{"id":6819,"date":"2026-10-21T14:38:53","date_gmt":"2026-10-21T05:38:53","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/?p=6819"},"modified":"2026-10-21T14:38:53","modified_gmt":"2026-10-21T05:38:53","slug":"2026%e5%b9%b411%e6%9c%8818%e6%97%a5%e6%b0%b4-%e3%81%ab%e7%94%a3%e7%a0%94%e8%ac%9b%e6%bc%94%e4%bc%9a%e3%80%8cmanaging-investments-under-bargaining-in-a-coopetitive-supply-chain%e3%80%8d%e3%81%8c","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/news\/6819","title":{"rendered":"2026\u5e7411\u670818\u65e5(\u6c34) \u306b\u7523\u7814\u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\u300cManaging Investments under Bargaining in A Coopetitive Supply Chain\u300d\u304c\u958b\u50ac\u3055\u308c\u307e\u3059\u3002"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u300cManaging Investments under Bargaining in A Coopetitive Supply Chain\u300d\uff08\u82f1\u8a9e\u3067\u306e\u3054\u5831\u544a\uff09<\/span><\/h3>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u65e5\u6642<\/th>\n2026\u5e7411\u670818\u65e5\uff08\u6c34\uff0915:05~16:45<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u958b\u50ac\u65b9\u6cd5<\/th>\n\u2460\u5bfe\u9762 \uff0a11\u53f7\u9928 803\u6559\u5ba4
\n\u2461Zoom\uff0a\u304a\u7533\u8fbc\u307f\u5b8c\u4e86\u306e\u81ea\u52d5\u8fd4\u4fe1\u30e1\u30fc\u30eb\u306b\u3066\u3001\u53c2\u52a0\u7528URL\u3092\u304a\u77e5\u3089\u305b\u3044\u305f\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/th>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/th>\nMichael Kopel \u6c0f\u00a0<\/span> (<\/span><\/span>Professor, University of Graz)<\/span><\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8981\u65e8<\/th>\nWe examine a hybrid supply chain in which a manufacturer distributes its product both directly to consumers via an online channel and indirectly through its affiliated retailer. Contract terms are determined through Nash bargaining. The manufacturer and the retailer make strategic upfront investments that increase the consumers\u2019 willingness to pay. We focus on the parties\u2019 asymmetric bargaining positions: the retailer can only profit when bargaining reaches an agreement while the manufacturer can still offer its product if bargaining fails. As a consequence, we find that the investments have opposite effects on the surplus that is shared between the supply chain partners. The retailer\u2019s investment always increases the trade surplus, whereas the manufacturer\u2019s investment reduces the trade surplus. This gives rise to counterintuitive results. The parties\u2019 profits are reduced, if (1) the consumers\u2019 common willingness to pay for the product increases, (2) the consumers\u2019 \u201cdislike\u201d of online purchases from the manufacturer decreases, and (3) both firms\u2019 investment efficiency increases. Our results hold under linear and nonlinear demands, under quantity and price competition, and with a linear and nonlinear supply contract. We further find that an increase in the manufacturer\u2019s bargaining power can actually reduce the manufacturer\u2019s profit, increase the retailer\u2019s profit, but hurt the supply chain.<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/th>\n\u82e5\u6797\u3000\u5229\u660e\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u51c6\u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u53c2\u52a0\u7533\u3057\u8fbc\u307f\u65b9\u6cd5<\/th>\n\u53c2\u52a0\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\u304b\u3089\u304a\u7533\u8fbc\u307f\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002\u203b11\u670816\u65e5\uff08\u6708\uff0917:00\u7de0\u5207<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5171\u50ac<\/th>\n\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u90e8\u30fb\u7523\u696d\u7d4c\u55b6\u7814\u7a76\u6240\u30fb\u91d1\u5b50\u826f\u592a\u5206\u79d1\u4f1a\u30fb\u9234\u6728\u5b5d\u5247\u5206\u79d1\u4f1a\u30fb\u4f1a\u8a08\u7814\u7a76\u6240<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u300cManaging Investments under Bargaining in A Coopetitive Supply Chain\u300d\uff08\u82f1\u8a9e\u3067\u306e\u3054\u5831\u544a\uff09 \u65e5\u6642 2026\u5e7411\u670818\u65e5\uff08\u6c34\uff0915:05~16:45 \u958b\u50ac […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[24],"class_list":["post-6819","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news","tag-events"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6819","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6819"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6819\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6820,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6819\/revisions\/6820"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6819"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6819"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6819"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}