

Moro Societies in the Philippines before and after the 2017 Marawi Crisis  
Patricio N. Abinales\*

“The Sultan of Masiu...who ran successfully in a mayoralty race in 1959, was once asked which of the two offices he preferred, Sultan or Mayor. He answered that he liked both: his position as Sultan was highly prestigious, that of Mayor carried tangible power.”<sup>1</sup>

On the August 29, 2018 issue of *Hijabi Mag*, an "online modest lifestyle magazine...for modest girls around the world" based in Manila, the main writer Najman Capal interview Sr. Sayfa Gilman, a 22-year-old graduate in broadcast communications whom she describes as “a niqabi sister who inspired me in many ways.” Gilman resigned her job in an American company, and worked fulltime in Connect Institute PH, an Islamic non-profit organization devoted to educating Moros on Islam the right way, and, more importantly, act in accordance to the tenets of the religion.<sup>2</sup> When asked what she hoped would be the future of the Moros Gilman replied:

I hope that my sisters will no longer be asked to remove their hijab and niqab in their work, university, etc. I hope that my brothers will not be asked to shave their beard when they apply for job...I hope that our youth and future children will not be exposed to pornography, I hope that their minds will be pure [and] free from all kinds of evil that society is instilling in them in all forms and shapes. I hope that our parents and future parents will be supportive of their children when they want to study the Deen and not be concentrated on secular knowledge only. I hope that our community will be able to provide plenty of Institutions that caters (sic) both Islamic and Secular knowledge so the

---

\* Professor, School of Pacific and Asian Studies, University of Hawaii-Manoa.  
abinales@hawaii.edu.

future generation will be experts in various academic fields and will be Islamically learned at the same time. I hope that there will be more masjids, prayer areas, Islamic gatherings, events and projects so we can be gathered a lot, where the angels will envelop their wings and the mercy and forgiveness of Allah descends. I hope that there will be more ‘Ulama and Mujahideen as Islam is like a bird that its two wings are Da’wah and Jihad. I hope that we’ll be able to break the huge barriers of tribalism, cultural and traditional practices of various tribes<sup>3</sup>

Three decades earlier, the ideologue of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), Sallah Jubair (a.k.a. Mohagher Iqbal) echoed something similar. In his book *Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny*, Jubair concludes:

If the Moros have suffered a lot and are on the verge of extinction, they and their leaders are partly to be blamed. But the greater blame falls on the leaders, who are mostly traditionalists or secularists. In both leadership styles, leaders contribute little, if any, to the general welfare of the people... Traditionalism perpetuates age-old practices, which usually spawn abuses and tribulations in society, while secularism enslaves man in his quest of satisfaction for the insatiable self. Secularism leads him to many evil ways like impiety, alcoholism, materialism, and other acts of hedonism. Moreover, people should stop thinking of salvation as forthcoming from without or by some day’s gift. Man should relay, first of all, on Allah, and then on himself, to develop, succeed and to be truly God’s viceregent on earth.<sup>4</sup>

These two comments indicate the extent of explaining and doing “Islamic politics” in the Philippines have changed between generations. The younger Gilman believes returning to Islam is an intensely personal; it is “between Allah and me,” as it were. The older Jubair is less wishful,

is more political and impresses upon his readers that one can never embrace Islam fully unless one is ready to act politically. This includes removing self-serving “traditionalist” Moro leaders and secularists. Gilman hopes that “there will be more Ulama and Mujahideen as Islam is like a bird that its two wings are Da’wah and Jihad.” Her tone is messianic, and in synch with the dominant lingua franca of today’s Islamic politics. Jubair’s pitch is guarded, suggesting a dash of realism that comes from having cut his teeth in the battlefield. Gilman has yet to be in combat and get involved in the humdrum of painstaking day-to-day organizing. What is not said, but hinted is that, to Jubair, only a well-armed and politically-deft organization could defeat traditionalists and secularists in battle. Gilman, however, is content with a few dedicated individuals willing to sacrifice their lives to destroy enemies at their stronghold. In the argot of military tactics, this committed individual would be epitomized by the suicide bomber. The latter has become the most favored means of fighting for the Islamic cause in the Philippines and elsewhere. Jubair still believes in the power of organization in pursuit of military and political victories and when the time has come for negotiations. Facing the government panel on the other side of the table is greatly bolstered by ones strength in numbers.

Oddly, while these “two extremes” appear run parallel to each other, they actually are more intertwined in a manner that is taken for granted at the ground level, but only seen as a peripheral issue outside of the Moro *ummah* (community). Jubair and Gilman have an unlikely glue – the datu-politicos that they have been very critical of because of their watering down of Islamic teaching to suit their un-Islamic way of exercising power. These purveyors of “traditionalism” (Jubair) have also lived un-Islamic lives, participating in the politics of spoil and patronage practiced across the Philippines, living off the poverty of the *ummah*, and engaging in the most sacrilegious of trades – selling arms, drugs and trafficking people. The irony is that

these radical interpretations could not move forward politically *and militarily*, without the support of these datu-politicos. The former needs the latter's guns but, more importantly, their sway over their constituents. Neither could they consolidate or expand their organizations (the MILF and whatever form of association the likes of Gilman seeks to form) without incorporating a powerful "traditionalist" tool – the clan.

This paper, therefore argues that while "radical Islam" appears to be a new phenomenon in Moro Mindanao, its "newness" is actually anchored on an older, more pliable, and even more popular manner of doing politics: the datu-politicos and the family/clan. This dependence on the latter was what allowed "radical Islamists" victories in the battlefields or the negotiating table. It is also the bane of their existence since the progress of their agenda is premised on eliminating these very old political solidarities that made them a force in Moro society in the first place. In the succeeding pages I will try to elaborate on this Gramscian dilemma of radical Islam, starting with the war in the Islamic city of Marawi between "Islamic terrorists" and government forces, from May 23 to October 23, 2017.

### Marawi Revisited

On May 23, 2017, a group that claimed to be the local representatives of jihadi group ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, with the acronym "Daesh), clashed with a police-army team sent to arrest Isnilon Hapilon, the leader of another ISIS-affiliated cluster, the Abu Sayyaf. Hapilon was in Marawi to meet with Abdullah and Omar Maute, who formed a *Dawlah Islamiya* (Islamic state) in Marawi in 2012.<sup>5</sup> The hostilities turned into a full warfare as other armed groups, including pro-ISIS foreign fighters, came to the rescue of Hapilon and the brothers. The

“Maute group” - as the *Dawlah Islamiya* of the Mautes was popularly called - counter-attacked, taking over a military camp, several buildings including the Marawi City Hall, schools including the Mindanao State University, a Mosque and a Protestant church.<sup>6</sup> They took several hostages and used them as a defensive shield against government troops.<sup>7</sup> The government counter-attacked but this joint force of army and marines were slowed down by their unfamiliarity with urban warfare. What followed then was a five-month siege where in order for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to root out the Maute Group, it had to destroy most of the city. When Marawi was “liberated” on October 27, and by the time the shooting had died down, the siege had claimed the lives of 920 militants, 165 soldiers, 47 civilians. The military rescued 1,790 hostages, over 100,677 families (about 460,000 persons) had to flee the city.<sup>8</sup>

The narratives about the war focused their attention on the brothers Omar and Abdullah. They were said to be “petty criminals,” in Butig, a municipality south of Marawi City and Lake Lanao, which is their family home (Map 1). They began to change once they went overseas to work as well as study. Omar studied Islamic theology in Egypt, while Abdullah took similar courses in Jordan. Both were said to have subsequently moved around Syria and the United Arabs Emirates and found themselves being attracted to ISIS’s idea of a Caliphate.<sup>9</sup> They returned to Butig, formed their own *Dawlah Islamiya*, and began recruiting locally but also in Marawi City to reach out to young Moros, especially students from the large Mindanao State University.<sup>10</sup> After word of their presence reached government and anti-terrorism experts, their profiles changed – the “petty criminals” were now described as “young, charismatic, Arabic-speaking...social-media savvy and with an extensive international connection.”<sup>11</sup>

Map 1. Location of Butig, Lanao del Sur



The Mautes “idealism” and the “bold and daring” acts also attracted the attention of MILF fighters who have been increasingly disappointed with their leaders’ inability to forge a permanent agreement with the Philippine government. The longer it has taken for both sides to implement a new version of Moro autonomy to replace the inefficient and corrupted Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), the more appealing the Maute option had become for these young soldiers. Even the MILF’s older rival, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), appeared to worry about what was left of its armed force. The MNLF’s young cadres had also began joining the Mautes, including children of the leaders of the different factions of the organization. On November 24, 2016, Malaysian authorities arrested Datu Mohammad Abduljabbar Sema, son of Moroin Sema. the chairman of the largest faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the MILF’s rival and former mayor of Cotabato City.<sup>12</sup>

The last of the Maute's recruits were family and kin. Brothers, cousins, uncles and aunts joined or supported the brothers and fought alongside them in the street battles. Clan leaders called on kinfolks outside of Butig to join the war.<sup>13</sup> Aminkisa Macadato, a nephew of the brother's mother, Farhan, was charged with being a major financier of the Mautes.<sup>14</sup> Cayamora Maute, the father, was formerly with the MILF. Cousins from the MILF likewise took leave from the organization to heed the call for reinforcements. The military suspected that MILF units loyal to the family of the late Alim Abdul Aziz Mimbantas, who was vice-chairman of the military affairs of the MILF, joined the Mautes because Mimbantas' second wife was a cousin of the Mautes.<sup>15</sup> Mimbantas' brother, Jannati, who is commander of the MILF's North Eastern Mindanao Front, that operates out of Butig, which also happened to be the hometown of the Mimbantas family. The MILF leadership had all but admitted the involvement of their men in Marawi since "the MILF [commanders in the area] and the Maute group have family ties either by blood or marriage." It was not unlikely, therefore, that some MILF fighters "decided to help their relatives under military attack."<sup>16</sup>

Relatives from, as it were, the "other side" gave support through indirect means. The government suspected that the family of leading politicians in the area helped provide cover for the Mautes. Another Maute son, Mohammad "Otto" Maute, who was believed to be a logistics supplier of the group, was married to Nijiya Dilangelen, a niece of former Congressman Didagen Dilangelen who represented Maguindanao province which adjoins Lanao del Sur. The Dilangelen clan include another congressman, a mayor and a governor, and the clan are relatives of one of the most powerful and brutal families of the province— the Ampatuans.<sup>17</sup> Two other suspected Maute financiers were Fahad Salic and his brother Omar Solitario Ali, both former


mayors of Marawi. Salic was arrested and charged with rebellion by the military which alleged that he was subsidizing the Mautes because one of his wives was Farhana Maute's sister.<sup>18</sup>

Salic was not only a strong person of interest because of his marriage ties. The government had also connected him and his brother to the lucrative illegal drug trade in Lanao del Sur. After the military discovered boxes of methamphetamines (also known as poor man's cocaine) in a house used by the Maute group, President Rodrigo Duterte lumped the "foreign-based terrorist groups, the ISIS (Islamic State)...as well as illegal drug money [as providing] the financial and logistical support to the Maute group."<sup>19</sup> Duterte particularly accused Salic and Solitario as "the drug kingpins of Marawi City and the entire Lanao del Sur province."<sup>20</sup> The brothers denied the charges and were eventually removed from the list of local politicians collaborating with the Maute group.<sup>21</sup>

Finally, there was the primary family itself. The Mautes are a wealthy family, owning property in Marawi, other places in Mindanao and even Manila.<sup>22</sup> The family ran a furniture shop, used car and construction business, the last one being the most profitable of enterprises given that with proper political connections, one could get an infrastructure project or two which are funded by international aid agencies. Overseeing all this is Farhana Maute (a.k.a Ominta Romato), whose political ties made her the "kingmaker" and the most critical financier and logistics supplier of the Maute group. The family had a private militia which was also most likely involved in the uprising.<sup>23</sup> Finally, the Mautes had a commodity trading business in Surabaya, Indonesia which Philippine authorities believed was used as a front by Jemmah Islamiya (JI).<sup>24</sup> In fact, in 2012, the military killed Ustadz Sanusi, one of seven JI operatives hiding in Mindanao, after discovering him staying in a house owned by Mohammad Khayyam Maute.<sup>25</sup> Sanusi was believed to have trained the Maute brothers in urban warfare.<sup>26</sup>

This network of Islamic fundamentalists politicians, drug lords, and insurgents remains to be fully substantiated given that the above links are based on assumptions mainly by the military, government and media (Table 1). It is, for example, unclear to what extent ISIS has helped the Mautes saved for their ideological education, while, at the ground, ascertaining which Maute fighter belonged to which organization has not yet been clearly established. This tentativeness notwithstanding, one actor appears is repeatedly at the center that link these groups to each other under the Maute’s canopy – the unusual and enduring marriage between Islam and politics at the local level under the tight command of the datu-politico.

Table 1. The Maute Network (From the Security Agencies’ Perspective)



“Datu-Mayor”

Historians are generally in agreement that the Islam which arrived in Mindanao in the late 14<sup>th</sup> and early 15<sup>th</sup> centuries was brought in by Arab missionaries from the Hadramut region who

sought converts *and also* trade the men of prowess (*orang besar*) who ruled the port-settlements along the coastlines of the Sulu Archipelago and southern Mindanao.<sup>27</sup> The missionaries easily adjusted their proselytization by incorporating their commercial partners' indigenous beliefs of ancestor worship and the reverence of the spirits, to ensure successful commercial transactions. The *orang besar* accepted Islam for the same strategic reasons: becoming Muslim opened up access to a larger trading network of where the Arab missionaries were highly admired for their exceptional navigation skills and savvy diplomacy.<sup>28</sup> It likewise boosted their standing among their people and in other ports settlements in maritime Southeast Asia. That said, they accepted this new "global" religion not at the expense of customary beliefs. Eric Tagliacozzo noticed that the Tausug, the biggest ethnic group in the Sulu archipelago, "bent some Moro orthodoxies (such as the bans on the slavery of fellow Moros, for example) to local norms when it suited them."<sup>29</sup> Religious syncretism was a long-stand practice of Mindanao and Sulu Moros. Historian O.W. Wolters refereed to this as an *orang besar's* "soul stuff."

The leadership of 'big men,' or to use the term I prefer, 'men of prowess,' would depend on their being attributed with an abnormal amount of personal and innate 'soul stuff,' which explained and distinguished their performance from that of others in their generation and especially among their own kinsmen...[A] person's spiritual identity and capacity for leadership were established when his fellows could recognize his superior endowment and knew that being close to him was to their advantage not only because his entourage could expect to enjoy material rewards but also, I believe, because their own spiritual substance, for everyone possessed it in some measure, would participate in his, thereby leading to *rapport* and personal satisfaction.<sup>30</sup>

After being adopted as an instrument of commerce, “folk Islam” would also become the frame with which Moros fought or collaborated with each other. “Church” and “state” were, as it were, not held separate since the Arab missionaries, in formalizing trade ties with the *orang besar*, also conferred upon the latter the right to be Islam’s representative among their people.<sup>31</sup> The title *ima muwallam halipa* (priest) was bestowed upon a priest as well as a sultan or a datu who, upon accepting the title, would become “the Caliphal representative within the community over which he ruled to establish the judgement of the Islamic religion.”<sup>32</sup> The Sultan of Sulu, for example, was the protector of his realm, *and* the messenger who stood in for Allah.<sup>33</sup> A formidable *orang besar* would be one who possessed pre-Islamic “charismatic grace” (*barakat*), sexual and military prowess, and the Islamic power (*daulat*), that allowed his “words and commands” (*tita*) to reach “heaven where they would be heard by the dead as well as the living.”<sup>34</sup> Ruudje Laarhoven described him as someone who was “not much different from the Pope as the head of the Catholic Church, representing God on earth.”<sup>35</sup> An *orang besar* would then institutionalized his broadened position of authority by having his genealogical account (*tarsila*) written (or revised) to show that his lineage could be traced back to the Prophet Mohammad, his family or a prominent religious teachers who worked with the Prophet.<sup>36</sup>

When the Moros went to war against the Spanish, they were less driven by religious motives, nor were these engaged simply in defensive actions as some scholars of Moro Mindanao history contend.<sup>37</sup> The Moros were, in fact, consistently in the offensive. Beginning in the 1600s, fleets from the Sulu and Maguindanao raided Spanish-controlled settlements in the central and northern parts of the Philippine archipelago and brought home products to trade in and around maritime Southeast Asia, that included slaves. Spanish attempts to push back were short-lived victories, as no sooner had they built their forts when they would be driven out of

these Sultanates' territories, followed by more slave raids. Another series of raids would often follow. Every time the sultanates returned from their pillaging, their stature as men of prowess and messenger-protectors of Islam was bolstered.<sup>38</sup> The Spanish were only able to turn the tide in the 1880s when steam-ran vessels defeated the wind-reliant, ill-armed *praos* of the Sultanates. Peace treaties were signed which allowed the Spanish to establish a presence in Moro Mindanao, constructing among other things, a series of forts in the coastal areas of the island, as well as missions from whence they sent preachers deep into the territories of the Maguindanao and Buayan sultanates. This did not last long as in 1896, Filipino revolutionaries in Manila launched their war of independence against a fast-fading Spanish colonial regime.

The Americans fared better compared to the Spanish, in subjugating the Moros. They had superior firepower, which they followed by signing peace pacts with *datus* and sultans who were already by the Spanish rule, and the break-up of their commercial alliances with other Southeast Asian *orang besar* as the Dutch and English asserted their control in Batavia and the Malay Peninsula-Sabah grid, respectively. The new colonizers likewise promised their "Moro wards" that they would respect Islam and not persecute Moros on religious grounds.<sup>39</sup> Finally, the *Melikans*, as the Moros called them, assigned collaborating *datus* administrative responsibilities pertaining mainly to the collecting of taxes and the establishment of "Moro exchanges" designed to replace the trading networks of yore.<sup>40</sup> It was through these activities that *datus* and sultans were also introduced to different aspects of colonial governance, and they proved to be quite adept with it, especially in their Janus-faced role as leaders/spokespersons of the community on one side and as administrative partners of the Americans on the other.<sup>41</sup>

Thus, when the Americans turned over the colonial state to Filipino leaders at the second decade after the former arrived, Moro elites were more than ready to adopt a new set of coats of

officialdom, adding these to syncretic powers they already had. The end-product was something akin to Islam's indigenization - new *and modern* designations were added to old ones, which enhanced once more the power of the Moro elite. As the late Moro scholar Mamtua Saber put it:

[The] same person who carries the title of sultan, datu, et... might at the same time be or elected to state office as a governor, mayor, army officer, or a simple clerk. Such a leader holding a dual role... bridges the relationship between the traditional community and the modern government, although such dual leadership is undocumented, or not formally recognized by the two different authorities... In this situation of culture-contact whereby a person assumes dual leadership between two separate societies and cultures, his role might be... that of a... double agent of two kinds of authority systems. Moro elites become congressmen or mayors, and even if they become publicly modern, the copyright of 'traditional leadership' continues to remain theirs.<sup>42</sup>

These tags were carried over to the Republican period. Datu-politicos enthusiastically adopted the trappings of modern constitutional politics, Moro elites while preserving the appearances of being "the Caliphal representative within the community." With Philippine leaders continuing the tradition of started by the Americans of respecting and not politicizing Islam, and respecting the local power of datu-politicos, the role of "Caliphal representative" took on more secular forms. Moro-politicos "invested in various emblems of Islamic identity – pilgrimages, mosques, and Islamic schools and organizations," but not simply for the purpose of religious proselytization.<sup>43</sup> These investments were equally parts of a larger plan to enrich Islamic identity by ending poverty in the *ummah*. The instrument was to a Commission on National Integration that would vigorously implement programs to uplift the conditions of the

Moros, improve their way of living, and in so doing deprive “religious fanaticism” of any authority to flourish.<sup>44</sup>

When it came to the relationship between non-Muslim elites and national leaders (those in Manila), the datu-politicos would use the same “weapon” that other local strongmen and their clans deployed. They offered a solid “Moro vote” for their national partners during elections. In exchange, the latter respected a datu-politico’s control over his territory and keep their promise of a steady flow of largesse from the executive offices and the legislature to Moro Mindanao (and in a lot of cases to these datu-politicos’ pockets). These national connections and lateral ties with other local elites would then be bandied to impress constituents of their being ability to bring home news about Manila goings-on, the state development programs coming to Moro Mindanao, and the future of Moro Mindanao-Manila ties.<sup>45</sup> The latter would then show their appreciation by voting the datu-politicos or their candidates, and offering their services when needed, including going to war with and in behalf of their leaders.

This relationship between datu-politicos and “their people” was critical in keeping some stability in a Mindanao that was experiencing the largest ever (spontaneous) migration of people from the north. Keeping the peace by providing people security was a responsibility that the Philippine state could not fulfill for the simple reason that its agencies of coercion – the military and the national police (Constabulary) – were almost non-existent in the entire island (Table 2). The near-absence of the state also helped explain why Moros’ political consciousness was stunted. Their knowledge and understanding of politics came only from one source – the datu-politicos – as the state failed to address literacy throughout Moro Mindanao. This was a failing that began in the first years of the Republic and lasting to the years when the country was under martial law.

Table 2. Distribution of Military and Constabulary Personnel, Moro Mindanao, 1952-53<sup>46</sup>

| Province/City          | Constabulary | Army | Reserve Officers | Total |
|------------------------|--------------|------|------------------|-------|
| Cotabato               | 222          | 1    | 292              | 516   |
| Lanao                  | 389          | 1    | 461              | 852   |
| Sulu                   | 418          | 0    | 202              | 620   |
| Zamboanga del Norte    | 67           | 0    | 51               | 118   |
| Zamboanga del Sur      | 102          | 0    | 1                | 103   |
| Dansalan (Marawi City) | 85           | 0    | 0                | 85    |
| Basilan City           | 28           | 0    | 0                | 28    |

A 1971 survey by the Shell Corporation-supported Filipinas Foundation on the state of education in Cotabato, Lanao del Sur and Sulu, discovered that out that the “total public high school enrollment in the three provinces [was] only 7,060, representing 2.04% of the total school population.” The report added: “This contrasts with that of the entire country, where the youth, aged 13-16...in the public secondary schools was 17.9% in 1958-1959.”<sup>47</sup> With the social welfare support system hardly existing, the Moros’ sources of knowledge coming from religious teachers (who were kept out of politics by the datu-politicos) and from their datus, Moro were had difficulty grasping the intellectual, political and even moral meaning of phrases like “a sense of nation.” Their knowledge, much less appreciation of democratic/popular politics and notions of industry-led economic development was almost non-existing.

It was not until the appearance of student radicals in the mid-1960s that the Moros’ parochialism would be shaken by more progressive opinions. If the state is unable to provide the most basic of these services, and keeping communities safe, then people inevitably turn to their local leaders for advice and assistance. A 1969 informal survey by the Moro intellectual Alunan Glang is quite informative (Table 3). The “datu and mayor” was the main source of new and advise for the respondents except when it came to be able to make happen a spiritual life’s project of going on the *haj*. Given, that a “datu-mayor’s” concern was the local goings-on, and

hardly news from outside; and given the absence of schools or any other state-funded depository that would whet one’s curiosity about the outside world or any other matter that is outside the narrowed purview of the village, the knowledge base of many a Moro was therefore seriously deficient, if not totally empty. It has not also helped that 96 percent of Moro Mindanao was rural.<sup>48</sup> The intellectual vacuum merely strengthened the datu-politicos’ power.

Table 3. . Leaders Communities Seek for Assistance<sup>49</sup>

| Issue                             | Leaders Sought for Advice and Support |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| Family relations                  | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Agrarian Problems                 | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Who to Vote during Elections      | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Boundary disputes                 | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Violations of the Law             | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Financial Problems                | “Our datu”                            |
| Agricultural Problems             | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Pilgrimages and religious matters | Our religious leaders                 |
| Health and Sanitation             | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Plant and Animal Pests            | “Our datu and mayor”                  |
| Etc., etc.,                       | “Our datu and mayor”                  |

Mutual political accommodation with national politicians, however, did not mean a permanent state of peace in Moro Mindanao. In fact conflict was endemic within the *ummah*, in *rido* – the revenge killings between families over disputes that range from the minor (insults, petty theft, insults, love affairs, even jests) to serious ones (land disputes, elections, family honor). There was no escaping this *rido*, for once the patriarch issued the call to battle, every one had to join. As one Mindanao-based scholar puts it: “Since you are part of a while, whatever ails the whole is also your ailment. Since you are a family member, if other members have *rido*, then you become a part of the *rido* or vendetta automatically.”<sup>50</sup>

The prevalence of firearms helped sustain *rido*. World War II was a boon for anti-Japanese guerrillas, as the arms they amassed gave an edge over rivals through the duration of a

rido. For political families, these weapons and the private militia they could muster played critical roles in winning elections and keeping opponents at bay while they ruled. Politically-related violence, however, were to be kept to a minimum.<sup>51</sup>

The data on *rido* are sparse, but what was available indicate that revenge-killing had happened as far back as the 1970s. The Moro public intellectual Abhoud Syed Lingga's listed 218 rido in Maguindanao and Cotabato City from 1970 to 2004. Of the total, only 116 were resolved, 102 unresolved and eight recurring in this time span.<sup>52</sup> A *rido* research team reported: In the 70s, around 13 cases of clan conflict were reported (Maranao, seven; Sama, six); in the 1980s, eight cases were reported with six among the Maranao and two cases among the Sama; in the 1990s, 19 cases were reported (Maguindanao, seven; Sama, six; Maranao, six); and since year 2000, 14 cases (Maguindanaos, three; Maranao; eight; and Sama, three). There were 34 cases with unspecified dates that reportedly occurred among the Yakan groups in Basilan. In the Sulu study area, 39 cases of *rido* were reported.

When President Ferdinand Marcos asserted the central state's presence in Mindanao, in the name of national economic development but also to create his own patronage network to challenge and destroy those of his rivals, the physiognomy of *rido* took more political tone. As the breakdown of order in the Moro zones spiraled, a new group emerged in the turmoil to also upend the reign of the datu-politicos. In the mid- the 1960s, Moro students who were politicized by the radical nationalism at the University of the Philippines and Al Azhar University in Egypt formed the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) to oppose what they called the Philippine government's systematic genocidal campaign against the Moro people through the force of arms. They received weapons and other resources from Libya and Malaysia and additional

manpower from the datu-politicos whom Marcos was trying to get rid of.<sup>53</sup> A year after President Marcos declared martial law, the MNLF went to war.

The story of the Moro armed revolt after Marcos declared martial law, has been covered by other scholars, and thus need not be re-told here.<sup>54</sup> The one aspect of the war germane to this presentation was the fate of the datu-politicos. The Marcos campaign to disempower them led them to a military alliance with the student radicals. The latter may have led the MNLF, but its army included the private militias who remained loyal to these displaced datu-politicos. Their inclusion added firepower and, in a sense, some military experience from these veterans of rido and armed political skirmishes. The united front did not last long as battlefield losses, and the regime overtures led to most datu-politicos abandoning the MNLF and switching their support to Marcos. Their “political turncoatism,” had the benefit of keeping them in control of their towns, cities, and provinces, even if they now submitted to the powers of the Marcos dictatorship.<sup>55</sup>

In short, the datu-politician as a central figure in Moro communities survived. After Marcos was overthrown and democratic politics restored, datu-politicos also easily reclaimed their powers and prospered under the new order. The apparatus that the state set up to answer to Moro needs and defuse the MNLF rebellion easily fell prey. The ARMM became just another “bureaucratic layer providing little except position and privilege for self-interested Muslim politician.”<sup>56</sup>

### Diluting Radical Islam

The MNLF was a more secular organization than a religious one, despite its repeated contention that Islam inspired its rebellion. There were several reasons for this abstention, the

foremost which was the nature of its leadership and its international connections. MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari and several of his close comrades were trained in state-run universities (the University of the Philippines in Misuari's case). The Islamic countries that supported its rebellion were countries that were ruled as republics, not caliphates: the Federation of Malaysia, the United Arab Republic of Gamal Abdel Nasser, and the "Islamic socialism" of Libya's Muammar Gaddafi.<sup>57</sup> Misuari echoed these regime's temperament by promising the creation of a Bangsamoro Republik if the MNLF's separatist revolution succeeded. Its "Declaration of Independence" even went beyond this by committing itself "to the principle of establishing a democratic system of government which shall never allow or tolerate any form of exploitation and oppression of any human being by another or one nation by another nation."<sup>58</sup> The MNLF never challenged the right of the datu-politicos to be "the Caliphal representative within the community."

The breakaway faction inside the MNLF that eventually formed the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) justified its actions as a response to the arrogant, conspiratorial and exclusivist "MNLF leadership...being manipulated away from its Islamic basis, methodologies, and objectives and fast evolving towards a Marxist-Maoist orientation."<sup>59</sup> When it officially announced the formation of the MILF on March 1984, its chairman, Salamat Hashim, declared that "the ultimate aim of our Jihad is to make supreme the World of Allah" as they struggle to separate Mindanao, the Sulu archipelago and Palawan island from the Philippine.<sup>60</sup> This commitment to Islam as a political ideology came from MILF leaders being mentored by Egyptian Islamic reformers Hassan al Banna and Syed Qutb while studying at Al-Azhar University. What firmed up this commitment was their subsequent participation in the anti-Soviet *mujahideen* resistance in Afghanistan.<sup>61</sup> When they officially declared their existence, the

MILF had an army consisting of 15,000 regulars and 10,000 militias, led by 500 Afghan-trained commanders, and bragged of a sophisticated politico-administrative structure that paralleled that of the Philippine government.<sup>62</sup>

Islamic swagger, however, was one thing; pursuing the struggle at the ground level was different especially after they (re)encountered the datu-politicos. Jubair was critical of the latter, describing the latter as possessing a “lackluster mentality [that] ultimately led to surrender or what we may mildly term as ‘subservience.’” He blames their “traditional privileges” for having “contributed a lot to this unfortunate frame of mind.”<sup>63</sup> When the peace negotiations with the Philippine government began to forge ahead, however, Jubair had changed his mind. He still acknowledged that “warlord-politicians and vigilantes” ruled Mindanao and their private armies have been used “for highly suspect purposes, including the undermining of the peace process between the MILF and the government.” Then he added this caveat: “They were feared, respected – and hated by foes and friends alike, but in one way or the other they stood for Moro rights and aspirations.”<sup>64</sup> Jubair cited the “old warlords” like the Udtog Matalam of Cotabato and Ali Dimaporo of Lanao del Sur as examples, but he did not stop there. This sympathy towards “Moro rights as aspirations” was also shared by the more current generation datu-politicos, including the most vicious of warlords. In the twisted logic of the MILF ideologue,

[N]one of the present Moro politicians including [former] Governor Datu Andal Ampatuan and his son, Datu Zaldy Ampatuan, regional governor of the ARMM, ever spoke against the on-going GRP [Government of the Republic of the Philippines]-MILF Peace Talks. Invariably, they support the peace talks initiated by the Arroyo administration with the MILF.<sup>65</sup>

Political observers admire the MILF for its political pragmatism, but if seen from the perspective of its relationship to datu-politicos, this realist position is also an admission of the limits of its radicalism.<sup>66</sup> Datu-politicos may have lost some of their authority during the Marcos dictatorship, but after Marcos was ousted in 1986, many of them recouped their political clout. In many cases, however, they faced the challenge of parvenu strongmen and women. One group of rising politicos were the former MNLF commanders who brought their armed entourage along when they shifted to electoral politics.<sup>67</sup> Their combined firepower was more than enough reason for the MILF to bring its radicalism down by several notes. For example, in 2011, in Central Mindanao, where MILF forces were most concentrated, there were also 25 private armies and 45 militias funded by ARMM politicians.<sup>68</sup>

Five years later, the Philippine National Police (PNP) acknowledged that at “least eight out of every ten private armed groups the police are keeping a close watch on are in the two most volatile regions in Mindanao, the ...ARMM and Central Mindanao.”<sup>69</sup> In the past, the MILF promised to work with the Philippine government in dismantling these militias, although the failure to seal the agreement on a new autonomous region under the MILF’s control has prevented this from happening.<sup>70</sup> There is no question that with its 15,000-regular army, the MILF can destroy the private armies of datu-politicos. The problem, however, is that the separatist group has to deal with the continuing approbation of the “traditional role” of datu-politicos. In 2004, the Asia Foundation ran a survey on conflict management in the ARMM. It noted that 57% of the respondents listed family-involved conflicts as the most important and between 44 and 47 percent reported that these conflicts had ended in violence. What is more interesting, however, is that when it came to who could resolve these wars, their preference

remained local elites (Table 4). In the case of *rido*, protagonists sought out local government officials more than the military or the police (Table 5). None asked the MILF for help.

Table 4. Percent with very much trust in specific law enforcers, Moro provinces (percent)<sup>71</sup>

| Official/Leader      | Total | Lanao del Sur | Maguindanao | Sulu | Tawi-Tawi | Lanao del Norte |
|----------------------|-------|---------------|-------------|------|-----------|-----------------|
| Barangay captain     | 60    | 54            | 76          | 62   | 71        | 50              |
| Mayor                | 59    | 35            | 75          | 57   | 69        | 53              |
| Local police         | 42    | 18            | 56          | 47   | 63        | 43              |
| Military             | 38    | 11            | 42          | 45   | 70        | 36              |
| Shariah courts       | 36    | 38            | 46          | 51   | 48        | 24              |
| Lawyers              | 30    | 9             | 47          | 37   | 45        | 23              |
| Judges               | 28    | 6             | 45          | 41   | 43        | 22              |
| Prosecutor/Fiscal    | 28    | 4             | 46          | 38   | 47        | 20              |
| Local secular courts | 27    | 5             | 41          | 39   | 38        | 24              |

Table 5. Institutions which Families involved in *Rido* go to settle the conflict<sup>72</sup>

| Province            | Local Government Officials | Military/ Police | Elders/ Traditional Leaders | Both LGUs and Elders/Tradition als |
|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-----------------------------|------------------------------------|
| Basilan             | 44                         | 7                | 3                           | 3                                  |
| Sultan Kudarat      | 5                          | -                | 3                           | 10                                 |
| Lanao del Norte     | 77                         | 3                | 21                          | 46                                 |
| Tawi-Tawi           | 20                         | -                | 1                           | -                                  |
| Zamboanga Sibugay   | 37                         | 8                | 20                          | 3                                  |
| Zamboanga del Sur   | 24                         | 5                | 18                          | 10                                 |
| Zamboanga del Norte | 43                         | -                | 3                           | 10                                 |
| Sulu                | 62                         | 2                | 12                          | 16                                 |
| North Cotabato      | 4                          | 1                | 14                          | 10                                 |
| Total               | 312 (54%)                  | 25 (4%)          | 81 (14%)                    | 152 (26%)                          |

Moros, however, continued to regard for the national state with suspicion. Moros continue to doubt whether state institutions could resolve *rido*, and bring justice to victims. What Alunan Glang took notice in 1969 – i.e., the absence of the state in the economic, political, religious and social calculations of Moros had changed very little. The percentage of trust towards the judicial system did rise a few percentage points in a 2004 survey, as the national government appeared to be more sensitive to the needs of Moros through offices like the ARMM.

In the whole, however, Moro preference still leaned towards the datu-politicos and keeping the national state at arm's length (Table 6).

Table 6. Perception of Impact of Judicial System to resolve Rido<sup>73</sup>

| Province            | Yes (%) | No (%) |
|---------------------|---------|--------|
| Zamboanga del Norte | 57.1    | 40.5   |
| Zamboanga del Sur   | 48.9    | 51.1   |
| Zamboanga Sibugay   | 39.0    | 61.0   |
| North Cotabato      | 30.0    | 70.0   |
| Sultan Kudarat      | 38.9    | 61.1   |
| Basilan             | 68.3    | 31.7   |
| Lanao del Norte     | 51.3    | 48.7   |
| Tawi-Tawi           | -       | 100    |
| Sulu                | 57.1    | 42.9   |

The repercussions had been devastating. In 2015, the Asian Foundation and the polling group Social Weather Stations (SWS), ran a survey that included ascertaining the percentage of those in Mindanao who were familiar with Islam. The Foundation reported that “extensive knowledge on the teachings and beliefs of Islam were highest at 25% in September 2005, and the lowest at 6% in October 2008. Those with partial but sufficient knowledge of the teachings and beliefs of Islam in Mindanao were the highest at 29% in November 2010 and the lowest at 11% in March 2015.”<sup>74</sup> Historical conjunctures finally abetted the MILF’s dire position. On January 25, 2015, 44 members of the PNP’s Special Action Force were killed in a clash with a combined force of MILF guerrillas and fighters from the MILF breakaway group, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). The after effect of the Mamapasano massacre was immediately palpable: 16 percent of Filipinos nationwide had “much trust” on the Moros, 19% were undecided, and 61% showed little or no trust on the Moros.<sup>75</sup>

## Real Economy of Mindanao

This portrait of the datu-politico's remarkable resilience would not be complete without mention of his involvement in Moro Mindanao's illicit trade. Other than the former MNLF commanders, the other group rose to political pre-eminence were the families of amassed in their association with the thriving illicit drug and armed trade in their areas.<sup>76</sup> The Mindanao's informal economy was born out of the attempts by American colonial officials to suppress the Moro slave trades, which continued to thrive even after the Spanish left, and tax the trade in other commodities in the southern Philippines. These campaigns were only partly successful as the trade simply went underground and was kept secure and protected "dominant families and clans [who] were involved in all important aspects of the underground economy, i.e., from smuggling of pearls, jewelry and other dry goods from Sabah to the smuggling of manufactured goods such as appliances, engines, and vehicles (cars, trucks, motorbikes, etc.) to the illegal transport and sale of unlicensed guns and ammunition."<sup>77</sup>

This continued into the post-war period and even prospered during the 1970s, and despite martial law, as armed groups, including units of the MNLF and the MILF, provided protection. Financing the trade received additional monies after President Corazon Aquino signed a Local Government Code" in 1991, which devolved some agencies of the national government, and returned 40% of taxes collected to the local governments.<sup>78</sup> Then once illegal drugs were added to the list in the 1980s, the illicit sector's part of the Moro Mindanao economy dramatically expanded, and so did the need to capture local state power to protect this flourishing business. According to Francisco Lara, drug money and the "internal [tax] revenue allocations" to the provinces and regions made "the capture of local state power...more attractive for datu elites."

Holding political office in turn “enabled the clans to access the networks, links, and resources that could expand the capital and scope of their underground businesses and illegal operations. Being city mayor, provincial governor and ARMM head “could also buttress the protection of their enterprises and enable them to extort taxes from competitors and other entrants to the underground economy.”<sup>79</sup>

Clans which once operated in the “shadow economy” to escape state interdiction now became the most potent player in the political stage. They challenged and defeated their old patrons in local elections, or when preferring to operate in the shadows, financed the election campaigns of datu-politicos. Among the more notorious of these clans are the Ampatuan family whose patriarch, Andal, started as a member of the security detail of an old Moro political family, then gradually building his power base by investing in drug and weapons trafficking. With his wealth and weapons, Andal became mayor and then was elected governor of Maguindanao Province in 2001. He made sure that his children and kin would be appointed or elected into other offices. Together Ampatuan clan turned Maguindanao province into their fiefdom, with local officials subject to their whims and caprice.<sup>80</sup> Maguindanao likewise became a safe transshipment point for the production and distribution of drugs. They would extend the base of their power when a son was elected ARMM governor.<sup>81</sup>

The Ampatuan’s story was and continues to be replicated all over Moro Mindanao, including Lanao del Sur province where Marawi City is located. Moreover, as was the case in Maguindanao the political, what Rufa Cagoco-Guiam and Steven Schoofs call the “nexus between illicit drugs, politics and violence are often brought into sharp relief by violent incidents that accompany the drug trade in Muslim Mindanao.”<sup>82</sup> A leaked cable from the American embassy in Manila warned of the rise of “narco-politics” in the ARMM, and described Lanao del

Sur this as a province where “drug lords” controlled at least nine municipalities,” including seven mayors whose “Lucky Seven Club” of mayors, each heading a committee that oversees “various illegal activities which include, in addition to drug trafficking, gunrunning, kidnapping, carnapping, armed robbery, and selling smuggled merchandise.”<sup>83</sup>

Finally, Frahana Maute’s leadership role may not be the exception. In Lanao del Sur’s thriving drug trade, two women carried the alias “Shabu Queen of Mindanao.” One of them was Fatima Daud Baliwan, a village official for Magindanao province who was suspected of running a “drug ring” in and around Marawi city. Baliwan was arrested not in Marawi but in President Duterte’s hometown, Davao City.<sup>84</sup> The other “drug queen” was Johaira Macabuat (a.k.a, Johaira Abinal, a.k.a., “Mayora”), a former mayor of a Lanao del Sur town (Maguing) who was arrested in July 2016, for controlling the distribution of methamphetamines. “Mayor” however had strong connections. In September 2018, a local judge ordered the dismissal of all the charges against Johaira, her husband, and eight others for illegal possession of drugs and arms.<sup>85</sup> The judge declared as credible the defense’s contention that agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) planted evidence in Macabuat’s home in 2016.<sup>86</sup>

Filipinos came to learn about Lanao del Sur’s “narco-politicians” as early as 2012. It was in this world where, five years later, the Mautes declared a jihad in the name of ISIS.

## Conclusion

Much had changed in Moro society before and after the Marawi crisis of 2107. The national state now has a permanent presence in “frontier” Mindanao, since the Marcos dictatorship’s war against the MNLF while implementing its “national development plan ” with

the entire Mindanao island playing an integral part in it.<sup>87</sup> The national government had given Moros the ARMM, but it hardly advances Moro autonomy and could not get out of its financial dependence from the national government.


The MNLF and MILF have become enduring parts of the local body politic and play critical players in all of the political, much less military, events in the ummah. Both still favor revolutionary rhetoric although, since the late 1980s, these two armed separatist movements have made peace in variable ways with the Philippine state. Their “political compromise” opened the field to more extremist groups like the Abu Sayyaf, the BILF, and the Maute Group. The dreams of ISIS to organize the branch of the Caliphate in Southeast Asia had reached Moro Mindanao after gaining footholds in Malaysia and Indonesia..<sup>88</sup> In January 2018, government troops clashed with “remnants” of the Maute group, indicating that “liberation” of Marawi did not mean that ISIS had abandoned the southern Philippines. This encounter and many others suggest that the group “might be considering a return, and the Philippines could be an attractive option – where they could find refuge, stage attacks, inspire the Marawi survivors or attempt to open a new training camp.”<sup>89</sup>

The odds of these fundamentalists prevailing in the long run, however, are very low because the political turmoils of the past never eliminate the datu-politicos. They have re-emerged stronger after every significant firestorm. The ARMM governors, including former MNLF commanders given a chance to lead the regional body in 1995, plundered it and used its resources to strengthen their patronage network.<sup>90</sup> The clans also immersed themselves again in political battles, be these electoral, illicit, or political. The latest edition of this combat, the Marawi siege, was a fusion of separatist aspirations, religious zealotry, opoid racketeering, political rivalries, and *rido*. But it was is not the Maute group-as-terrorist that was the nub of the

resistance. It was the datu-politico – the historical glue of Moro society – who gave the family their firepower, and, once the siege was over, outlasted the Mautes and rode out the conflict.

There is, therefore, a need to change the Maute map the government and security agencies crafted, in favor of one with the datu-politicos as the hub and the connecting tissue (Table 7). The temporary lull in the militant attacks meant, among other things, a return to the status quo –preparing for the next elections, restoring the drug network, reconfiguring political alliances, and, most of all, bringing back rido back into the center of local conflicts.

Table 7. The Maute Network (from the Datu-Politico’s perspective)



As the embers of the Marawi siege began to die down, the advocacy group *International Alert* warned that “there will be those who will seek revenge. They lost their property, they lost their loved ones, and they want revenge – that’s one potential source, and its classic *rido*.”<sup>91</sup> This reiteration of the concerns of an earlier 2007 study that showed that “[m]any armed confrontations in the past involving insurgent groups and the military were triggered by a local

rido.”<sup>92</sup> The Mautes themselves have a standing *rido* against the mayor of their hometown, Butig. Dimnatang Pansar’s reaction to the Marawi siege was to declare a *rido* against who ever is left in the Maute family (all members of the primary family were killed or died; only Farhana is alive and is in jail). He has the support of Moro families who were directly affected by the siege.<sup>93</sup> MILF commands whose units joined the Mautes in Marawi had offered asylum to remnants of the group.<sup>94</sup> This has created tensions with the MILF leadership after it ordered its troops to join the AFP in its final assault into Marawi.<sup>95</sup> The MILF *mufti* Sheikh Abuhuraira Abdulrahman Udasan ebeb issued a fatwa against ISIS “vigorously to ensure that this violent extremism or radicalism shall not take root in any part of our communities because it has no basis whatsoever in any of the teachings of Islam.”<sup>96</sup>

In this fluid situation, the only group that rode the crisis were the political clans, especially those in the illicit sector. Civil society groups grudgingly recognize their stabilizing value and warn that violence in the same magnitude as Marawi could very easily break out again if there is a “fragmentation of traditional structures for welfare and protection in Moro society.”<sup>97</sup> This is precisely the ironic power of the datu-politico: the government weakens or eliminates them to bring about lasting peace in Moro Mindanao and conflict would erupt. But to keep them in power also mean that clan control of political office, inter-family rivalries that can easily erupt into clan wars, and the increasingly profitability of the drug trade, will continue to dominate the political landscape. In order to keep some peace, central governments will have to compromise, allow the datu-politicos their seemingly interminable “feudal” dominance, even if they know that the latter – in their now time-tested skill of political calculating - will never break their links with the “other side.”

---

## End Notes

<sup>1</sup> Saber, in “The contact between the traditional and legal authority systems,” p. 3.

<sup>2</sup> In this paper, I use the term “Moro” in recognition of the radical appropriation of a derisive term used by the Spanish against the sultanates and datu-ships of Mindanao.

<sup>3</sup> Naiman Capal, “Take advantage of Your Before Old Age: Interview with Sayfa Gilman,” <http://www.hijabimag.com/take-advantage-of-your-youth-before-old-age/> (accessed September 6, 2018).

<sup>4</sup> Salah Jubair, *Bangsamoro: A Nation under Endless Tyranny* (Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin SDN BHD, 1984) p. 265.

<sup>5</sup> Hapilon was “one of the first Filipino militants to pledge his loyalty to Abu Bakr-al-Baghdadi, the Islamic State leader, after he declared a caliphate in Mosul, Iraq in 2014.” Sidney Jones, “How Isis Got a Foothold in the Philippines,” *The New York Times*, June 4, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/opinion/isis-philippines-rodriigo-duterte.html> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>6</sup> “‘Articulate, educated, idealistic,’ Maute brothers who brought Islamic State brand of terror to southern Philippine city,” *South China Morning Post*, June 12, 2017, <https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-asia/article/2097909/articulate-educated-idealistic-maute-brothers-who-brought> (accessed September 12, 2018)/ According to Carmela Fonbuena, “[It] was in 2016 when they earned their own notorious name ‘Maute Brothers’ after they attacked a military detachment and killed two soldiers in nearby Butig, the hometown of Farhana.” Carmela Fonbuena, “Terror in Mindanao: The Mautes of Marawi,” *Rappler*, June 26, 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/173697-terrorism-mindanao-maute-family-marawi-city> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>7</sup> Some of these hostages were reportedly raped and forced to become “wives” of Maute militants as per the ISIS norms of gender relationships. See “Women hostages forced to sex slavery by Maute terrorists, the military says,” *ABS-CBN News*, June 27, 2017, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/06/27/17/women-hostages-forced-to-sex-slavery-by-maute-terrorists-military-says> (accessed September 21, 2018).

<sup>8</sup> “*The Battle of Marawi*”: *Death and Destruction in the Philippines* (London: Amnesty International, 2017), p. 6. <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/ASA3574272017ENGLISH.PDF> (accessed September 8, 2018); and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Protection Cluster, “Philippines: Displacement Dashboard, Mindanao, Issue No. 43 (December 2017),” <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-displacement-dashboard-mindanao-issue-no-43-december-2017> (accessed September 8, 2018).

---

<sup>9</sup> Joseph Hincks, “The Battle for Marawi City: What the Siege of a Philippine City reveals about ISIS’ deadly new front in Asia,” *Time*, <http://time.com/marawi-philippines-isis/> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>10</sup> The Mautes had also been successful in recruiting Moro students by promising their freedom from a constricting “feudal” relationship where their parents’ authority was unquestioned. This was particularly appealing to the women who had no say in the planning of their future, and whose acts of defiance, especially when it came to intimate relationship, would cause them to be publicly shamed and ostracized from the family and the community. Carmela Fonbuena, “MILF, Maute Group battle for legitimacy,” *Rappler*, July 3, 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/174531-milf-maute-group-peace-process-marawi-crisis> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>11</sup> Jones, “How Isis Got a Foothold in the Philippines,” *The New York Times*, June 4, 2017, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/opinion/isis-philippines-rodriago-duterte.html> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>12</sup> Charmaine Deogracias, “Duterte bestows ISIS status on Maute Group,” *PhilStar Global*, May 29., 2017, <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/05/29/1704755/duterte-bestows-isis-status-maute-group> (accessed September 10, 2018).

<sup>13</sup> Kaye Impson, “AFP validating if mom of Maute Group top leaders went to Lanao town to bury her 2 sons,” *Interaksyon*, June 13, 2017, <http://www.interaksyon.com/afp-validating-if-mom-of-maute-group-top-leaders-went-to-lanao-town-to-bury-her-2-sons/> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>14</sup> Rambo Talambong, “PNP captures suspected Maute group funder,” *Rappler*, October 24, 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/186214-pnp-capture-aminkisa-macadato-maute-group-funder-marawi> (accessed September 12, 2018). A possible cousin, Unday Macadato, was arrested and accused of being a sniper during the siege. Rambo Talambong, “PNP nabs alleged Maute Group sniper ahead of Marawi siege anniversary,” *Rappler*, May 8, 2018, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/202013-pnp-arrest-maute-group-sniper> (accessed September 12, 2018).

<sup>15</sup> Manuel Mogato, “Little-known Maute militants becoming formidable force in the Philippines,” *Reuters*, May 24, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-maute/little-known-maute-militants-becoming-formidable-force-in-philippines-idUSKBN18K16W> (accessed September 10, 2018).

<sup>16</sup> Chiara Zambrano, “The ties that bind MILF and Maute group,” *ABS-CBN News*, March 3, 2016, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/03/03/16/the-ties-that-bind-milf-and-maute-group> (accessed September 12, 2018)..

---

<sup>17</sup> Karol Ilagan, “The Ties that Bind: The Maguindanao Chronicles: Repots on Politics, Murder and the Quest for Justice, *Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism*, April 10, 2013, <http://pcij.org/stories/the-ties-that-bind/> (accessed September 12, 2018). Nijiya was arrested on suspicion of helping her husband, but was released later on. See Ina Reformina, “Maute member’s wife released,” *ABS-CBN News*, January 13, 2018, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/01/31/18/maute-members-wife-released> (accessed September 12, 2018).

<sup>18</sup> “Filipino force seize 11 kg of methamphetamine from rebels fighting in Marawi,” *Agencia EFE*, June 19, 2017, <https://www.efe.com/efe/english/world/filipino-forces-seize-11kg-of-methamphetamine-from-rebels-fighting-in-marawi/50000262-3301251> (accessed September 12, 2018).; Alwen Saliring, “Former Marawi City mayor arrested for rebellion,” *Sunstar Philippines*, June 8, 2017, <https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/146440> (accessed September 12, 2018); and Jaime Laude, Roel Pareno, and John Unson, “Ex-mayor tagged as Maute financier,” *PhilStar Global*, June 8, 2017, <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/06/08/1708190/ex-mayor-tagged-maute-financier/> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>19</sup> Alexis Romero, “Links between Marawi siege, drugs confirmed,” *PhilStar Global*, June 24, 2017, <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/06/24/1713458/link-between-marawi-siege-drugs-confirmed> (accessed September 12, 2018).

<sup>20</sup> “Duterte drug matrix: Salic brothers control all drug trade in Lanao del Sur; sent kill orders against rival drug lords,” *Politiko: The Bible of Philippine Politics*, September 23, 2017, <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2017/06/24/1713458/link-between-marawi-siege-drugs-confirmed> (accessed September 12, 2018).

<sup>21</sup> Allan Nawal, “DND removes names of ex-Marawi mayor, vice mayor, from wanted list,” *Inquirer Net*, April 29, 2017, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/923991/defense-department-secretary-delfin-lorenzana-marawi-city-mayor-omar-solitario-ali-vice-mayor-arafat-salic-mindanao-crisis> (accessed September 12, 2018).

<sup>22</sup> Raju Gopalakrishnan and Manuel Mogato, “The Mautes of the Philippines: from monied family to Islamic State,” *Reuters*, June 22, 2017, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-philippines-militants-matriarch/the-mautes-of-the-philippines-from-monied-family-to-islamic-state-idUSKBN19E0A9> (accessed September 12, 2018).

<sup>23</sup> Carmela Fonbuena, “Who is Farhana Maute?” *Rappler*, June 10, 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/172523-farhana-maute-marawi-siege> (accessed September 12, 2018); and Nicola Smith, “‘Terrorist matriarch’ emerges as kingpin behind Islamic State assault on Philippine city,” *The Telegraph*, June 26, 2017, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/06/26/terrorist-matriarch-emerges-kingpin-behind-islamic-state-assault/> (access September 12, 2018).

<sup>24</sup> “Update – the Philippines, Indonesia and Myanmar (Burma),” *South East and Indochina Review*, November 2017, <http://oamme.com/2017/11/16/south-east-asia-and-indochina-review-november-2017/> (accessed September 12, 2018).

- 
- <sup>25</sup> Fonbuena, "Terror in Mindanao: The Mautes of Marawi," *Rappler*, June 26, 2017.
- <sup>26</sup> Sanusi was married to the daughter of Mimbantas. Sidney Jones, "Pro-ISIS groups in Mindanao and their links to Indonesia and Malaysia," *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict*, Report No. 33 (25 October 2016), pp. 14-16.
- <sup>27</sup> On the concept of the *orang besar*, see O.W. Wolters, *History, Culture and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982), pp. 5-9.
- <sup>28</sup> The founder of the Sulu Sultanate, Syed Abu Bakr, was said to be Hadrami as the title "Syed" was the one given to these missionary-trader-diplomat. On the coming of the Hadrami to Southeast Asia see, Sumit Mandal, *Becoming Arab: Creole Histories and Modern Identity in the Malay World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 26.
- <sup>29</sup> Eric Tagliacozzo, *The Longest Journey: Southeast Asians and the Pilgrimage to Mecca* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 233.
- <sup>30</sup> Wolters, *History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives*, pp. 18-19.
- <sup>31</sup> The motivation may be pragmatic: the missionaries lacked the manpower to continue the evangelization. The *orang besar* did not only have the influence but also the additional personnel for the mission.
- <sup>32</sup> Samuel K. Tan, *Surat Sug: Letters of the Sultanate of Sulu*, Vol. 1 (Manila: National Historical Institute, 2005), p 48.
- <sup>33</sup> Cesar Adib Majul, *Moros in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press and the Asian Center, 1973), p 16.
- <sup>34</sup> Thomas M. Kiefer, "The Tausog polity and the Sultanate of Sulu: A Segmentary State in the southern Philippines," in *People of the Current Sulu Studies Revised* (Manila: National Commission for Culture and the Arts, 2003), p. 14.
- <sup>35</sup> Ruurdje Laarhoven, *Triumph of Moro Diplomacy: The Maguindanao Sultanate in the 17<sup>th</sup> Century* (Quezon City, Ruudje Laarhoven and New Day Publishers, 1989), p. 141.
- <sup>36</sup> Cesar Adib Majul, "An Analysis of the 'Genealogy of Sulu,'" *Archipel*, 22 (Annee 1981), p. 167. *Moros in the Philippines* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press and the Asian Center, 1973), pp. 16, 25.
- <sup>37</sup> These scholars put a nationalist spin to these "Moro wars" by describing them as a long-drawn, 200-year "anti-colonial resistance" by the sultanates of Maguindanao, Buayan and Sulu. See Cesar Adib Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines* (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1985), Chapter 2; T.J. S. George *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine*

---

*Politics* (Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 28-48; and, Ivan Molloy, "The decline of the Moro national liberation front in the Southern Philippines," *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, Volume 18, No. 1 (January 1, 1988), 59-76.

<sup>38</sup> Thomas McKenna, *Moros Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1998), p. 77.

<sup>39</sup> Article 2 of the treaty between the Sultan of Sulu Jamalul Kiram and American General John C. Bates stated: "The rights and dignities of His Highness the Sultan and datos shall be fully respected; the Moros shall not be interfered with on account of their religion; all their religious customs shall be respected, and no one shall be persecuted on account of his religion." Quoted in Jubair, *Bangsamoro: A Nation under Endless Tyranny*, p. 62.

<sup>40</sup> An excellent discussion of this commercial project in Michael Hawkins' *Making Moros: Imperial Historicism and American Military Rule in the Philippines' Muslim South* (DeKalb, Illinois: Northern Illinois University Press and the Center for Southeast Asian Studies, 2013), 224 pp.

<sup>41</sup> Patricio N. Abinales, *Making Mindanao: Cotabato and Davao in the Formation of the Philippine Nation-State* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 2000), p. 206.

<sup>42</sup> Mamitua Saber, "The Contact between the Traditional and Legal Authority in a Moro setting," in Alfredo Tiamson, ed., *On the Codification of Moro Customary (Adat) and Quranic Laws* (Davao City: Ateneo de Davao University and the Mindanao State University, 1974), pp. 300-301 (underscoring mine).

<sup>43</sup> Thomas McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines* (Los Angeles, Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 114.

<sup>44</sup> Muslim "religious fanaticism" here referred to the *amok*, a fanatic's attack targeting everyone around him (particularly his enemies). Filipinos weaved myths around Moros allegedly possessing this "demonical impulse" and this became a permanent marker to describe the Moros. See Eduardo Ugarte, "Running Amok: The 'Demonical Impulse'," *Asian Studies Review*, Vol. 16, Issue 1 (2007): pp. 182-189. The belief has not faded away. In a 2005 human development survey, 55% of Filipino respondents "think that Muslims are probably more prone to run amok." See "Philippine Human Development Report 2005," Second edition (Manila: Human Development Network, 2005) p. 56.

<sup>45</sup> Tagliacozzo, *The Longest Journey*, p. 234.

<sup>46</sup> "Appendix M Report, Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary, December 19, 1953," in *Report of the Commission on Elections to the President of the Philippines and the Congress on*

---

*the Manner the Elections were held on 10 November 1953* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1954), pp. 122-123.

<sup>47</sup> Filipinas Foundation, *An Anatomy of Philippine Muslim Affairs: A Study in Depth of Muslim Affairs in the Philippines* (Makati, Rizal: Filipinas Foundation, 1971), p. 102.

<sup>48</sup> See United Nations Office of Humanitarian Affairs, "Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Profile, December 1, 2015, <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-autonomous-region-muslim-mindanao-armm-profile-1-dec-2015> (accessed September 26, 2018).

<sup>49</sup> Alunan Glang, *Moro Secession or Integration?* (Quezon City: R.P. Garcia, 1969), p. 3

<sup>50</sup> Claribel D. Bartolome, *Maratbat and Rido: Implications for Peace and National Development* (Marawi City: Department of Graduate Studies, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mindanao State University, 2001), as quoted in Lingga, "Dynamics and Management of *Rido* in the Province of Maguindanao," p. 47.

<sup>51</sup> Ophelia L Durante, Norma T. Gomez, Ester O. Sevilla, and Howard Manego, "Management of Clan Conflict and *Rido* among the Tausug, Maguindanao, Maranao, Sama, and Yakan Tribes," in *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management*, pp. 97-98.

<sup>52</sup> Abhoud Syed Lingga, "Dynamics and Management of *Rido* in the Province of Maguindanao," in Wilfredo Magno Torres, *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014), p. 49.

<sup>53</sup> The MNLF was able to convince Libyan President Colonel Moamar Khaddafi that this genocidal campaign was happening, while the Malaysian government was seething over the attempt by Marcos to destabilize the federal state of Sabah through military infiltration to show the Malaysian government that the Philippines historic claim to Sabah was still on the table. See "Wikileaks: Libya used Sabah to arm PHL Moro rebels in 1970s," Alpaslan Ozerdem, "The Contribution of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference to the Peace Process in Mindanao," *Civil Wars Journal*, Vol. 14, Issue 3 (2012): 3930413; Paridah Abd. Samad and Darusalam Abu Bakar, "Malaysian-Philippine Relations: The Issue of Sabah," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 32, Nop. 6 ( ( June 1992), pp. 554-567; and *GMA News Online*, April 12, 2013, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/303584/wikileaks-libya-used-sabah-to-arm-phl-moro-rebels-in-1970s/story/> (accessed September 27, 2018); Majul, *The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines*,

<sup>54</sup> Apart from McKenna's *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, the best accounts about the separatist war include T.J.S. George, *Revolt in Mindanao: The Rise of Islam in Philippine Politics* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), 294 pp; Eric U. Gutierrez, ed. *Rebels, Warlords, and Ulama: A Reader on Muslim Separatism and the War in the Southern Philippines* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), 366 pp; and, Marites Vitug and Glenda Gloria, *Under*

---

*the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy and the Institute for Popular Democracy, 2000), 327 pp.

<sup>55</sup> McKenna, *Muslim Rulers and Rebels*, pp. 161-163.

<sup>56</sup> Macapado Muslim and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, *Mindanao, Land of Promise*, London: Conciliation Resources, 1999), as quoted by Francisco J. Lara, *Insurgents, Clans, and States: Political Legitimacy and Resurgent Conflict in Muslim Mindanao, Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014), p. 142.

<sup>57</sup> Marjanie Salic Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements in Mindanao: Islam as a Thrusting Force," *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, Vol. 19, Issue 4 (April 2014), footnote 27-28, pp. 4-5. See also Youssef M. Choueiri, *Arab Nationalism: A History: Nation and State in the Arab World* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), pp. 166-206. On the creation of a secular Federation of Malaysia, see Donna J. Amoroso, *Traditionalism and the Ascendancy of the Malay Ruling Class in Colonial Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur and Singapore: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre and National University of Singapore Press, 2014), pp. 167-210.

<sup>58</sup> "Manifesto of the Moro National Liberation Front on the 'Establishment of the Bangsa Moro Republic,'" *Bangsa Moro Homeland*, April 28, 1974.

<sup>59</sup> "Letter of Salamat Hashim to the OIC [Organization of Islamic Conference] Secretary-General Ahmadou Karim Gaye, December 23, 1977," as quoted by Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements in Mindanao: Islam as a Thrusting Force," p. 7.

<sup>60</sup> Salamat Hashim, *The Bangsamoro Mujahid: His Objectives and Responsibilities* (Mindanao: Bangsamoro Publications, 1985), p. 4, as quoted by Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements in Mindanao," p. 8. Macasalong quotes Joseph Liow who wrote: "Hashim proposed that it was through *da'wah* and *jihad* that the MILF Islāmization agenda, which comprised of the transformation of every Muslim in MILF into 'a true and real Muslim whose beliefs...and his entire life is in conformity with the teachings of Islam derived from the Qur'an and Sunnah', of every MILF home into 'real Islamic homes where the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah prevail', and of community into 'a true Islamic one governed by the Shari'ah' would be realized." Joseph Chinyong Liow. "Muslim Resistance in Southern Thailand and [the] Southern Philippines: Religion, Ideology, and Politics," *East-West Center Washington*, Policy Studies 24 (2006): p. 15., as quoted by Macasalong, "The Liberation Movements in Mindanao," pp. 8-9.

<sup>61</sup> Marjanie Salic Macasalong, "The Impact of Militancy on Liberation Movements: The Case of Mindanao," *Islamic and Civilisational Renewal*, No. 5.2, p. 231, <https://www.icrjournal.org/icr/index.php/icr/article/download/405/381/> (accessed September 13, 2018).

<sup>62</sup> And clearly so. The MILF's political organization is quite elaborate. Its leadership is assigned "political committees" to head, and such bodies are represented from the top down to provincial, town and the village levels, the last three running parallel to that of the government's local

---

administrative structures. See Shamsuddin L. Taya, “The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines,” *Intellectual Discourse*, Vol. 15, No. 1 (2007): p. 63. On the MILF’s army, see Macasalong, “The Impact of Militancy on Liberation Movements,” p. 231.

<sup>63</sup> Jubair, *Bangsamoro: A Nation under Endless Tyranny*, p. 144.

<sup>64</sup> Salah Jubair, *The Long Road to Peace: Inside the GRP-MILF Peace Process* (Cotabato City: Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, 2007), p. pp. 84-85.

<sup>65</sup> Jubair, *The Long Road to Peace*, p. 85 (underscoring mine). The Ampatuans and their private army killed 58 people on November 23, 2009.

<sup>66</sup> On the MILF’s pragmatism, see Joseph Franco, “The Philippines: The Moro Islamic Liberation Front – A Pragmatic Power Structure?”, in Michelle Hughes and Michael Miklaucic, eds. *Impunity: Countering Illicit Power in War and Transition* (Washington D.C. Center for Complex Operations, May 19, 2016), pp. 170-189.

<sup>67</sup> Anna Louise Strachan, “Conflict Analysis of Muslim Mindanao.” *Governance-Social Development-Humanitarian-Conflict* (GSDRC) and the Australian Government, December 2015, p. 10.

<sup>68</sup> The Institute of Bangsamoro Studies and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, “Armed Violence in Mindanao: Militia and Private Armies,” p. 24. There were 102 of militias all over Mindanao island.

<sup>69</sup> Germelina Lacorte and Judy Quiros, “PNP: 80% of private armies keep hideouts in Mindanao,” *Inquirer Net*, April 2, 2016, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/777424/pnp-80-of-private-armies-keep-hideouts-in-mindanao> (accessed September 18, 2018).

<sup>70</sup> John Unson, “MILF to help in dismantling private armies in Mindanao,” *PhilStar Global*, January 3, 2013, <https://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/01/03/892881/milf-help-dismantling-private-armies-mindanao> (accessed September 18, 2018).

<sup>71</sup> Carijane C. DayangLaylo, “Conflict management in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao, paper presented at the 4<sup>th</sup> Regional Conference of the World Association for Public Opinion Research, February 23-24, 2004, Asian Institute of Management, p. 6.

<sup>72</sup> Jamail A. Kamlian, “Survey of Feuding Families and Clans in Selected Province in Mindanao,” in Wilfredo Magno Torres, *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014), 40

<sup>73</sup> Jamail A. Kamlian, “Survey of Feuding Families and Clans in Selected Province in Mindanao,” in Wilfredo Magno Torres, *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2014), p. 41.

---

<sup>74</sup> Asia Foundation and Social Weather Stations, “Filipino Public Opinion on the Bangsamoro Basic Law and the Mamasapano Incident,” *SWS*, March and June 2015 Surveys, p. 4.

<sup>75</sup> Armed Forces of the Philippines Board of Inquiry, “The Mamasapano Report,” March 2015, pp. 72-76, as posted in *GMA News Online*, March 13, 2015, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/451737/full-report-pnp-board-of-inquiry-report-on-mamasapano-encounter/story/> (accessed September 15, 2018)/

<sup>76</sup> See, for example, how the vicious Ampatuan family – responsible for the massacre of 58 people, 34 of them journalists, on November 23, 2009 – came to power by eliminating heads of an older political clan, the Candao. See “*They Own the People*”: *The Ampatuans, State-backed Militias, and Killings in the Southern Philippines* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2010), p. 27-31.

<sup>77</sup> Lara, *Insurgents, Clans, and States*, p. 163.

<sup>78</sup> See “Point C, section 284, Title III. Shares of Local Government Units in the Proceeds of National Taxes, the Local Government Code of the Philippines,” Chan Robles Virtual Law Library, <http://www.chanrobles.com/localgov2.htm#.W6wh3xNKg8Y> (accessed September 26, 2018).

<sup>79</sup> Lara, *Insurgents, Clans, and States*, p. 165.

<sup>80</sup> A senior police officer assigned to the Maguindanao province had this story to share ““You can't be installed as regional director [of police] if you don't go along with the policies of the [Ampatuan] government. [A police officer] has to give at least 50 weapons [to the Ampatuans] in order to become a regional director, including M14s, M16s. One [time], ... they requested some 700 firearms... The van [carrying the firearms] entered the camp, after a few hours it was escorted by the policemen from Maguindanao, taken to the [Ampatuan] residence.” See Human Rights Watch, “Philippines: Local Ruling Family’s Abuses Implicate Government,” December 6, 2009, <https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/16/philippines-local-ruling-familys-abuses-implicate-government> (accessed September 26, 2018).

<sup>81</sup> See Human Rights Watch, “*They Own the People: The Ampatuans, State-backed Militias, and Killings in the Southern Philippines* (New York, Human Rights Watch, 2101), 104 pp. On the Ampatuans control of Maguindnaao Province and the ARMM see Lara, *Insurgents, Clans, and States*, p. 284,

<sup>82</sup> Rufa Cagoco-Guiam and Steven Schoofs, “A Deadly Cocktail? Illicit Drugs, Politics and Violent Conflict in Lanao del Sur and Maguindanao,” in Francisco J. Lara, Jr., and Steven Schoofs, eds., *Out of the Shadows: Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of Mindanao* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press and International Alert, 2016), p. 113.

---

<sup>83</sup> As quoted in Guiam and Schoofs, “A Deadly Cocktail,” p. 139. Lara counted 12 municipalities as “heavily involved in the drug trade.” Lara, *Insurgents, Clans, and States*, p. 166. Guiam and Schoofs write that the politician-members of the “Lucky Seven Club” are “governed by strict codes of conduct and well-defined agreements on profit-sharing,” thereby creating a “criminal web of activities [that] mimics the internal governance structure of a mega-corporation.” Guiam and Schoofs, “A Deadly Cocktail,” p. 140.

<sup>84</sup> Louie Angchay, “Mindanao ‘shabu queen’ falls in Davao,” *ABS-CBN News*, September 5, 2017, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/05/17/mindanao-shabu-queen-falls-in-davao> (accessed October 5, 2018).

<sup>85</sup> Jigger J. Jerusalem, “After Marimar’s arrest, shabu supply seen to lessen,” *SunStar Philippines*, July 25, 2016, <https://www.sunstar.com.ph/article/88114> (accessed September 26, 2018). Johaira’s siblings, Mamulan Abinal Molok (also a former mayor of Maguing) and Ali Abo Abinal (mayor of Marantao town) surrendered to authorities and admitted being involved in the drug trade. They “vowed to change their ways.” See “Two mayors surrender, admit involvement in drug trade,” *ABS-CBN News*, August 5, 2016, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/news/08/05/16/two-mayors-surrender-admit-involvement-in-drug-trade> (accessed September 26, 2018).

<sup>86</sup> Jigger J. Jerusalem, “Court clears Mindanao ‘drug queen’,” *Inquirer.net*, <https://newsinfo.inquirer.net/1037124/court-clears-mindanao-drug-queen> (accessed September 6, 2018), <https://app.grammarly.com/ddocs/375013906> (accessed September 5, 2018).

<sup>87</sup> Rafael Salas, “Development Plan for Mindanao,” *Sunday Times Magazine*, No. 2 (February 1961): pp. 2-3; Eugenio Demegillo, “Mindanao: Development and Marginalization,” *University of the Philippines Third World Studies Center, The Philippines in the Third World Papers*, Series 20 (August 1979), pp. 1-21; and, Eduardo Tadem, *Mindano Report: A Preliminary Study on the Economic Origins of Social Unrest* (Davao City: AFRIM Resource Center, Davao City, 1980); p. 24-53.

<sup>88</sup> Sidney Jones, “Post-Marawi Lessons from Detained Extremists in the Philippines,” *Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict Report No 41* (27 November 2017), pp. 1-11; and Sidney Jones, “Radicalisation in the Philippines: The Cotabato Cell of the ‘East Asian Wilayah,’” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, DOI (July 1, 2018): pp. 1-11.

<sup>89</sup> Sidney Jones, “After Hapilon’s death and the ‘liberation’ of Marawi,” *The Interpreter* (The Lowy Institute), October 19, 2017, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/after-isnilon-hapilon-s-death-and-liberation-marawi> (accessed September 8, 2018).; and, “Fighting erupts between troops, Maute group in Lanao del Sur,” *Rappler*, January 20, 2018, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/194115-encounter-troops-maute-terrorists-lanao-del-sur> (accessed September 8, 2018). See also Ralph Jennings, “Moro rebels retrench in Philippines after losing 5-month war,” *Voice of America*, March 9, 2018, <https://www.voanews.com/a/philippines-maute-rebels/4287525.html> (accessed September 8, 2018).

---

<sup>90</sup> See G. Carter Bentley, “People Power and after in the Islamic City of Marawi,” in Benedict J. Kerkviet and Resil B. Mojares, eds., *From Marcos to Aquino: Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1991), pp. 36-58.

<sup>91</sup> Jee Y. Geronimo, “Group warns of revenge killings, rise in clan feuding in Marawi,” *Rappler*, November 30, 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/189922-warning-revenge-killings-clan-feuding-marawi> (accessed September 10, 2018).

<sup>92</sup> Wilfredo Magno Torres III, ed. *Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao* (Manila: The Asia Foundation, 2007), p. 8. See also Simone Orendain, “Philippines Local Disputes Complicate Peace Talks with Separatists,” *Voice of America*, June 26, 2011, [www.voanews.com/content/philippines-local-disputes-complicate-peace-talks-with-separatists-124586334/141380.html](http://www.voanews.com/content/philippines-local-disputes-complicate-peace-talks-with-separatists-124586334/141380.html) (accessed September 15, 2018).

<sup>93</sup> Carmela Fonbuena reported such reaction: “*“Kung talagang bigyan niyo ako ng pulutan at bigyan ng baril, laban na talaga sa Maute group yan* (If you are going to supply me with bullets and firearms, I will really fight that Maute group),” said an angry Punde Ander, chairman of Barangay Butig Proper, during the meeting at the National Irrigation Authority building where the municipal government has been holding office since they abandoned the town hall in Butig Proper.” Carmela Fonbuena, “Arm Butig residents to fight Maute? Mayor says no,” *Rappler*, December 4, 2016, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/154457-butig-residents-firearms-maute> (accessed September 21, 2018).

<sup>94</sup> Carmela Fonbuena, “Maute group taking refuge near MILF areas in Butig,” *Rappler*, December 6, 2016, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/154627-maute-clashes-drag-milf> (accessed September 21, 2018).

<sup>95</sup> Carmela Fonbuena, “MILF, Maute Group battle for legitimacy,” *Rappler*, July 3, 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/174531-milf-maute-group-peace-process-marawi-crisis> (accessed September 21, 2018).

<sup>96</sup> Carmela Fonbuena, “MILF commits to implement fatwa vs. radical extremism,” *Rappler*, July 5, 2017, <https://www.rappler.com/nation/174775-milf-support-fatwa-radical-extremism> (accessed September 8, 2018).

<sup>97</sup> Francisco J. Lara, Jr., “Our long hot summer of terror,” *Business World*, June 8, 2017, <http://www.bworldonline.com/our-long-hot-summer-of-terror/> (accessed September 8, 2018).