{"id":6079,"date":"2019-02-08T18:15:12","date_gmt":"2019-02-08T09:15:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/?p=6079"},"modified":"2025-11-27T13:05:00","modified_gmt":"2025-11-27T04:05:00","slug":"itoh-hideshi-professor-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/faculty-en\/6079","title":{"rendered":"ITOH Hideshi, Professor"},"content":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<h3>Profile<\/h3>\n<p>Professor Itoh joined WBS in 2017. Prior to joining WBS, he served as professors at Kyoto University, Osaka University, and Hitotsubashi University. He was visiting professors at University of California at San Diego, Stanford University, and Columbia University. He received MA and BA in commerce from Hitotsubashi University, and Ph.D. in decision sciences from Stanford University. Professor Itoh has widely published in academic journals in the field of organizational economics and contract theory. He is the 2003 recipient of the Nakahara Prize from Japanese Economic Association. He is an Executive Board Member of Japan Law and Economics Association, and a former President of Japanese Economic Association(2022-2023)<\/p>\n<h3>Selected Publications<\/h3>\n<p>Google Scholar: <a href=\"https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/citations?user=WHbC5OwAAAAJ&amp;hl=en\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">https:\/\/scholar.google.com\/citations?user=WHbC5OwAAAAJ&amp;hl=en<\/a><\/p>\n<p><strong>\uff1c<\/strong><strong>Journal Articles\uff1e<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>&#8220;What Do Contracts Do to Facilitate Relationships?&#8221; Forthcoming in <em>Japanese Economic Review<\/em>. doi: 10.1007\/s42973-023-00132-7<\/li>\n<li>&#8220;Information Acquisition, Decision Making, and Implementation in Organizations,&#8221; <em>Management Science<\/em>, 69(1), 2023, 446-463, (with Kimiyuki Morita) doi: 10.1287\/mnsc.2022.4373<\/li>\n<li>\u201cFormal Contracts, Relational Contracts, and the Threat-Point Effect,\u201d <em>American Economic Journal: Microeconomics<\/em>, 7 (2015), 318-346 (with Hodaka Morita).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cEconomic Theories of Middle Management: Monitoring, Communication, and the Middle Manager&#8217;s Dilemma,\u201d <em>Japan Labor Review <\/em>7, No,4 (2010), 5-22 (with Fumitoshi Moriya).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cComplementarities among Authority, Accountability, and Monitoring: Evidence from Japanese Business Groups,\u201d <em>Journal of the Japanese and International Economies<\/em> 22 (2008): 207-228 (with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cMoral Hazard and Other-Regarding Preferences,\u201d <em>Japanese Economic Review<\/em> 55 (2004), 18-45.\n<ul>\n<li>Reprinted with a newly written addendum in Shinsuke Ikeda, Hideaki Kiyoshi Kato, Fumio Ohtake, and Yoshiro Tsutsui (eds.), <em>Behavioral Interactions, Markets, and Economic Dynamics: Topics in Behavioral Economics<\/em>. Springer (2016), Chapter 17, 483-517.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\u201cCorporate Restructuring in Japan, Part I: Can M-Form Organization Manage Diverse Businesses?\u201d <em>Japanese Economic Review<\/em> 54 (2003), 49-73.<\/li>\n<li>\u201cJob Design and Incentives in Hierarchies with Team Production,\u201d <em>Hitotsubashi Journal of Commerce and Management<\/em> 36 (2001), 1-17.<\/li>\n<li>\u201cMoral Hazard and Renegotiation with Multiple Agents,\u201d <em>Review of Economic Studies<\/em> 68 (2001), 1-20 (with Shingo Ishiguro).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cJob Design, Delegation, and Cooperation: A Principal-Agent Analysis,\u201d <em>European Economic Review<\/em> 38 (1994), 691-700.<\/li>\n<li>\u201cCoalitions, Incentives, and Risk Sharing,\u201d <em>Journal of Economic Theory<\/em> 60 (1993), 410-27.\n<ul>\n<li>Reprinted in David Martimort (ed.), <em>The Economic Theory of Incentives<\/em>. Edward Elgar (2017), Volume II, Chapter 13.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\u201cCooperation in Hierarchical Organizations: An Incentive Perspective,\u201d <em>Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization<\/em> 8 (1992), 321-45.<\/li>\n<li>\u201cJapanese Human Resource Management from the Viewpoint of Incentive Theory,\u201d <em>Ricerche Economiche<\/em> 45 (1991), 345-76.\n<ul>\n<li>Reprinted in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.), <em>The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength<\/em>. Oxford University Press (1994).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\u201cSocial Relations and Incentive Contracts,\u201d <em>Kyoto University Economic Review<\/em> 41 (1991), 35-55.<\/li>\n<li>\u201cIncentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations,\u201d <em>Econometrica<\/em> 59 (1991), 611&#8211;36.\n<ul>\n<li>Reprinted in Peter M. Jackson (ed.), <em>The Economics of Organization and Bureaucracy<\/em>. Edward Elgar (2013), Volume I, Chapter 23.<\/li>\n<li>Reprinted in David Martimort (ed.), <em>The Economic Theory of Incentives<\/em>. Edward Elgar (2017), Volume I, Chapter 23.<\/li>\n<li>Featured in Cheap Talk: A blog about economics, politics and the random interests of forty-something professors, <a href=\"https:\/\/cheaptalk.org\/2010\/01\/07\/how-should-state-c-i-a-n-c-t-c-etc-be-incentivized-to-work-together\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">\u201cHow should State, C.I.A., N.C.T.C. etc. be incentivized to work together?\u201d<\/a>, January 7, 2010.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>\u201cInformation Processing Capacities of the Firm,\u201d <em>Journal of the Japanese and International Economies<\/em> 1 (1987), 299-326.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p><strong>\u00a0\uff1c<\/strong><strong>Chapter in Books\uff1e<\/strong><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>\u201cBusiness Portfolio Restructuring of Japanese Firms in the 1990s: Entry and Exit Analysis,\u201d in Masahiko Aoki, Gregory Jackson, and Hideaki Miyajima (eds.), <em>Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Change and Organizational Diversity<\/em>. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press, 2007, Chapter 8, 227-256 (with Tatsuya Kikutani and Osamu Hayashida).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cDecentralised Personnel Management,\u201d in I. Ohashi and T. Tachibanaki (eds.), <em>Internal Labour Market, Incentives and Employment<\/em>. Macmillan Press, 1998, Chapter 5, 98-125 (with Osamu Hayashida).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cDo Positions and Tenure of Top Executives Affect Their Attitude?\u201d in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), <em>Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm<\/em>. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 3, 56-78 (with Hiroshi Teruyama).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cEffort Incentives: Evidence from Japanese Data,\u201d in T. Tachibanaki (ed.), <em>Who Runs Japanese Business?: Management and Motivation in the Firm<\/em>. Edward Elgar, 1998, Chapter 3, 97-125 (with Hiroshi Teruyama).<\/li>\n<li>\u201cCoordination, Specialization, and Incentives in Product Development Organization,\u201d in Masahiko Aoki and Ronald Dore (eds.), <em>The Japanese Firm: The Sources of Competitive Strength<\/em>. Oxford University Press (1994), Chapter 10, 265&#8211;284.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<h3>Courses in Charge<\/h3>\n<p>Organizational Economics<\/p>\n<h3>Others<\/h3>\n<p>Personal Website: <a href=\"https:\/\/go2hitoh.github.io\/\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">hideshi_itoh&#8217;s_website (go2hitoh.github.io)<\/a><\/p>\n<div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p style=\"text-align: right;\"><a href=\"\/fcom\/wbs\/en\/faculty\">Back<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>&nbsp; Profile Professor Itoh joined WBS in 2017. Prior to joining WBS, he served as professors at Kyoto Unive [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":9201,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[109],"tags":[95],"class_list":["post-6079","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-faculty-en","tag-faculty-en"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6079","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6079"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6079\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":15126,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6079\/revisions\/15126"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/9201"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6079"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6079"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/wbs\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6079"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}