-sex partners in awarding survivor benefits. Given that such benefits function as compensation, this discrepancy is difficult to justify under existing civil law.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

            \n
          1. Impact on the interpretation of other laws and regulations\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

            The textual interpretation of the Act adopted by the majority opinion in this judgment, specifically\u00a0regarding\u00a0the phrase \u201ca person who has been in a\u00a0de facto marital relationship\u201d may influence the interpretation of other statutes that use similar expressions. This raises concerns about potential inconsistencies with the original purpose of other legal frameworks.\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

              \n
            1. Unclear standards for recognizing a \u201cde facto marital relationship\u201d between same-sex couple\u00a0\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

              Historically and legally, marriage has been understood as a relationship between a woman and a man, and the extension of equivalent legal protection to same-sex couples is a\u00a0relatively recent\u00a0development. Thus, when recognizing whether a same-sex couple is in a \u201cde facto marital relationship\u201d it is difficult to\u00a0establish\u00a0objective and consistent criteria, and the majority opinion does not clearly present such standards.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

              While there is no objection to the majority opinion that the mental and economic\u00a0impact on the surviving partner should not differ based on whether the couple is of the same or opposite sex, it remains too hasty, at this point in time, to extend such an interpretation to this case. Therefore, the claim should be dismissed.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \n
              1. Concurring Opinion by\u00a0Supreme Court\u00a0Justice HAYASHI\u00a0Michiharu<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

                Justice Hayashi agreed with the majority opinion and gave the following opinion.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                First, the interpretation of the phrase \u201ca\u00a0de facto marital relationship\u201d should be based on the purpose of the crime\u00a0victims\u00a0benefits\u00a0system. That is to say, to promptly alleviate the mental and economic damage suffered by the surviving families, etc. of persons who died unexpectedly as a result of criminal acts, thereby contributing to the realization of a society in which the rights and interests of persons who suffered crime damage, etc. are protected.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Therefore, even if the victim and the applicant are of the same sex, if the relationship can be deemed to have been in a relationship with the crime victim that is equivalent to an opposite-sex common-law marriage in view of the person’s relationship with the crime victim in light of the cooperation with each other and having lived together, and the continuity of such a relationship, it is reasonable to consider that they would suffer similar mental and financial damage, and thus such individuals should be included as eligible parties of the victims benefits.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Secondly, the mental and economic damage addressed by this benefits system does not necessarily have to align strictly with the damages for which a tort claim can be brought against the perpetrator. However, in this case, it may\u00a0reasonably be\u00a0interpreted that at the very least, a claim for solatium based on a tort can be filed against the\u00a0perpetrator.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Finally, although there are a considerable number of provisions of laws and regulations in which a phrase that is the same as or similar to the phrase \u201ca person who has been in a\u00a0de facto marital relationship\u201d,\u00a0the interpretation of that phrase should be made individually and specifically based on the intent and purpose of each legal system. In this case, the majority opinion does not\u00a0make a determination\u00a0on other provisions.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Editorial Note:<\/span><\/b>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Under the current legal framework, de facto partners are, in principle, not afforded sufficient legal protection upon the death of their partner. For example, even where the relationship between the parties may be\u00a0regarded in substance\u00a0as equivalent to marriage, no right of inheritance is recognized.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>By contrast, in the field of social security benefits, de facto couples may, in certain circumstances, be treated in the same manner as legally married spouses. Benefits payable to bereaved family members of crime victims constitute a representative example.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                The issue in the present case was whether the benefits payable to bereaved family members of crime victims may also be granted to a same-sex partner. Article 5, paragraph (1), item (i) of the Act provides that a person who was in \u201ca de facto marital relationship with the crime victim\u201d is entitled to claim such benefits; the question was whether a same-sex partner falls within this category. This case is significant in that, for the first time, the Supreme Court expressly held that a same-sex partner does fall within that category and affirmed that the same legal protection afforded to opposite-sex couples in a de facto marital relationship also extends to same-sex couples<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>(Ono,\u00a02024).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Moreover<\/span>, this judgment is noteworthy in that it encourages a reconsideration of the quasi-marriage legal framework, previously premised exclusively on opposite-sex couples, to include same-sex couples as well. Firstly, unlike the second instance in this case and the Sapporo District Court decision (September 11, 2023, published on the Courts in Japan Website), the majority opinion in this judgment, while referring to the concept of \u201cspouse\u201d under the Civil Code, adopts the view that eligibility for victims benefits under the Act should not be denied solely on the grounds that the victim and the applicant were of the same sex. That is, the Supreme Court held that even in same-sex partnerships, the surviving partner could be presumed to have suffered comparable mental and economic damage as a legal\u00a0spouse, and\u00a0thus should be considered potentially eligible for benefits under the Act, in light of its purpose (Machado, 2024).\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Secondly, with regard to whether same-sex couples should be granted quasi-marital protection, the concurring opinion suggests a framework in which even a same-sex couple could also be regarded as being in \u201ca relationship with the crime victim that is equivalent to an opposite-sex common-law marriage\u201d.\u00a0The concurring opinion also explicitly\u00a0identifies\u00a0elements such as the fact that the parties lived together in cooperation, and the continuity of that cohabitation. In other words, these elements correspond precisely to the kinds of considerations that the dissenting opinion argued should have been clearly specified when\u00a0determining\u00a0whether a same-sex couple falls under a circumstance that \u201cequivalent to a de facto marital relationship.\u201d\u00a0Accordingly, this judgment can be understood as having provided a certain degree of guidance\u00a0regarding\u00a0the concrete factors to be considered when evaluating whether a quasi-marital relationship can be recognized for same-sex couples.<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Finally, with regard to this issue, which is closely connected to the question of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage, the majority opinion in the present case may be viewed as expressing a progressive stance that affirms the potential for same-sex marriage even under the current legal framework (Ono, 2024).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                Nonetheless, as Justice Imazaki pointed out in his dissenting opinion, although the concurring opinion seeks to limit the scope of the Court\u2019s interpretation to the Act, doubts remain as to whether this limitation can effectively constrain the ripple effects on the interpretation of other statutes. Moreover, even if same-sex partners are\u00a0deemed\u00a0eligible for benefits under the present system,\u00a0determining\u00a0their priority\u00a0relative\u00a0to \u201csurviving families who are financially dependent on the victim\u2019s income\u201d would inevitably require a considerable degree of policy-based judgment. Accordingly, going forward, issues such as the legal status of SOGI and whether same-sex marriage should be legalized will require careful consideration, including possible legislative reforms (Kobayashi, 2024).<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                (See Ono, T. (2024). \u201cCase Note on the Denial of Crime Victims Benefits to an Individual whose Same-sex Partner was Murdered,\u201d\u00a0<\/span>Shin\u00a0Hanrei\u00a0Kaisetsu\u00a0Watch: Constitution<\/span><\/i>, (232), 2-3; Kobayashi, N. (2024). \u201cThe Supreme Court Decision Granting the Claim to Revoke the Denial of Crime Victims Benefits for Same-sex Partners,\u201d\u00a0<\/span>WLJ\u00a0Hanrei\u00a0Column<\/span><\/i>, (317), 5-6; Machado, D. (2024). \u201cA Same-sex Partner of a Crime Victim may Qualify as a Person \u2018in a de facto marital relationship\u2019,\u201d\u00a0<\/span>Shin\u00a0Hanrei\u00a0Kaisetsu\u00a0Watch: Civil Law (Family Law)<\/span><\/i>, (158), 2.)\u00a0<\/span>\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

                \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

                \uff0aNOTE\u00a0 The following decision\u00a0is\u00a0among the most significant judgments of the Supreme Court of Japan on family\u00a0 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":8346,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[47,20],"class_list":["post-12930","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-news","tag-research","tag-precedent"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12930","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=12930"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12930\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":12936,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/12930\/revisions\/12936"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/8346"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=12930"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=12930"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/folaw\/icl\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=12930"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}