{"id":6245,"date":"2026-05-21T14:29:25","date_gmt":"2026-05-21T05:29:25","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/?p=6245"},"modified":"2026-05-21T14:29:25","modified_gmt":"2026-05-21T05:29:25","slug":"2026%e5%b9%b47%e6%9c%8822%e6%97%a5%e6%b0%b4-%e3%81%ab%e7%94%a3%e7%a0%94%e8%ac%9b%e6%bc%94%e4%bc%9a%e3%80%8cmandatory-vs-voluntary-disclosure-in-the-dynamic-market-for-lemons-%e3%80%8d%e3%81%8c","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/news\/6245","title":{"rendered":"2026\u5e747\u670822\u65e5(\u6c34) \u306b\u7523\u7814\u8b1b\u6f14\u4f1a\u300cMandatory vs voluntary disclosure in the dynamic market for lemons.\u300d\u304c\u958b\u50ac\u3055\u308c\u307e\u3059\u3002"},"content":{"rendered":"

\u300cMandatory vs voluntary disclosure in the dynamic market for lemons.<\/span>\u300d<\/span><\/h3>\n
\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u65e5\u6642<\/th>\n2026\u5e747\u670822\u65e5\uff08\u6c34\uff0913:10~14:50<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u958b\u50ac\u65b9\u6cd5<\/th>\n\u2460\u5bfe\u9762 \uff0a11\u53f7\u9928\u30001112\u6559\u5ba4
\n\u2461Zoom\uff0a\u304a\u7533\u8fbc\u307f\u5b8c\u4e86\u306e\u81ea\u52d5\u8fd4\u4fe1\u30e1\u30fc\u30eb\u306b\u3066\u3001\u53c2\u52a0\u7528URL\u3092\u304a\u77e5\u3089\u305b\u3044\u305f\u3057\u307e\u3059\u3002<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5bfe\u8c61<\/th>\n\u5b66\u751f\u30fb\u6559\u8077\u54e1\u30fb\u4e00\u822c<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8b1b\u6f14\u8005<\/th>\nCyrus Aghamolla \u6c0f
\n\uff08Rice University, Jones Graduate School of Business, Associate Professor of Accounting\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u8981\u65e8<\/th>\nWe consider a dynamic adverse selection setting where a privately informed seller\u3000can choose to reveal or withhold past trade information to privately informed buyers. Buyers naturally receive less information when the seller can strategically withhold\u00a0negative news relative to a setting where current buyers always observe the seller’s\u00a0history of trade, i.e., mandatory disclosure. Despite the informational disadvantage,\u00a0we find that strategic disclosure by the seller can be welfare-increasing relative to\u00a0mandatory disclosure, under which past trade is always disclosed. This occurs\u00a0because voluntary disclosure attenuates the seller’s incentive to engage in destructive\u00a0signaling and can lead to more efficient trade.<\/p>\n

Our model of repeated trade has applications to financial markets, particularly\u00a0over-the-counter markets. Various OTC markets have been subject to increased\u00a0post-trade transparency regulations in recent years, including a number of debt\u00a0securities markets through TRACE, the European bond market through MiFID II,\u00a0and the municipal bond market through MSRB Rule G-14. The empirical literature\u00a0examining the impacts of these regulations has been mixed, with studies generally\u00a0documenting both positive and negative effects of increased transparency depending\u00a0on factors such as liquidity or yield of the asset. Our setting sheds light on possible\u00a0improvements to transparency regulations, where permitting voluntary disclosure of\u00a0past trade for certain asset types can improve trade frequency and welfare. In particular,\u00a0when interpreting parameters of our model in the context of the OTC bond market,\u00a0our results imply that voluntary disclosure can be advantageous relative to mandatory disclosure when adverse selection frictions are not too severe for high- and\u00a0low-inventory cost bonds.<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n

\u4e16\u8a71\u4eba<\/th>\n\u82e5\u6797\u3000\u5229\u660e\uff08\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u5b66\u8853\u9662 \u6e96\u6559\u6388\uff09<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u53c2\u52a0\u7533\u3057\u8fbc\u307f\u65b9\u6cd5<\/th>\n\u53c2\u52a0\u306f\u3053\u3061\u3089<\/a>\u304b\u3089\u304a\u7533\u8fbc\u307f\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002\u203b7\u670820\u65e5\uff08\u6708\uff0917:00\u7de0\u5207<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5171\u50ac<\/th>\n\u65e9\u7a32\u7530\u5927\u5b66\u5546\u5b66\u90e8\u30fb\u7523\u696d\u7d4c\u55b6\u7814\u7a76\u6240\u30fb\u91d1\u5b50\u5206\u79d1\u4f1a\u30fb\u9234\u6728\u5206\u79d1\u4f1a\u30fb\u8c37\u5ddd\u5206\u79d1\u4f1a<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table><\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u300cMandatory vs voluntary disclosure in the dynamic market for lemons.\u300d \u65e5\u6642 2026\u5e747\u670822\u65e5\uff08\u6c34\uff0913:10~14:50 \u958b\u50ac\u65b9\u6cd5 \u2460\u5bfe\u9762 \uff0a11 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":3,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_acf_changed":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[24],"class_list":["post-6245","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-news","tag-events"],"acf":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6245","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/3"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=6245"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6245\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":6246,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/6245\/revisions\/6246"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=6245"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=6245"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.waseda.jp\/fcom\/riba\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=6245"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}