{"id":10774,"date":"2026-04-16T09:00:12","date_gmt":"2026-04-16T00:00:12","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/soc\/?p=10774"},"modified":"2026-04-16T14:26:17","modified_gmt":"2026-04-16T05:26:17","slug":"2022%e5%b9%b47%e6%9c%88-%e7%94%a3%e6%a5%ad%e7%b5%8c%e5%96%b6%e7%a0%94%e7%a9%b6%e6%89%80%e3%82%a4%e3%83%99%e3%83%b3%e3%83%88%e3%81%ae%e3%81%8a%e7%9f%a5%e3%82%89%e3%81%9b-2-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/soc\/news\/10774","title":{"rendered":"2026\u5e74\u5ea6 \u7523\u696d\u7d4c\u55b6\u7814\u7a76\u6240\u30a4\u30d9\u30f3\u30c8\u306e\u304a\u77e5\u3089\u305b"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u4ee5\u4e0b\u306e\u3068\u304a\u308a\u3001\u7523\u696d\u7d4c\u55b6\u7814\u7a76\u6240\u306e\u30a4\u30d9\u30f3\u30c8\u3092\u958b\u50ac\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002<\/p>\n

\u3010\u7523\u7814\u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\u3011<\/p>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e744\u670817\u65e5(\u91d1) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\n\uff1c\u7d2b\u7dac\u8912\u7ae0\u53d7\u7ae0\u8a18\u5ff5\u8b1b\u6f14\uff1e
\n\u4f1a\u8a08\u5236\u5ea6\u3068\u5e02\u5834\uff1a\u8fd1\u4e16\u5546\u5bb6\u306e\u4f1a\u8a08\u3068\u73fe\u4ee3\u4f01\u696d<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\n\u8584\u4e95\u3000\u5f70 \u6c0f\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u5965\u6751\u3000\u96c5\u53f2\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e744\u670820\u65e5(\u6708) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nWaseda Organizational and Financial Economics Seminar
\nAre All Foreign Directors Alike? Evidence from European Boards<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nLara Faverzani \u6c0f\uff08Lecturer, Adam Smith Business School, University of Glasgow\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6982\u8981<\/td>\nWe examine the appointment and economic role of foreign independent directors in publicly listed European firms from 2010\u20132023, distinguishing systematically between non-local EU directors and extra-EU directors. Foreign directors are common, present in nearly 40% of firm-years, with non-local EU directors more prevalent than extra-EU directors. Director characteristics differ across groups: both foreign categories are older, busier, and more highly educated than local directors, while extra-EU directors are disproportionately female and hold more internationally oriented qualifications. Firm-level selection patterns also diverge: non-local EU directors are associated with larger, more independent boards and lower operating performance, whereas extra-EU directors are concentrated in larger, cash-rich, R&D-intensive firms with global ownership structures. In outcome regressions, non-local EU directors are linked to modestly lower ROA and Tobin\u2019s Q, while extra-EU directors exhibit no systematic performance effects. Neither group materially affects earnings management or acquisition activity.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u8c37\u5ddd \u3000\u5be7\u5f66\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e744\u670822\u65e5(\u6c34) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nSymbol and\/or Substance? A Multi-Method Investigation of B Corp Certification on Customer Ratings<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nWesley David Sine \u6c0f\uff08Professor, Cornell SC Johnson College of Business, Cornell University<\/span>\u00a0\uff09<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6982\u8981<\/td>\nWe examine how B Corporation certification affects customer satisfaction through both symbolic and substantive mechanisms, addressing longstanding debates about certification effectiveness on firms and research on corporate social responsibility and environment, social and governance. Using a multi-method approach combining archival analysis of a matched sample of 940 firms and controlled laboratory experiments, we find that B Corp certification significantly enhances customer ratings through improved employee satisfaction. Our archival analysis reveals that certified B Corps achieve 16-22% higher customer ratings compared to conventional firms through superior employee satisfaction levels. Critically, firms with stated social missions but lacking formal certification (\u201cB Corp-like\u201d firms) demonstrate weaker effects, underscoring the value of third-party verification and ongoing monitoring. Controlled experiments using identical products show that B Corp certification creates perceptual enhancement effects, with participants rating the same ice cream significantly higher when believing it originated from certified B Corps, particularly in family business contexts where ethical considerations are salient. These findings demonstrate that effective certification functions through dual pathways: substantive improvements in organizational practices that enhance stakeholder experiences, and symbolic signaling that activates values-based perceptual processes. Our research bridges signaling and institutional theories by showing that certification\u2019s value emerges from coupling credible external signals with authentic internal transformation.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u4e09\u6a4b\u3000\u5e73\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e744\u670824\u65e5(\u91d1) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nVenture Businesses in the U.S. compared with Japan: A Case Study<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\n\u30c0\u30f3\u3000\u30b1\u30a4\u30d7\u30ca\u30fc \u6c0f\uff08\u30e6\u30bf\u30fb\u30d0\u30ec\u30fc\u5927\u5b66\u3000\u30d3\u30b8\u30cd\u30b9\u30b9\u30af\u30fc\u30eb\u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u9ad8\u702c\u00a0 \u6d69\u4e00\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e744\u670827\u65e5(\u6708) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nWaseda Organizational and Financial Economics Seminar
\nInstitutional Trades through Affiliated Brokers<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nGiuseppe Pratobevera \u6c0f\uff08Senior Lecturer, University of Bristol Business School, University of Bristol\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6982\u8981<\/td>\nUsing U.S. institutional trading data, I show that trading through affiliated brokers declines sharply after the SEC\u2019s 2004 compliance reforms strengthened monitoring, documentation, and board oversight. The decline is concentrated among institutions with high pre-reform reliance on affiliated brokers and in trades most likely to attract scrutiny\u2014large, high-commission orders\u2014and it is matched by greater routing to unaffiliated brokers, mainly through pre-existing broker relationships. I then study trading outcomes using a difference-in-differences design based on pre-reform exposure. The effects are heterogeneous across institution types: for money managers, moving away from affiliated brokers is followed by worse execution and lower post-trade price drift, consistent with foregone efficiencies and information advantages; for pension plan sponsors, the decline in affiliated routing is associated with lower commissions and improved overall outcomes, consistent with a reduction in conflicts of interest. Overall, the findings highlight a trade-off: tighter compliance and governance curbs conflicted routing, but may also reduce the value of relationship-based execution and raise trading frictions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u8c37\u5ddd \u3000\u5be7\u5f66\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e745\u670811\u65e5(\u6708) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nWaseda Organizational and Financial Economics Seminar<\/p>\n

Home Advantage (not Bias) in Perfect Markets with Global Firms:<\/p>\n

Necessary Conditions and Empirical Validation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nHaim Kedar Levy \u6c0f\uff08Professor, The Guilford Glazer Faculty of Business and Management, Ben Gurion University of the Negev\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6982\u8981<\/td>\nExisting explanations for home bias depend on market imperfections such as government restrictions, information asymmetry, or behavioral reasons. We show that home bias can exist in perfect markets under information symmetry and rational investors. We develop a parsimonious asset pricing model where firms operate domestically and globally. Home advantage emerges if firms\u2019 operations can be diversified more efficiently with domestic rather than global risks. We therefore obtain a rationale for \u2018home advantage\u2019 rather than home bias and provide empirical support. Further, liberalization and local support mechanisms need to be tailored to fit the local industrial diversity and its global interactions.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u8c37\u5ddd \u3000\u5be7\u5f66\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e745\u670813\u65e5(\u6c34) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nReduce\u00a0or Compress? UK Panel Evidence on Working Time Arrangements and Wellbeing<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nWilliam Fleming\u6c0f\uff08<\/span>Research Fellow, Wellbeing Research Centre, University of Oxford \uff09<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u4e09\u6a4b\u3000\u5e73\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e745\u670818\u65e5(\u6708) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nWaseda Organizational and Financial Economics Seminar<\/p>\n

Opening the Brown Box: Production Responses to Environmental Regulation<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nRebecca De Simone \u6c0f<\/p>\n

\uff08Assistant Professor, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u6982\u8981<\/td>\n\n

We study the production responses of manufacturers to an emission capping regulation. Firms lower emissions by improving energy efficiency, substituting towards cleaner fuels, and moving from producing electricity to purchasing it from the grid. They move away from coal-intensive products and increase their abatement expenditures. These changes improve firm productivity, supporting theories that regulation prompts technology adoption. In the aggregate, we document lower product variety and an altered firm-size distribution, driven by a reduced likelihood of business formation. Our findings highlight how mandated pollution reduction can be effective and the costs it imposes, suggesting a loss of agglomeration externalities.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u8c37\u5ddd \u3000\u5be7\u5f66\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e745\u670820\u65e5(\u6c34) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nEconomic Effects of Sustainability Reporting Regulation When Social Activism Amplifies Transition Risks<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nMartin Kl\u00f6sch \u6c0f\uff08PostDoc Researcher, University of Vienna \u2013 Department of Accounting, Innovation, and Strategy\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6982\u8981<\/td>\nWe study the economic effects of corporate sustainability reporting regulations in a model with a capital market-oriented manager who invests in abatement activities and obfuscates adverse E&S impacts (greenwashing), financially oriented investors, and an impact-oriented social activist who advocates for future E&S regulations and, thus, amplifies corporate transition risks.
\nMore stringent reporting regulation induces corporate abatement and also intensifies social activism, creating a powerful strategic complementarity that disproportionately increases the value relevance of sustainability reporting. This then strengthens managerial greenwashing incentives and counters the deterrence effect of reporting regulations. In equilibrium, we show that greenwashing first increases and then decreases with the stringency of sustainability reporting regulations. In addition, we establish that lax rather than stringent regulation can be socially optimal under certain conditions. Our results give rise to novel empirical predictions and have
\nimportant regulatory implications.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u82e5\u6797 \u5229\u660e\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u51c6\u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

\u25ce2026\u5e745\u670825\u65e5(\u6708) \u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\uff08\u8a73\u7d30\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\uff09<\/p>\n

\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u30c6\u30fc\u30de<\/td>\nWaseda Organizational and Financial Economics Seminar<\/p>\n

Corporate biodiversity footprint and the dynamic adjustment of capital structure<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/td>\nThanh Thi Phuong Nguyen \u6c0f<\/p>\n

\uff08\u7acb\u6559\u5927\u5b66 \u30b0\u30ed\u30fc\u30d0\u30eb\u30fb\u30ea\u30d9\u30e9\u30eb\u30a2\u30fc\u30c4\u30fb\u30d7\u30ed\u30b0\u30e9\u30e0 \u7279\u4efb\u51c6\u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u6982\u8981<\/td>\n\n

Biodiversity finance remains an emerging field. Within the still limited research, only a small number of studies examine how biodiversity-related factors affect firms, and most focus on corporate outcomes rather than financial strategies. This study analyses how biodiversity risk, measured by the Corporate Biodiversity Footprint (CBF), affects capital structure and, critically, its dynamic adjustment process. We use a cross-country sample of 2,513 individual firms with annual data from 2018 to 2023. The data sample used in this paper was sourced from the Iceberg Data Lab (IDL) biodiversity metrics provider at the firm level. We find that CBF has a significant negative relationship with leverage: a higher biodiversity footprint is associated with lower leverage. Moreover, firms with high CBF adjust their leverage level toward the target more quickly than other firms.<\/span><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u5bfe\u8c61<\/td>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/td>\n\u8c37\u5ddd \u3000\u5be7\u5f66\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

\u3010\u7523\u7814\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30e9\u30e0\u3011<\/p>\n

2026\u5e741\u670819\u65e5\uff08\u6708\uff09\u7b2c46\u56de\u7523\u7814\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30e9\u30e0\u300c\u65e5\u672c\u306b\u304a\u3051\u308bPR\uff08\u30d1\u30d6\u30ea\u30c3\u30af\u30ea\u30ec\u30fc\u30b7\u30e7\u30f3\u30ba\uff09\u306e\u6b74\u53f2\u3068\u4eca\u5f8c\u306e\u5c55\u671b\u300d<\/a>\u304c\u958b\u50ac\u3055\u308c\u307e\u3057\u305f\u3002<\/p>\n

\u3010\u305d\u306e\u4ed6\u30a4\u30d9\u30f3\u30c8\u3011<\/p>\n

2025\u5e747\u670822\u65e5\uff08\u706b\uff09\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u7b2c28\u56de\u30d3\u30b8\u30cd\u30b9\u30d7\u30e9\u30f3\u30b3\u30f3\u30c6\u30b9\u30c8<\/a>\u304c\u958b\u50ac\u3055\u308c\u307e\u3057\u305f\u3002<\/p>\n

\u3010\u30a2\u30ab\u30c7\u30df\u30c3\u30af\u30fb\u30d5\u30a9\u30fc\u30e9\u30e0\u3011\uff082024\u5e74\u5ea6\uff09<\/p>\n

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