

Media, Pop Culture and Education

Student Mobility and Regional Integration

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In this decade, Asian countries attached greater importance to higher education strategies and international student policies. According to OECD, countries are eager to host international students in order to facilitate mutual understanding, to generate revenue and to attract highly skilled migrant student in a long run.

In case of Japan, her main concern toward internationalization in higher education is still on cultural exchange and mutual understanding, while countries like Malaysia or South Korea have more clear vision of achieving an economic effect through international student policy. Malaysia aims to be a pillar of educational excellence in Southeast Asia; however, many international students choose Malaysia not because of local culture but a Western university degree.

English had evolved into sought-after commodity. South Korea started to provide 15-35% courses in English. English seem “must-items” to attract more foreign students. However, competition of internationalization in higher education in providing English courses or transnational programs may disregard the cultural context in host country. Although, some may argue that evolving with local culture is not necessary, cultural conflict between native residents and foreign students are serious issues in many regions. Sustainable effort from both sides of receiving countries and international students are needed.

Cultural aspects of internationalization in higher education are crucial for future friendship between nations. At policy-making level is critical for future strategy in higher education. Other than English, each country should have ‘something special’ to attract foreign students, which has root in each country’s context.

At government level, it is needed to facilitate mutual understanding and to establish closer ties between nations. Economic aspects of internationalization have driving force from civil side, while cultural aspects are seen as an incidental consequence of internationalization. These two aspects of internationalization should be balanced and considered when each country decides the way of internationalization and how to provide the courses/programs in higher education.

Introduction

The rise of the knowledge economy and global competition for skilled labor has provided a new driver for the international of education system in many countries. The recruitment of foreign

students becomes part of a broader strategy to recruit highly skilled immigrants. OECD publication stated that the “university is no longer a quiet place to teach and do scholarly work at measured pace and contemplate the universe as in centuries past. It is a big, complex, demanding, competitive business requiring large scale ongoing investment.” (OECD, 2004)

In this decade, Asian countries attached greater importance to higher education strategies and international student policies. Since these strategies and supporting policies are closely related to human resource, hosting more foreign students and sending more students to foreign countries became a key factor to sustain national development. The additional revenue is that foreign students may generate momentum in the drive of international education development.

Internationalization to Asianization in Higher Education

So-called Asianization is apparent in this area. For instance, 92.2% of the foreign students in Japan are from Asian countries. Even though Japan has a higher percentage of government sponsored foreign students than other industrialized countries, 93.5% of Asian students are self-supporting students. Despite scant opportunities for scholarship, the push factors from private level drive the internationalization in higher education.

Meanwhile, host nations have various reasons to get involved in international education. According to OECD, countries are eager to host international students in order to facilitate mutual understanding, to generate revenue and to attract highly skilled migrant student in a long run. In case of Japan, even she faces serious decreasing in population and is in needs of hosting more migrants to sustain her development; her main concern is still on cultural exchange and mutual understanding. On the other hand, countries like Malaysia, China or South Korea have more clear vision of achieving an economic effect through international student policy.

Strategy of Internationalization in Higher Education in Case of Malaysia

Malaysia aims to be a pillar of educational excellence in Southeast Asia and her strategy is

not so much for mutual understanding as for a kind of economic competition with other countries of the Asian Pacific Area. Malaysia had sent many Malaysian students at the higher education level abroad before which caused a serious brain drain problem, but after expansion of higher education, she successfully reversed the tide of brain drain. Transnational educational program became one of the popular programs in Malaysia, which enable students to study for foreign qualification to obtain degrees that are awarded by universities in countries such as the United State, United Kingdom or Australia and so on. The rapid increase of international students shows that Malaysia's higher education has some merits to attract international students.

However, the concern here is that the most international students chose these transnational programs not because they had interests in Malaysian cultures or languages, but because they can obtain degree from world-class university in western countries with cheaper price and geographically convenience. (Sugimura, 2006) This type of "studying abroad" is further promoted on a commercial basis.

Underlying Factors in Students' Choice of Country of Study: Language

The language spoken and used in instruction is essential factor in the decision-making of a foreign country of where to study. English language is the language to learn and had evolved into sought-after commodity; therefore, the dominance of English-speaking destination such as US, Canada or UK may be largely because students intend to study abroad to improve their English language skills. An increasing number of institutions in non English speaking countries now offer the courses in English to overcome their linguistic disadvantage in terms of attracting foreign students. For instance, some leading universities in South Korea started to provide 15-35% courses in English and it reflects the local and international demands to accept more international students and also to foster globalized Korean.

Language is the key factor which can measure the level of internationalization in non English speaking countries. For countries such as South Korea or Japan, which don't have

international language, the courses provided in English seem “must-items” to attract more foreign students.

Looking for “Something Special”

As mentioned in introduction, the internationalization in higher education aims at strengthening the relationship in with human resources development for national development. A win-win situation can be observed — sending students abroad will bring globalized human resources, while hosting international students can bring more human resources and financial benefit. At the same time, internationalization in higher education can promote mutual understanding and friendship with foreign countries. This part sounds more idealistic other than economical aspects, which stand on realistic and visible merits.

Many Asian countries introduce English courses or provide transnational program which, thus students get education of western universities in Asian countries. The movement seems to have broadened all over the Asia in the past few decades. However, my concern here is that competition of internationalization in higher education in terms of providing English courses or transnational programs disregard the cultural context in host countries.

There may be an objection like following — just staying in accepting country is enough to understand the cultural context, and no serious necessity to learn local languages or to deepen understanding about local cultures; Mutual understanding is something incidental consequence through studying abroad.

Conclusion

Cultural conflict between local residents and foreign students are apparently a serious issue in many regions. Sustainable effort from both sides of receiving countries and international students are needed. In this point of view, cultural aspects of internationalization in higher education are crucial for future friendship between nations. To emphasis the original feature of

internationalization in higher education in each country as policy-making level will be crucial for future strategy in higher education. Every country should have 'something special' to attract foreign students, which has root in each country's context.

At government level, it is needed to facilitate more mutual understanding and to establish closer ties between nations. Economic aspects of internationalization have driving force from civil side, while cultural aspects are seen as an incidental consequence of internationalization. These two aspects of internationalization should be balanced and considered when each country decides the way of internationalization, and the means to provide the courses/programs in higher education.

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Nationalism in Chinese Popular Culture
Quantitative Study from the International Joint Research Project 2008

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Thesis Summary

This paper will focus on one of the characteristics of today's Chinese society, nationalism. Special attention will be paid on nationalism of young Chinese in metropolitan areas like Shanghai. It will be investigated to what degree their nationalistic sentiment affect their everyday lifestyles. Among many aspects of lifestyles of Chinese youth, this paper will pay particular attention to popular culture, and clarify the relation which exists between nationalism of Chinese youth and their tastes and attitudes towards popular culture they are familiar with by applying a cultural theory introduced by John Fiske.

Based on about 400 data samples obtained through the International Joint Research Project 2008, unlike previous researches, this study will attack the diversity and complexity of nationalism in the contemporary Chinese society and its relation with the preference of particular popular cultural taste with introducing the concept of cultural consumer ethnocentrism.

The result of data analysis explains that cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies in the students of Fudan University do relate to the psychology of requiring particular Chinese cultural elements in their own popular culture. One of the factors extracted by factor analysis called hard nationalism was found out to have cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies, however, this factor is not acting as a cause of the preference of particular popular culture. Instead, according to the result of correlation and regression analysis, soft nationalism turned out to be the positive cause of favoring Chinese cultural elements even if it does not show any evident CCE tendencies.

Furthermore, this study will investigate the result of data analysis by looking at it from a different angle adopting another popular cultural theory.

Introduction

The year 2008 was a meaningful year for the People of Republic of China, and also for the people who live in the country. It has marked 30 years since the PRC changed their direction from revolutionary past to the Open Door Policy. Social changes brought in this 30 years have been achieved with an unprecedented speed, especially the economic growth. These marvelous social transformations have led China to be the host country for the 2008 Olympic Games, which impressed the people in China as well as the whole international society. Being exposed to these social achievements and changes, people living in China are at least feeling pleasure, and many of them are proud of being a member of the Chinese society. Their attitudes towards their society have received many attentions in the international society, and many scholars and researchers study them as nationalism. In particular, nationalism sprang up from young Chinese through the internet has been a hot issue, since information technologies have well developed and spread among ordinary households. Therefore, understanding Chinese nationalism also means understanding the Chinese society in this 30 years as nationalism has mirrored the feelings and sentiments of people living through each era.

Research Theme

This paper will focus on one of the characteristics of today's Chinese society, nationalism. Special attention will be paid on nationalism of young Chinese in metropolitan areas like Shanghai. It will be investigated to what degree their nationalistic sentiment affects their everyday lifestyles. Among many aspects of lifestyles of Chinese youth, this paper will pay particular attention to popular culture, and clarify the relation which exists between nationalism of Chinese youth and their tastes and attitudes towards popular culture they are familiar with. Although nationalism has been the center of sociological and political researches on the Chinese society, there are few actual researches explaining its possible connection with popular culture. By suggesting the existence of nationalistic sentiment in the field of popular culture, this paper is aimed at providing a new knowledge to current academics.

Research Backgrounds

1. "Blind" nationalism seen in NATO bombing in Belgrade 1999

Since the 1990s, in political, economic and social scenes the Chinese society has faced a number of critical events that attracted the world's attention. Among them, there are two noteworthy events which allowed me to explore Chinese nationalism. The first event highlighting Chinese nationalism was so called the NATO bombing in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, 1999. According to Linchuan Qiu, a Chinese media researcher, after the bombing, many notes and messages were posted on popular online BBSs such as sina.com and sohu.com, and many of the messages were written by young people like college students who utilize the internet on a

daily basis.¹ Qiu argues that that these posts are full of anger and anti-American attitudes which were resulted from a sense of humiliation as being neglected from western countries.² Many scholars especially those from western societies see this type of nationalism seen in the Chinese society after the late 1990s as powerful and dangerous. An American political scientist, Edward Friedman argues that this type of nationalism can be threatening the whole international society as it contains anti-American or anti-Japanese sentiments, and emphasizes it as “blind” and nepotistic nationalism.³ It is also argued that this “blind” nationalism is deep rooted in the society and it can be said as the aspect which characterizes China as well as its peculiar political system. ⁴ Similar argument has been also developed by a political scientist Stanley Rosen, and it points out that this type of nationalism not only positively enhances Chinese people’s expectation towards their own government, but also results in political inflexibility.⁵ Accordingly, due to its characteristics and backgrounds, this type of nationalism seen in young Chinese people tends to be treated as unsafe. It can be said that the image of Chinese nationalism that ordinary people receive from mass media contains above factors to some extent.

2. “Healthy” nationalism seen in the Sichuan earthquake 2008

However, during the year of 2008, a different form of nationalism was seen in the Chinese society. Nationalism seen after the large earthquake occurred in Sichuan province of western China was apparently different from the one that Freedman and Rosen argue as “blind” nationalism. What I have witnessed on online BBSs was a sense of unity and cooperative spirit with which Chinese people tried to overcome the misfortune they were confronting. Eulogies for the victims were expressed even on online shopping malls, and similar phenomena were found almost every popular online websites. Psychologists, Qiong Li and Marilyn Brewer analyze that this type of feeling tends to appear when communities or nations one belongs to are under attack or difficult situations.⁶ They argue that under such situations, nationalism with a strong sense of solidarity towards achieving shared goals will easily appear rather than nationalism with anti-foreign sentiments. Nationalism found after the earthquake does not involve any feeling excluding other groups or communities, therefore, this is rather classified as “healthy” nationalism.

From the social movements occurred in China between the end of 1990s and 2008, we can find two interesting figures of nationalism. These nationalism were sent out to the whole world through the internet, and there are many scholars focusing on the role of the internet and researching the present situation of Chinese nationalism. Chinese nationalism is, however, also

¹ Jack Linchuan Qiu, 2006. “The changing web of Chinese nationalism” *Global Media and Communication* Vol. 2(1), p. 126.

² *Ibid.*

³ Edward Friedman, 2001. “Still Building the Nation: The Causes and Consequences of China’s Patriotic Fervor” in ed. Hua, Shiping, *Chinese Political Culture: 1989-2000*. Armonk, New York; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, p. 130.

Edward Friedman, 1995. *National Identity and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China*. Armonk, New York; London, England: M.E. Sharpe, p. 30.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ Stanley Rosen, 2003. “Chinese media and youth: attitudes toward nationalism and internationalism” in ed. Lee, Chin-Chuan, *Chinese Media, Global Contexts*. New York: RoutledgeCurzon. pp. 91-118.

⁶ Qiong Li and Marilyn B. Brewer, “What Does It Mean to Be an American? Patriotism, Nationalism, and American Identity After 9/11” *Political Psychology*, 25. 5(2004), p. 732.

frequently discussed in other dimensions, one of which is popular culture.

3. The rise of “Zhongguo-feng (Chinese taste)” popular culture

After 2000, Chinese music scenes have witnessed new form of popular music, so-called “Zhongguo-feng (Chinese taste)” popular music. “Zhongguo-feng” popular music is one kind of music style which mixed western Hip-Hop or R&B with Chinese traditional elements by playing traditional musical instruments. This style of popular music became dominant among Chinese music scenes, and particularly gained popularity from Chinese youth like high school and college students. After the regulations on importing foreign cultural products were lifted, western music genres imported via Hong Kong and Taiwan were the mainstream in mainland China, however, after the year of 2000, new style of music with a taste of Chineseness has received popularity among the young Chinese. After the rise of this Chinese taste popular music, although there have been few researches investigating its mechanism, some critiques of popular music mention that a touch of Chineseness contained in this music style works on enhancing the pride and nationalistic feeling of the audience. Most of the critiques paid attention on these traditional musical elements and argue the influences these elements give to the audience with nationalism.

Hence, nationalism as a characteristic of the contemporary Chinese society also exists at scenes like popular culture, and there actually is a phenomenon supporting the connection between nationalism and popular culture. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, there is no demonstrative research evidentially explaining the relation between these research fields. This research is aimed at exploring the connection of these two main axes by taking an apt methodology and understanding nationalism of Chinese young people from different angles.

Research interest

Considering these research backgrounds, mainly two research interests can be set. First, this paper will explore the relation between the Chinese youth’s nationalism and their taste of popular culture. It can be said that the rise of nationalism leads Chinese youth to be proud of their own culture and ethnicity. Does their nationalism allow these youth to require their own cultural elements even for popular culture? As discussed earlier, before the arrival of popular culture with a taste of Chineseness, what occupied amongst Chinese popular cultural scenes were those which came from western societies. Does their taste of popular culture show any change due to their nationalistic sentiments?

Second, this paper will take different facets of nationalism into consideration, and categorize nationalism of the Chinese youth into two types. As looked through in the research background, Chinese nationalism displays various faces in different social situations and backgrounds. Despite the diversity of nationalism in the contemporary Chinese society, existing researches suggesting the linkage between nationalism and popular culture have not paid enough attention on this diversity and complexity. It can be supposed that nationalisms constructed through different psychological stages give different influences on one’s taste of

popular culture. What kind of psychologically constructed nationalism allows Chinese young people to require their own cultural elements to popular culture? This study will explore these research interests using a set of data samples obtained from the quantitative survey conducted in Shanghai.

Literature Review

Popular Culture Theories

Theodore Adorno's critique on popular culture was mainly targeted on popular music such as jazz and doo-wop. His arguments on criticism of popular music were based on the idea of standardization which consists of two main factors, part interchangeability and pseudo-individualization. Using these two concepts, Adorno seizes the mechanism of popular culture industry in the same way as that of the vehicle mass production, and insists the backwardness of the industry and popular culture itself.¹ The backwardness of popular culture is further pointed out by the passivity of the audience. Adorno argues that compared to high music like Beethoven or Chopin, the mass production under the capitalist system tends to produce not only boring music, but also dull and passive listeners.²

While Adorno captured popular culture and its social meanings in a negative manner, sociologists after Adorno challenged the criticism they inherited from Adorno. One of the prominent popular culture researchers, John Fiske approaches the relationship between popular culture and its audience with a notion of activity in contrast to Adorno's passivity. According to Fiske applying semiotic theories, the text of popular culture means differently depending on the audience's social mutual relationships, and therefore, each audience receives different messages from the same popular culture.³ Fiske also emphasizes the importance of ethnographic approaches in order to analyze the relationship between the audience and the text, since decoding of the text largely depends on the individual's daily experience itself.⁴ Therefore, unlike the classic endeavor of popular culture by Adorno, contemporary media scientists like Fiske have attempted to prove the text of popular culture is somehow meaningful to the audience.

Nationalistic sentiments in Chinese popular music

Adopting the theories introduced by Fiske and other contemporary popular culture theorists, a Chinese media scientist, Zhao Pu has challenged to analyze the popularity of "Zhongguo-feng" popular music. Zhao claims that the rise of China power in the international society has enhanced Chinese people's nationalism and this elevation of national pride in turn

¹ Theodor W. Adorno, edited by J. M. Bernstein, *The Culture Industry: Selected essays on mass culture* (London; New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 34.

Th. W. アドルノ『音楽社会学序説:十二の理論的な講義』渡辺健、高辻知義共訳、(音楽之友社、1970)、p. 48, 64.
テオドール・W・アドルノ『アドルノ音楽・メディア論集』渡辺裕編、村田公一、船木篤也、吉田寛訳、(平凡社、2002)、pp. 145-156.

² Theodor W. Adorno, 1991, p. 47.

³ ジョン・フィスク『テレビジョン・カルチャー:ポピュラー文化の政治学』伊藤守他訳、(梓出版社、1996)pp. 100-101.

ジョン・フィスク『抵抗の快楽—ポピュラーカルチャーの記号論』山本雄二訳、(世界思想社、1998)pp. 8-9.

⁴ *Ibid.*

leads them to require Chinese style popular music.¹ Chinese youth as the audience of this particular style of popular music adopt their nationalistic sentiments developed in their social environment as a tool to decode the text or message they receive from the music. Zhao's research had a large impact on the preceding study of popular culture as it approached to a present-day popular phenomenon. However, Zhao's research did not pay enough attention to the diversity and complexity of nationalism in contemporary Chinese society. It only captures nationalism with a single-dimensional view and fails to get to the bottom of psychological nationalism.

Nationalism

As mentioned above, this paper regards nationalism as a psychologically constructed element. Several psychologists have historically approached the construction and development of nationalism, and most of them categorized the relationships between the self and the belonging community into two types. By adopting quantitative research methods, Seymour Feshbach et al and Daniel Druckman carried out factor analysis and classified the relationships between the self and the country into "patriotism" and "nationalism". These psychologists define "patriotism" as national identification with love and devotion to the belonging country, and on the other hand, define "nationalism" as national identification characterized by a sense of superiority to other countries.² Although Feshbach and Druckman both warn that these two classifications of psychological nationalism do not necessarily represent the whole complexity of nationalism, other studies using these factors prove that the differences clarified by these two factors do affect various research results.

Another psychologist, Ervin Staub analyzes the psychological backgrounds in which the relationship between the self and the country is constructed, and classified them into "constructive patriotism" and "blind patriotism". Staub develops his argument on these two ideas with the results from factor analysis, and proposes the central concept which divides "constructive patriotism" and "blind patriotism", "critical loyalty".³ "Constructive patriotism" is defined as national identification which allows one to critically question the culture and customs of belonging community in order to achieve better future for the community.⁴ On the other hand, people with "blind patriotism" rejects and de-humanizes others from out-groups.⁵

¹ 赵朴,《从“西北风”到“中国风”- 社会文化环境对流行音乐影响刍议》《交响-西安音乐学院学报》2007年3月第26卷第1期, 92-96页

² Jim Sidanius, Seymour Feshbach, Shana Levin and Felicia Pratto, "The Interface Between Ethnic and National Attachment: Ethnic Pluralism or Ethnic Dominance?" *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 61 (1997), p. 106.

Seymour Feshbach and Noboru Sakano, "The Structure and Correlates of Attitudes toward One's Nation in Samples of United States and Japanese College Students: A Comparative Study" in Daniel Bar-Tal and Ervin Staub (eds), *Patriotism in the lives of individuals and nations* (Chicago: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1996), pp. 95-97.

Daniel Druckman, "Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective" *Mershon International Studies Review*, 28 (1994), pp. 47-48.

Daniel Druckman, "Social-Psychological Aspects of Nationalism" in John L. Comaroff, Paul C. Stern (eds), *Perspectives on Nationalism and War* (London; New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 58.

³ Robert T. Schatz, Ervin Staub and Howard Lavine, "On the Varieties of National Attachment: Blind Versus Constructive Patriotism" *Political Psychology* 20.1 (1999), p. 153.

⁴ Ervin Staub, *The Roots of Evil: The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence* (Cambridge; New York; Melbourne; Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 252-253.

⁵ *Ibid.*

From the results of a series of correlation and regression analysis, Staub regards these two factors as different psychological states, and the differences themselves have large influences on other factors.¹ Therefore, while nationalism is captured in a political context, such as building of nation-states, psychological researches analyze how nationalism itself is constructed through various psychological stages. Psychologically examined nationalism explains the relationship between the self and the belonging country on a deeper level, which is the reason why this study adopts socio-psychological approaches to find out the relation between popular culture and nationalism.

Consumer Ethnocentrism

Attitude towards other groups is also investigated in other areas of study like marketing where ethnocentric tendency is analyzed with consumer psychology. A notion of consumer ethnocentrism is developed by Terence Shimp and Subhash Sharma, and they define consumer ethnocentrism as psychological state in which one regards buying or consuming foreign goods as somehow inappropriate and immoral.² Although there are a wide range of causes of consumer ethnocentrism, Shimp and Sharma argues that as a result of consumer ethnocentric tendencies, people tend to overestimate domestic products in their home country.³

The concept of consumer ethnocentrism is purely a product of marketing research, however, its relations with sociological and socio-psychological factors have been examined as well. For instance, George Balabanis et al. ran regression analysis and concluded that on the one hand, “patriotism” and “nationalism” have positive influences on consumer ethnocentric tendencies, and on the other hand “internationalism” has a negative influence on the same tendencies.⁴

The argument over consumer ethnocentric tendencies and its socio-psychological causes is also found in the research by Kenichi Ishii. He uses socio-psychological approaches to attack the complexity of nationalism in China, and analyses whether anti-Japanese sentiments affect the intension to buy Japanese products such as media and cosmetic products and automobiles. With the result of regression analysis, Ishii concludes that anti-Japanese sentiments are positively influenced by “ethnocentrism” rather than “patriotism”, and people who hold negative attitude towards Japan as a country also tend not to purchase or consume Japanese products especially automobiles as analyzed in the researches by Shimp and Sharma.⁵

Research Question

¹ Ibid.

² Terence A. Shimp, “Consumer Ethnocentrism: The Concept and a Preliminary Empirical Test” *Advances In Consumer Research*, 11 (1984), p. 285.

Terence A. Shimp and Subhash Sharma, “Consumer Ethnocentrism: Construction and Validation of the CETSCALE” *Journal of Marketing Research*, XXIV (August 1987), p. 280.

Subhash Sharma et al., “Consumer Ethnocentrism: A Test of Antecedents and Moderators” *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, 23.1 (1995), pp. 26-27.

³ Ibid.

⁴ George Balabanis et al., “The Impact of Nationalism, Patriotism and Internationalism on Consumer Ethnocentric Tendencies” *Journal of International Business Studies*, 32.1 (2001), pp. 166-169.

⁵ 石井健一「中国人の愛国心・民族中心主義と日本・欧米ブランド志向」『グローバル化における中国のメディアと産業：情報社会の形成と企業改革』石井健一、唐燕霞編、(明石書店、2008)pp. 334-342.

As seen in the previous section of this paper, it can be estimated that nationalism in the contemporary Chinese society has a wide variety of characteristics according to various social and time backgrounds. Previous researches also show that nationalisms with different characteristics also differ in their functional nature. In addition, the research of Chinese popular music by Zhao suggests that nationalism in the Chinese society has an impact on the production and popularity of particular popular culture. However, as mentioned earlier, Zhao's research does not pay enough attention to the complexity and diversity of nationalism as argued in the psychological field. This peculiarity of nationalism has tended to be neglected once researchers stepped over the research field of nationalism. How does this diversity and complexity of psychological nationalism affect one's taste of popular culture? It can be supposed that nationalisms with different functional nature are involved differently in the process of text decoding by the audience.

Survey Outline

In order to reveal the relation between nationalism and popular culture, this research uses the data samples obtained from International Joint Research Project 2008. The project was organized around three prominent universities (Waseda University, Korea University and Fudan University) in East Asia, and the 400 samples of data analyzed in this research were collected at Fudan University in Shanghai. The targeted sample consists of around 400 undergraduate students. In order to obtain a proper representation of Fudan University's student population, quota sampling was used as a sampling method, therefore, demographic factors such as sex, grade and department were proportionally calculated and collected accordingly. Moreover, these samples were collected at the campus facilities such as classrooms and cafeterias, and each student filled out the questionnaire voluntarily.

For a quantitative research, the ideal sampling method is a random sampling method, however, due to the severe restriction on the protection of personal information in Japan, it was very difficult to obtain the name list of students at Waseda. As this project was originally organized as a comparative study, we collected these samples by snowball sampling instead of random sampling in other two partner universities as well. There could be some sampling biases brought by applying snowball sampling method, however, each project member attempted to approach students as many as possible. Additionally, utilizing quota sampling method allows us to generalize the findings of this study across the whole Fudan University.

Definitions of Key Terms

Popular culture in this study includes audio-visual media such as movie, drama series and music, text media such as magazines and comic books in Chinese languages. The questionnaire we utilized in this project did not specify the definition of popular culture to the respondents, but as the age of respondents ranges from 17 to 26, it can be supposed that popular culture for these students means popular culture for young people.

As mentioned throughout this paper, nationalism in this study is defined in a psychological field, however, it should be noted that psychological nationalism would change its nature according to time and social backgrounds. Additionally, in order to seize the complexity and diversity of nationalism in the targeted respondents, this study ran factor analysis using the total of nine questions in the questionnaire. As a result of factor analysis (method: promax rotation), two underlying factors were extracted behind six variables (Table 1, three variables were omitted due to insufficient factor loads). The first factor extracted from the analysis consists of four variables which can be regarded as a common sense of national identification. The second factor consists of two variables. These variables were “the world would be a better place if people from the other countries were more like the Chinese” and “people should support their country even if the country is in the wrong”, and the second factor with these variables differs from the first factor in its extreme nature. While the first factor can be seen as an ordinary national identification, the second factor can be blamed as nationalistic in a negative sense. Therefore, this study names the second factor as “hard nationalism”, and in contrast, the first factor as “soft nationalism”.

Table 1: Nationalism Factors

		Factor	
		1	2
A	Being Chinese means a lot to me	.748	-.019
B	When a foreign person praises China, it feels like a personal compliment	.757	-.065
C	I am proud of being Chinese	.826	.006
F	I feel very proud about China's economical achievements	.588	.147
H	The world would be a better place if people from the other countries were more like the Chinese	-.020	.931
I	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	.039	.428

This study will clarify the relation between two nationalisms extracted as a result of factor analysis and Chinese youth’s taste of popular culture by introducing the idea of “cultural consumer ethnocentrism (CCE)”. CCE in this study refers to a psychological mind of preferring and favoring domestic popular culture to that of foreign countries. Although the idea originally comes from Shimp and Sharma’s consumer ethnocentrism, CCE in this study differs from it in a various sense. For instance, unlike consumer ethnocentrism, the target products of CCE are cultural goods such as media and text products. Economic factors included in consumer ethnocentrism are not significant in CCE either. As consumer ethnocentrism was developed for

risk management in the international economy, maintaining the country's economic prosperity plays as a central idea. However, the aim of this study is not at examining the impact of CCE on marketing strategies, therefore, these factors are not significant in this study. In order to capture the tendency of CCE in Chinese youth, this study utilizes three variables extracted from Shimp and Sharma's CETSCALE in the survey questionnaire (Table 2).

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of CCE Scale

		Mean	Std. Deviation
A	Real Chinese should always watch Chinese movies/drama and listen to Chinese music	4.1807	1.29608
B	I always prefer Chinese popular culture over foreign popular culture	3.5338	1.15508
C	I would like if popular culture from China had more elements of Chinese culture	3.8000	1.16966

Hypotheses and Analysis Model

This study sets two hypotheses to investigate the relation between two sets of nationalism and Chinese youth's psychological preference for particular taste of popular culture. As discussed by popular culture theorists like Fiske, it can be said that popular culture is closely related to the living environment of young Chinese. According to Fiske's popular culture theory, it can be supposed that feeling of superiority over other countries can be also found in the preference of popular culture. Although two nationalisms in this study are different from each other in terms of their nature, they are both constructed around the central idea of national identification. Therefore, it can be supposed that they are both related to the tendency of CCE, however, due to their unique characteristics, hard nationalism rather than soft nationalism can be more strongly related to the CCE tendency.


H1: Compared to soft nationalism, hard nationalism is more significantly related to the tendency of cultural consumer ethnocentrism.

In addition, this study will focus on the preference of particular Chinese cultural elements on popular culture, and examine the presence of such psychological mind in two nationalisms by looking at the degree of cultural consumer ethnocentric tendency. It can be supposed that Chinese youth with CCE tendencies tend to find out the reasons to positively discriminate their own popular culture from that of foreign countries. As discussed in the study conducted by Zhao, this study also assumes that particular Chinese taste can be a decisive factor in such cases. Therefore, taking different characteristics of nationalisms into consideration, this study hypothesizes that preference for Chinese cultural elements in popular culture can be found in hard nationalism which can be positively related to the tendency of CCE.

H2: As cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies positively discriminate one’s own popular culture from that of foreign countries, the preference of particular Chinese cultural elements in popular culture can be seen in hard nationalism which supports cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies rather than soft nationalism.

The model of data analysis with supposed correlation is shown in the table 3 below.

Table 3: Data Analysis Model



Data Analysis

Cultural consumer ethnocentric tendency in hard nationalism

First, this study ran a correlation analysis in order to capture the hidden relation between two nationalisms, hard nationalism and soft nationalism and CCE. Before running a correlation analysis, the answers of three CCE questionnaire items are made into one scale (alpha: 0.834). Table 4 denotes there is positive correlation between nationalisms and CCE. Although they both show significant correlation value, compared to soft nationalism, hard nationalism is more strongly related to CCE. Accordingly, it can be said that nationalism with stubbornness and blindness rather than ordinary national identification is positively related to the tendency which overestimate one’s domestic popular culture.

Table 4: Nationalisms and CCE Correlation Analysis

	Soft nationalism	Hard nationalism	CCE
Soft nationalism	1	—	—
Hard nationalism	.409 **	1	—
CCE	.158 **	.431 **	1

** $p < .01$

It should be noted that there is also strong correlational value between two nationalisms, however, similar results are drawn in the studies by Feshbach and Staub. This study will not discuss about this correlation in detail, however, it can be said that these two nationalisms are psychologically different constructs, but positively related to each other. This relatively strong correlation between two nationalisms requires this study to conduct further statistical analysis. The correlational value extracted earlier cannot be reliable if these two nationalisms are indirectly related to CCE through each other. According to table 5, the results of regression analysis (R square: .186, VIF value: 1.202) shows that hard nationalism gives significant positive influence to a dependent variable, CCE, however, there is no such influence found between soft nationalism and CCE. Therefore, it can be said that the difference between two nationalisms is a determining factor for the preference and discrimination of their own domestic popular culture over foreign popular culture.

Table 5: Nationalisms and CCE Regression Analysis

	β
Soft nationalism	-.022
Hard nationalism	.440 ***

*** $p < .001$

Dependent variable: CCE

Cultural consumer ethnocentrism requiring Chinese cultural elements

In order to examine Fudan students' popular culture taste, this study uses a variable "I would like it if popular culture from China had more elements of Chinese culture" to investigate the relation with CCE tendencies. As a result of correlation analysis, there is significant positive correlational value (.272**) between CCE and the preference for Chinese cultural elements in popular culture. It can be seen that the students with CCE tendencies tend to require their own traditional cultural elements towards popular culture as well.

Nationalism requiring Chinese cultural elements


From above data analyses, following statements can be supposed. Compared to soft nationalism, hard nationalism supporting CCE tendencies tends to prefer particular Chinese cultural elements in their own popular culture. In order to prove this supposition, this study ran another correlation analysis using two nationalisms and a variable “I would like it if popular culture from China had more elements of Chinese culture”. From table 6 showing the result of correlation analysis, an interesting conclusion can be found. The preference for Chinese cultural elements in popular culture is positively related to soft nationalism at a significant level, however, there is no such relation found with hard nationalism. Nationalism characterized as ordinary national identification rather than stubborn and blind nationalism is unexpectedly positively related to particular taste of popular culture. The total results of correlation analyses are shown in the table 7.

*Table 6: Nationalisms and Preference of Chinese Cultural Elements
Correlation Analysis*

	Soft nationalism	Hard nationalism	Preference of Chinese cultural elements in popular culture
Soft nationalism	1	—	—
Hard nationalism	.409 **	1	—
Preference of Chinese cultural elements in popular culture	.247 **	.040	1

** $p < .01$

Table 7: The Total Results of Correlation Analyses



** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

Next, another regression analysis was conducted for analyzing the causal relationship between these variables. In this regression analysis, the preference for Chinese cultural elements in popular culture was set as a dependent variable, and other three as independent variables. The result of analysis is shown in table 8 (R square: .143). The table denotes that two independent variables, namely soft nationalism and CCE give positive influence towards the dependent variable at a significant level. On the other hand, hard nationalism has negative influence on the dependent variable at a significant level. Moreover, the VIF values of soft nationalism, hard nationalism and CCE are 1.202, 1.440 and 1.229 each, therefore, there is no evident problem with collinearity in this analysis.

Table 8: Nationalisms, CCE and Preference of Chinese Cultural Elements Regression Analysis

	β
Soft nationalism	.283 ***
Hard nationalism	-.207 ***
CCE	.310 ***

*** $p < .001$

Dependent variable: "I would like of popular culture from China had more elements of Chinese culture"

Hence, according to the results of data analysis, in the case of Fudan University students in China, although cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies give positive influence to their preference for particular Chinese cultural tastes in their popular culture, hard nationalism

with such tendencies does not play a positive role for favoring particular taste of popular culture. In contrast, soft nationalism without supporting such tendencies acts as a cause of requiring Chinese cultural elements in their popular culture.

Verification of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 can be verified with the result of the very first correlation analysis and regression analysis conducted in this study. The results of these analyses show that hard nationalism is positively related to or has positive influence on cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies rather than soft nationalism. It is supposed that soft nationalism is also possibly related to CCE, however, it is wise to judge there is no significant relation between soft nationalism and CCE from these results. Therefore, it can be said that hypothesis 1 is partially proven.

With regard to hypothesis 2, as positive correlation was found between CCE and the preference for Chinese cultural elements in popular culture, it was supposed that hard nationalism with CCE tendencies would be the cause of such preference among Fudan University students. However, the correlation and regression analyses run afterwards reveal that soft nationalism which did not show significant correlation with CCE plays an important role in the cause of particular popular culture taste among Fudan students. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is dismissed.

Discussions

As mentioned above, this study found out that nationalism is positively related to the preference of popular culture among Fudan university students, and the difference between two nationalisms is a decisive factor for requiring Chinese cultural elements in popular culture. From this conclusion, some interesting questions can be raised such as “why is the preference for particular cultural elements in popular culture found only in soft nationalism, not in hard nationalism?” It is apparent that the difference existed between soft and hard nationalisms is playing a significant role to interpret the result of the data analysis. However, although it can be supposed that hard nationalism has felt the dynamism of the contemporary Chinese society since the 1990s much more than soft nationalism has, there is no result supporting such supposition. Fiske argues that understanding the relationship between the audience and the meanings of popular culture needs to consider the social environment in which the audience is situated. Is this popular culture theory not suitable for this particular case of study?

In order to deal with these questions, this study suggests that we should pay more careful attention to the essentials of popular culture. This study regarded psychological nationalism as a complex and diverse entity, and analyzed how the different psychologically characterized nationalisms are related to the particular preference of popular culture. In consequence, the difference existed between these nationalisms was found to be a determining factor of requiring Chinese cultural elements in popular culture. However, this study did not clarify what popular

culture means to the students of Fudan University. This study mainly applied the popular cultural theory of Fiske and attempted to investigate the relationship between popular culture and the audience, but unfortunately, no evident results was found to support the theory. It can be said that popular culture for the students of Fudan University does not necessarily mean the object of national pride. Therefore, it is wise to say that there is some phenomena lying underneath which cannot be completely explained with the theory of Fiske.

The essentials of popular culture

While Fiske argues that by looking at the social environment of the audience popular culture can be something meaningful for the audience in his theory, there are several cultural theorists presenting contradictory opinions to Fiske.

For instance, Christina Williams analyzes the relationship between popular music and high school students in England and claims that true meanings of popular culture lie in its everydayness.¹ Although Williams agrees with Fiske in a sense that consumption and acceptance of popular culture can be socially constructed, she concludes that for the interviewees of Williams' study, popular music is just an entertainment which only decorates their everyday life, and nothing meaningful.² From Williams' argument, it can be said that only looking at these students' consumption of popular music would bring needless contradiction between their frequency of consumption and attitude towards popular culture.

Similar argument is also developed by Jing Wang who analyzed the attitudes of young students in Beijing towards "cool" culture. Adopting a qualitative narrative approach, Wang also found out that popular culture those young students in Beijing are familiar with does not necessarily represent their uniqueness or identities.³ Popular culture for them is rather a social tool to fit themselves into the environment that they are located, such as friendship. Wang expresses this kind of popular culture as "tribal culture" and points out the fluidity of their lifestyle and social relationships.

In addition, the theory of Fiske questioned in the studies of Williams and Wang is also being challenged by another media scientist, Joke Hermes. Using the concept of "fallacy of meaningfulness", Hermes questions the idea of active audience which Fiske adopts as a central idea of his popular culture theory. According to Hermes, it is dangerous to assume popular culture as something meaningful to the audience because not every reader and audience of popular culture actively receives messages or values from those activities.⁴ As Hermes warns that cultural theorists should not pay too much attention to the fans and enthusiasts of particular popular culture, it should be noted that the cultural theory which Fiske and other theorists have utilized is not necessarily suitable to all the studies.

¹ Christina Williams, "Does it really matter? Young people and popular music" *Popular Music*, 20.2 (2001), p. 240.

² *Ibid.*

³ Jing Wang, "Youth culture, music and cell phone branding in China" *Global Media and Communication*, 1.2 (2005), p. 198.

Jing Wang, *Brand New China: Advertising, Media, and Commercial Culture* (Cambridge; London: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 243.

⁴ Joke Hermes, *Reading Woman's Magazines* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 12-17.

The essentials of popular culture by Adorno

Although the works of Adorno on popular culture have been criticized by many cultural theorists, as Bernard Gendron pointed out in his book, there are many advantageous facets found in his cultural theory.¹ The main reason of criticizing the classic theory of Adorno is the idea of standardization brought by his negative attitude towards the cultural industry, however, the idea of standardization itself captures the essentials of popular culture in the era of the highly industrialized society. Taking the passivity of the audience as an example, Adorno denotes that backwardness of popular culture industry produces passive readers and listeners who vaguely consume those cultures without considering the contents of those cultures.² Additionally, Adorno links the passivity of the audience and leisure time and points out popular culture as merely a form of entertainment for those audiences. According to Adorno, the popular culture industry fully understands the psychology of the tired ordinary citizens who need refreshment and pleasure for their free time, therefore, thousands of new popular music and drama series are produced by the industry in order to satisfy the needs of those audiences.³ Therefore, it can be said that these ideas provided by Adorno originally captures the essential nature of popular culture.

The essentials of popular culture in the result of this study

So, how do the essentials of popular culture discussed by several theorists apply to the result of this study? The result of data analysis shows there is something that cannot be explained with the cultural theory of Fiske. This section will look back the different characteristics of two nationalisms and reconsider the analysis result. Hard nationalism factor extracted from factor analysis is characterized as blind and stubborn pride towards their own country, and this type of nationalism tends to overestimate their own popular culture compared to other foreign popular cultures. However, the result of data analysis shows that although there are CCE tendencies found in this factor, it does not directly link to the preference of Chinese cultural elements in their popular culture. Taking the characteristics of hard nationalism into consideration, it can be supposed that hard nationalism tends to require “authentic” nationalism or persistently hold their own definition of nationalism. If popular culture does not mean anything but an entertainment, it is not imaginable that hard nationalism reflects such “authentic” nationalism on mere popular culture. As popular culture is controlled by the worldly industry, hard nationalism would not require fake Chineseness in such popular culture.

On the other hand, the result of data analysis denotes that although there is no CCE tendencies found in soft nationalism, the requirement of Chinese cultural elements in popular culture is positively influenced by soft nationalism factor. As soft nationalism is defined as a common sense of national identification, it just regards being a part of their belonging

¹ Bernard Gendron, “Theodor Adorno Meets the Cadillacs” in Tania Modleski (ed), *Studies in Entertainment: Critical Approaches to Mass Culture* (Bloomington; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 18-36

² Theodor W. Adorno, 1991, p. 34.

³ テオドール・W・アドルノ、2002、pp. 179-180.

community as positive. Unlike hard nationalism, there would not be absolute definition or concept of what China or being a Chinese means for soft nationalism. Therefore, it can be imagined that soft nationalism can casually enjoy the Chineseness expressed in popular culture. While hard nationalism blames such Chinese cultural elements in popular culture as fake Chineseness, because there is not absolute value of nationalism for soft nationalism, it can require such Chineseness in popular culture just as a form of entertainment.

Hence, as discussed above, adopting the theory of popular culture by Adorno leads this study to an interesting point as the result of this study includes some aspects which cannot be fully interpreted by Fiske's theory. However, it should be noted that above discussions can be useful only when popular culture for Fudan students is characterized as mere entertainment. As mentioned earlier in this paper, the questionnaire used in this survey did not clarify the definition of popular culture, therefore, this study is unable to state what popular culture means to the respondents. At the same time, however, it can be positively said that the different natures of nationalisms is playing a significant role in interpreting the result of this study.

Conclusion and Future Study

This paper examined the impacts of nationalism on everyday life of young people in China by taking popular music as an example. Based on about 400 data samples obtained through the International Joint Research Project 2008, unlike previous researches, this study attacked the diversity and complexity of nationalism in the contemporary Chinese society and its relation with the preference of particular popular cultural taste with introducing the concept of cultural consumer ethnocentrism.

The result of data analysis explains that cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies in the students of Fudan University do relate to the psychology of requiring particular Chinese cultural elements in their own popular culture. One of the factors extracted by factor analysis called hard nationalism was found out to have cultural consumer ethnocentric tendencies, however, this factor is not acting as a cause of the preference of particular popular culture. Instead, according to the result of correlation and regression analysis, soft nationalism turned out to be the positive cause of favoring Chinese cultural elements even if it does not show any evident CCE tendencies.

Furthermore, using the cultural theory adopted by Adorno, this paper attempted to interpret the results drawn from a series of statistical analysis conducted in the study. Although applying Adorno's cultural theory does give us an interesting point of view, it is not appropriate to regard it as a conclusion of this study. As it is not possible to clearly define the term popular culture in this study, it requires further time and effort to interpret the results of this study.

In conclusion, although there are several limitations and difficulties existing in this study, it can be said that this study at least gives a fresh point of view to the existing studies of both nationalism and popular culture. There have been many controversial topics on nationalism in

the contemporary Chinese society, however, some aspects of Chinese nationalism like the one revealed in this paper are still publicly unknown. It can be said that the result of this study taught us to keep maintaining fresh approaches towards the researches of nationalism.

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Questionnaire Items

Q5 Do you agree with the following statements? Please express your opinion by checking one answer for each question.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Partly agree	Partly disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
A	Being Chinese means a lot to me	1	2	3	4	5	6
B	When a foreign person praises China, it feels like a personal compliment	1	2	3	4	5	6
C	I am proud of being Chinese	1	2	3	4	5	6
D	I don't feel any ties with China	1	2	3	4	5	6
E	I believe China will become a leading country in Asia in the near future	1	2	3	4	5	6
F	I feel very proud about China's economical achievements	1	2	3	4	5	6
G	I would rather be a citizen of China than of any other country in the world	1	2	3	4	5	6
H	The world would be a better place if people from the other countries were more like the Chinese	1	2	3	4	5	6
I	People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong	1	2	3	4	5	6

Q6 Do you agree with the following statements? Please express your opinion by checking one answer for each question.

		Strongly agree	Agree	Partly agree	Partly disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
A	Real Chinese should always watch Chinese movies/drama and listen to Chinese music	1	2	3	4	5	6
B	I always prefer Chinese popular culture over foreign popular culture	1	2	3	4	5	6
C	Chinese popular culture, first, last, and foremost	1	2	3	4	5	6
D	I would like it if popular culture from China had more elements of Chinese culture	1	2	3	4	5	6

Tears, Capital, Ethics: Television and the Public Sphere in Japan

Daniel White

Summary

In Japanese television, tears are abundant and productive. Not least of their productive capacities is their ability to stimulate capital for commercial broadcasters, operating as a rationalization mechanism that translates emotion into ratings. Alternatively, for public broadcasters like Japan's NHK, tears function as tools of emotional education, translating, as Dewey would have it, forms of sentiment into public problems (1991:131). Based on ethnographic fieldwork among TV producers, this study contrasts commercial and public TV production processes in Japan, using tears as a vehicle through which to understand how affect is rationalized in strategies of capital gain and tempered by ethics of public broadcasting. The paper attempts to place theories of neoliberalism in dialectical conversation with those of the public sphere, ultimately constructing the latter as a field of sentiment and ethics rather than as a model of communication and social structure upon which many theorists of the public sphere, following Habermas (1991), have relied.

Tears, Capital, Ethics: Television and the Public Sphere in Japan

For cultural anthropologists interested in affect, tears, to borrow an often-cited phrase from Levi-Strauss, are “good to think with” (1963:89). While there are many precedents in the natural sciences, humanities, and psychology to which the anthropologist might turn to ask questions about tears, mine is a more pragmatic endeavor. I want to use tears as productive sites around which much of affective cultural life assembles. I will ask, thus, in a heuristic vein, what do people *do* with tears: When do they cry? How do they cry? And how do they respond to the crying of others? The fact is that people do a great number of different things with tears and, like Geertz’s winks, the act of crying carries multiple, layered, and often unexpected meanings.

In the sphere of television in Japan, one, indeed, sees tears evoked in multiple and varied sites. Tears operate not exclusively as markers of strong emotion in afternoon melodrama, but enter into several other domains of media management: tears connect with capital in the competition for ratings among commercial broadcasters; they serve as tools of sentimental education for Japan’s public broadcaster; and they even help define what counts as democracy, responsibility, and public engagement for Japanese citizens and non-citizen residents. This paper looks at the variety of processes by which tears are managed by television producers. Through the contrasting examples of commercial and public television productions, I suggest that public displays of crying are interpreted and appropriated toward varying capitalist, ethical, and democratic ends. I hope to offer these examples as a way to think through and against the theoretical modeling of the public sphere in Japan.

Commercial Broadcasting and Ratings

Any fan of Japanese or Korean TV drama knows that a good amount of crying in stories makes for good TV; any producer of these dramas knows that a good amount of crying among viewers makes for good ratings. The problem for producers is, then, how to rationalize tears in such a way that they can guarantee a certain ratings return. Gabriella Lukacs (forthcoming) provides a revealing look into what are called the “reflexive practices” (Ong and Collier 2005:7) of TV drama producers. “Reflexive practices” refer to the various modes by which modern elite actors subject their own practices, often tied up in institutions of administrative, government, or bureaucratic organization, to reflexive questioning as a means of intervening, repairing, or improving those practices. Lukacs shows how TV producers in Japan judge scripts and the scenario writers who compose them on the basis of their potential emotional evocations. Producers have a keen eye for what kinds of scenarios will guarantee an emotional response that produces high ratings; however, because there is always an element of the unknown in drama production, they must be willing to reevaluate, constantly questioning themselves as to why a script might fail and always reincorporating recent failures and unexpected successes into new evaluations. The element of the unknown in TV drama production guarantees the sustained dynamic—quite dramatic in itself—between the pursuit of rationalized control over the relationship of emotional evocation and ratings on one hand, and its undeterminable failures on the other.

While there are numerous examples of commercial broadcasts in Japan that utilize tears as mechanisms for generating ratings, I will choose just one. “*Sanjūnin Sanjūikkkyaku*” is a two-hour special

broadcast from *Terebi Asahi* of a national tournament among sixth grade grammar school students who compete to see which school has the fastest “thirty one-legged team.” Most North Americans are familiar with the three-legged race from grammar school, summer camp, or neighborhood parties in which two participants have one of their legs lashed together by a chord or strand of cloth. The partners must cooperate by coordinating their steps with one another in order to move the most quickly and efficiently from the start to finish line, hopefully ahead of the other partner teams with whom they are in competition. The Japanese “thirty one-legged race” version of this is the same idea writ large. It involves the lashing together of the legs of thirty grade school students to form one long line that must, in careful synchronization, coordinate their steps in a timed race to the finish line. Teams, the winning schools from each of the 47 prefectures, cover the distance of fifty meters in a shocking gait for first time viewers familiar only with the two person version, marking times between nine and eleven seconds.

Although viewers unfamiliar with this exercise tend to interpret the program comically, it doesn’t take long to realize that the competition is quite serious. Very rarely do teams fall in the course of the race, laugh, or exhibit any other comic elements. In fact, falling in a race marks a seriously *kuyashii* (emotionally painful) event, one whose appropriate response demands tears rather than laughter.

Tears inundate the program. The students, along with the parents who have been arduously cheering their children on from the stands, will inevitably cry at the elimination of their team; coaches of the team will either cry along with them as evidence of his or her emotional investment in time and practice or fight back tears as a way to demonstrate leadership for those who are crying; and the four guest talents in the TV studio watching the program and intermittently solicited for comments and impressions will certainly cry. And the evocation of such sentiment is the aim of the program. Personal stories from individuals on each team are emphasized and dramatized through a narrative presented in film clips shot over the course of a year’s preparation for the tournament (one segment tells the story of a girl, the captain of her team, who injured her leg during the course of practice and only recovered a few weeks prior to the event—just in time, needless to say, to provide an emotionally satisfying ending to the story). One of the program’s announcers solicits impressions from some of the students and coaches before the race, highlighting their enthusiasm and determination, and once again solicits responses from members of the losing team—and often only the losing team—after the race. Inevitably the selected student will be in tears along with the rest of his or her peers, the emotional sign of a bitter end to a long process of sacrifice and group effort.

“*Sanjūnin Sanjūikkaku*” is representative of a number of variety shows that attract viewers through sentimental storylines. Other shows include melodramatic narratives of love or incurable diseases, documentaries on the trials of public education, and variety shows focusing on sentimental themes like the relationship between humans and animals. This genre of shows is often called *onamida chōdai* (literally “tears please” or “consuming tears” but most accurately translated as “sentimental”) and it is a product of a largely insulated and domestically oriented production process. Although we know that popular Japanese media today circulates transnationally (an important topic beyond the scope of this paper but see Iwabuchi 2002, Allison 2006, and Condry 2006), TV production processes are still based on business models that imagine and target a domestic viewership (since 1970 95% of Japanese television has been domestically produced, Iwabuchi 2004:22). In the competitive commercial television market in Japan, emotions in these

onamida chōdai programs are resources for ratings: tears, if you will forgive the pun, are liquidity.

While commercial broadcasters measure success by ratings, Japan's public broadcaster must consider not only success but also responsibility. However, even in public broadcasting one finds production processes and narrative storytelling that depend on overtly sentimental structures.

Public Broadcasting and the Public Sphere

In early November of 2007 I found myself sitting in a small audience at a public showing of a documentary on *jakunen nichishō*, or early-onset Alzheimer's. Looking around at the elderly Japanese audience members I noticed we had very little in common, except for the fact that we were all wiping voluminous tears from our eyes. I was at NHK's public archives in Kawaguchi, about an hour outside the center of Tokyo. I was there for a *mirukai*, a public showing of various productions from Japan's public broadcaster, *Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai* (NHK). Takada-san, the public planning director of the archives, hosts these showings about once a month. This time Takada-san was showing a documentary from 2005 titled "*Futari no toki o kokoro ni kizamu*" ("Etching Our Time into the Heart"). The opening scene finds the central character, Ochi-san, at a podium in front of a large international audience. His movements are slow, his hands somewhat shaky. He is reading a prepared statement, a short memoir of his experience and his ongoing battle with Alzheimer's. A young woman stands next to him, whispering in his ear at points where he stumbles over his words. Ochi-san comes to the climax and conclusion of his speech, where, tearing up himself, he expresses gratitude to his wife, the most important person in his life without whose care he neither could nor want to live. The camera shows his wife in the audience smiling proudly. Needless to say, she is the only one not crying. The rest of the audience members, both in the documentary and in the archives where I am, are in tears.

In an interview with Takada-san, the organizer of the public showing, he cites the importance of this opening scene of Ochi-san's presentation. This scene, he says, along with being a powerfully emotional one, demonstrates how far the public understanding of Alzheimer's has come among Japanese people. "In the past," he said, "Japanese people did not understand anything. They misunderstood the condition, saying that things were fine so long as the patient seemed happy with his life. However, with great progress and effort among professionals, family members, and patients themselves, Japanese people have to come to reconcile that misunderstanding." This shift in thought and feeling toward Alzheimer's patients represents for Takada-san a mark of progress for Japanese people. The tearful reaction of the audience shows how Japanese have developed ethically. Emotional evocation, here, certifies their ethical development.

"*Futari no toki*" represents how emotion and ethics develop in relation to each other in media spheres. Emotional evocation is dependent on the ethical consensus that what is happening is tragic and should, in fact, evoke tears. To understand Ochi-san, the sufferer, as happy with his life and to share in his happiness would be a misunderstood reaction, ethically and emotionally. Stylistically, the documentary goes to significant lengths to prevent such a misunderstanding. Instead of focusing on the theme of happiness, it takes up two alternative themes: the tragic suffering of Ochi-san and the determination and effort of his wife in the face of such suffering. Ochi-san's wife, Sumiko, sacrifices, cares, works, and more than anything else, cries over her husband's condition. Hers is a suffering experience and the point of

empathy is directed less upon the husband, who indeed seems quite happy, but on the wife, who we know through scenes of “private” displays of pain and tears is suffering. In fact, the contingency of ethical and emotional empathy is demonstrated by the contradiction in the statements of the program’s director, Nakashima-san, who expressed surprise at Ochi-san’s seemingly constant optimism: “Why is this person always happy?” I wondered. “He’s supposed to be suffering. I decided to make this a theme of the show.” The director’s ethical ambiguity toward Ochi-san reveals the degree to which, as an artistic producer as well as a typical member of the Japanese public who has limited knowledge of Alzheimer’s, he has the liberty to narrate and create a particular emotional affinity over another. Ultimately, his message is not one of celebrating happiness in the face of disease, but empathy with struggle, determination, and sacrifice in the face of suffering.

Although there is little written in English on the cultural history of Alzheimer’s in Japan, both Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney and Margaret Lock have commented on the changing views of the disease over the last two decades (personal communication). One can find structural affinities between the history of Alzheimer’s and other sensitive conditions in Japan that Western medicine would identify under the category of “mental illness.” Characteristic of these forms of suffering is the lack of public discourse in which to root a common sense understanding of the appropriate ethical and emotional reactions to unhealthy bodies. Suffering in these conditions remains a private affair, susceptible to anxiety over public shame and subject to a significant degree of contingency from one case to another. For a public broadcaster whose responsibility it is to represent public views as well as inform them, constructing a public narrative for a private and multivalent experience of sickness is not easy. In short, there are few precedents for its narration, which causes a sense of unease for producers. What precedents do exist are not of content but of narrative form and structure.

The practices of documentary direction pedagogy in NHK demonstrate this. Prior to entering NHK, seldom do directors have any experience with documentary production let alone with TV, film, or media in general. One director I spoke with majored in modern Japanese literature: he joked that one day he was writing a thesis on Dazai Osamu and the next day he was directing documentaries. This means that styles of documentary narration and production are taught on-site. This means also that aesthetic forms of documentary are rooted in a collective organization, NHK being one of the largest in Japanese media. Directors learn the forms of sentimental narration: how to, in the words of one producer, “drop the story in the viewer’s stomach” (*hara ni otosu*). Where early-onset Alzheimer’s may be an ambiguous and slippery theme to narrate, stories of struggle and determination in the face of suffering is an NHK convention.

Conclusions: Public Sphere Theory

Long before Habermas articulated his structural and communicative theory of the public sphere (1991), John Dewey provided a definition of a public as that which organizes around specific problems. Indispensable to such problems are the forms of their communication. For Dewey, a public could not emerge unless what he called “indirect consequences” (1991:131) could be perceived rather than simply felt. He explains, “At present, many consequences are felt rather than perceived; they are suffered, but they cannot be said to be known” (1922:131). In Dewey’s thought, in order to make a public problem out of

Alzheimer's, whose consequences are only felt in sites of private suffering, it requires a narrative form, what Dewey called "presentation," and presentation, says Dewey, "is a question of art" (1922:183).

From Dewey's perspective, then, we can understand the job of the director Nakashima-san and archive director Takada-san as narrating matters of common concern, of turning felt consequences into public problems. When I questioned Takada-san about NHK's public responsibility, he said, "It is NHK's mission to contribute to society. It is a virtue to be able to use such programs as this one to increase public understanding of issues such as early-onset Alzheimer's." Takada-san saw the event as a great success. Upon my asking how he evaluated the event's success, he judged it in terms of the public discussion that followed the event:

That we could have a discussion among Sumiko-san, the director Nakashima-san, as well as Sato-san, the sufferer of early-onset Alzheimer's who is living here in Kawaguchi, and moreover, that we could have this discussion with members of the public, many of them themselves sufferers or professionals working with victims of Alzheimer's, made this a wonderful event. I will be very happy if we could continue to have this high-level of public events.

In Takada-san's imaginary of the public sphere we see a model reflecting the values of Habermas's public sphere of eighteenth century Western Europe: values of rational debate and inclusion which have largely formed the discourse not only for public broadcasting but for democracy in general since Meiji and the post war era. What I hope this analysis has shown, however, is that we might do better to rely on Dewey's model of the public as one that forms around specific problems and that depends not on values of rational debate but on emotion, and often a fair amount of tears, in its emergence.

Tears are often public events and, as we have seen, they can be employed to varying ends. Like language, affects, and ideas, public spheres are shared spaces—social facts; and the terms for their legitimacy are likely to vary as much as the models of those who theorize them. In the spaces of Japanese public broadcasting, we see how tears, forms of sentiment, and the narrations they depend on play a major role in constructing public problems and the measures by which to evaluate the legitimacy of those problems. For those of us interested in how private sentiments become public culture in modernity, we might do well to pay attention to tears more often.

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Imagining Chinatown: a critical study of the Chinese-language media in New Zealand

Li Hairong

abstract

The Chinese population in New Zealand has rapidly increased through immigration since the passage of the 1987 Immigration Act. According to the latest census, conducted in 2006, Chinese now comprise 3.4% of the New Zealand population. A wide variety of Chinese-language media have accordingly thrived in New Zealand. This increase accelerated in the early 2000s, with the arrival of large numbers of Chinese immigrants from the People's Republic of China. The majority of these migrants have settled in Auckland, the largest metropolis in New Zealand.

This paper presents PhD research on the social dynamics of the Chinese migrant community in New Zealand through a critical analysis of the Auckland-based Chinese-language media. The researcher has surveyed a wide range of theories in order to establish a framework for examining these Chinese media as a distinct body of ethnic media in New Zealand. This survey combines two research fields, international migration studies and media studies, to conceptualise Chinese-language media as a specific type of alternative media in contemporary New Zealand. In contrast to New Zealand mainstream media, these Chinese media serve the specific needs and interests of newly-arrived and less acculturated Chinese migrants.

The research was conducted in three phases: firstly, quantitative and qualitative data were acquired from the content of Chinese-language radio programmes, Chinese newspapers and Chinese websites during the period of the 2005 New Zealand general election; secondly, qualitative data were obtained from focus groups and interviews with members of Chinese audience subsequent to the election; thirdly, qualitative data were generated from Chinese media personnel.

The findings suggest that these Chinese-language media closely reflect and depict recent PRC Chinese migrants' perceptions of New Zealand and aspirations towards their new life in the host country. Within the global context of the Chinese Diaspora in historical and contemporary times, this research also introduces a new angle for exploring the socio-economic impacts of China as a rising superpower on New Zealand and the Pacific Rim.

Introduction

The Chinese ethnic group has rapidly increased to become one of the largest in New Zealand since the Fourth Labour Government implemented the Immigration Act of 1987. The momentous feature of this Act was its non-discriminatory intent, which proclaimed, "Immigrants are now selected on the basis of personal merit rather than national or ethnic origin. This is a significant departure from the bias in favour of the British and West Europeans which had shaped New Zealand migrant flows for almost a century (Department of Statistics, 1990: 202)." The 1987 Immigration Act facilitated a strong wave of non-white European immigration to New Zealand. The most recent New Zealand census conducted in 2006 shows that Chinese now constitute 3.4 per cent of the New Zealand population. They account for nearly half of the Asian population in New Zealand, and are the second largest ethnic minority group in the country, next only to Maori, the indigenous people.

With the surge in Chinese immigration to New Zealand, a wide variety of Chinese-language media in the form of newspapers, radio, television, and websites has developed and flourished in a number of major cities in this country. To date, the significance of these Chinese-language media for the New Zealand Chinese migrant community has not received sufficient scholarly attention. This research addresses the following interlocked questions:

- To what extent is the Chinese migrant community reflected or exhibited by the Chinese-language media?
2. How do these Chinese-language media serve the Chinese migrant community as an institution to sustain Chinese solidarity?
 3. What role do these media play in the process of Chinese migrants' settlement and acculturation in the core society of New Zealand?
 4. How do Chinese migrants perceive New Zealand?
 5. What kind of aspirations do Chinese migrants hold for their new lives in New Zealand?
 6. What role do these media play in Chinese migrants' maintenance in the link with their homeland?

This paper is a brief report of the author's PhD research, which is a comprehensive study of the current Chinese migrant society in New Zealand through a critical analysis of the New Zealand-based Chinese-language media. The premise of this research is that the New Zealand Chinese media closely reflect the development of the Chinese migrant community in New Zealand, and provide a unique perspective for investigating Chinese migrants' settlement and acculturation in their host country.

Theoretical Framework

The researcher has approached the New Zealand Chinese media from three conceptual directions. Firstly, it is an investigation of the Chinese identity within the specific socio-cultural context of New Zealand. Chinese identity is a socio-historically constructed concept, which may refer to historical identity, Chinese nationalist identity, communal identity, national (local) identity, cultural identity, ethnic identity, class identity, etc. (Wang, 1991). Secondly, the researcher combined the approaches of media studies and international migration studies. On the one hand, ethnic Chinese media are treated as a specific type of alternative media in contrast to mainstream media in New Zealand. This approach focuses on examining how ethnic Chinese media publicise the marginalised Chinese migrants and facilitate communication within them. What sort of information is circulated among these migrants, and what are their specific needs and interests? On the other, the assimilation model, the pluralism model and transnationalism have been assessed and applied to analyse Chinese migrants' settlement in and adaptation to New Zealand. The researcher argues that Chinese migrants at different stages of acculturation have different interests and concerns which they advocate through Chinese media. Lastly, the researcher uses the framework of 'discourse analysis' developed by Fairclough (1995), to discuss the construction of Chinese media messages and the audience's reception. This examines the relationship between media

content, media production and the process of audience comprehension of media content, and between these and the wider social context.

These theoretical considerations lead to the expectation that ethnic Chinese media serve the specific needs and interests of the Chinese migrants at an early stage of acculturation in New Zealand.

Research design and data collection

Since this research is a study of the Chinese migrant community through analysing the Chinese media, the content of which is miscellaneous and frequently changing, the criteria for collecting empirical data focused on the expectation that the compiled information could illuminate characteristics of the Chinese media and divulge the interactive relationship between these media and the Chinese migrant community. The research was conducted in three phases. Firstly, quantitative and qualitative data were acquired from the content of Chinese-language newspapers, websites and talkback radio during the 2005 New Zealand general election. This decision was based on the researcher's expectation that the general election would stimulate the Chinese migrants to discuss their main interests and concerns about their socio-political status as new but equal members in democratic and multiethnic New Zealand. The preliminary findings of the first phase became the basis of the second phase, which concentrated on acquiring data on audience reception of the Chinese media through focus groups and interviews with Chinese migrants subsequent to the election. The third phase of data collection among Chinese media personnel was directed by the findings of the previous two phases, which had constructed a rough picture of the relationship between the New Zealand Chinese media and the Chinese migrant community, although some aspects still lacked clarity. The aim of the third phase of the research was to clarify some ambiguities through discussions with people who operate the Chinese media.

The aim was to cover three areas through these empirical findings: 1) the general content of Chinese-language media in New Zealand; 2) the relationship between the Chinese media and the New Zealand Chinese migrant community; and 3) Chinese migrants' perceptions of New Zealand and their link to the homeland as manifested by the Chinese media.

The empirical findings show that the general content of New Zealand Chinese media is dominated by commercial advertisements for Chinese community businesses; however, the Chinese media covered the 2005 New Zealand general election extensively. The Chinese media are an important source of information about New Zealand society for Chinese migrants, especially for the new arrivals. These media construct an alternative public sphere for Chinese migrants to participate in New Zealand politics. Among Chinese migrants, the newly arrived people are more eager to have Chinese representation in New Zealand politics than more established earlier arrivals; in 2005 these newcomers gave enormous support to conservative parties which had Chinese candidates, and were critical of the centre-left Labour government's taxation and welfare policies. During the period of the New Zealand election, a large number of PRC immigrants were overwhelmed by patriotic sentiments toward the homeland because of China's success in launching its first manned spacecraft.

Discussion of empirical findings

The theoretical framework suggests that New Zealand Chinese-language media primarily serve and cater for needs and interests of marginalised new Chinese migrants, most of whom lack competence in the English language and are acculturated minimally to the core society of New Zealand. The implication of this is that discussion of the empirical findings will centre around three major issues:

- Who are the marginalised new Chinese migrants that form the main audience of New Zealand Chinese media?

- What specific needs and interests of the marginalised new Chinese migrants do Chinese media reveal?
- In what sense are these new Chinese migrants minimally acculturated to the host country?

The statistical analysis of Chinese immigration to New Zealand over the past two decades shows that a sharp increase in PRC Chinese immigrants since the early 2000 has resulted in their demographic predominance in the current Chinese migrant community. Discussion therefore focuses on examining the significance of Chinese-language media within the recently arrived PRC Chinese migrants.

There are two large groups comprising the recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand. The first one is former Chinese international students. In the 2001 and 2002 financial year, more than 40,000 Chinese students were granted a permit to study in New Zealand. Although the number of Chinese students has decreased since, it still remains more than 20,000 each year. Since 2002, the New Zealand government has encouraged international students to become migrants once they complete their studies. Chinese students are the largest group benefiting from this change, and most of these students are from the wealthy families in China. The second group is Chinese business people, who are the largest source of business migrants to New Zealand since 2000. Both of these groups are the immediate beneficiaries of China's economic growth in recent years, and are from the newly-emerged middle and upper classes in urban China.

During the 2005 election, many recent PRC migrants were eager to have Chinese MPs and supported conservative parties. They felt insecure and sought mainstream politicians to stand up for them, but did not have faith in anyone other than ethnic Chinese. This suggests that these newcomers lack understanding of New Zealand's political system and the party politics in this country.

Their conservative views should be understood by reference to current China, a society in which uneven distribution of wealth and social inequalities are widespread.

China has developed into an economic powerhouse for the whole world, but many of its citizens have been left behind. A small number of urban rich and a sizable middle class control the greatest proportion of the country's wealth, while the majority of the Chinese population remain in poverty. The Chinese government has realised the danger of such a pyramidal social structure and has recently introduced a new social security system. However, receiving benefits challenges China's conventional value system; attaining social equality and justice through redistribution on social resources is still an alien ideology for recent PRC immigrants. By contrast, within the developed world, the welfare state is an accepted mechanism to coordinate social integration and maintain political stability. New Zealand has been a well-established welfare state since the 1930s.

Recent PRC migrants' ideological distance from the core society of New Zealand helps to explain their embrace of Chinese nationalism. During the 2005 general election, China's achievement in her space program was one stimulus for this. These migrants are very proud of China's immense success in developing her prosperous economy, which provides the basis for funding such an ambitious and costly project.

The connection between the revival of Chinese nationalism and China's fast economic growth has drawn a considerable amount of scholarly attention in recent years (e.g. Gries, 2004; Hughes: 2006; Zweig: 2002). The Chinese government has been using nationalism as a political strategy to legitimise CCP rule, following the Tiananmen Square protests and the collapse of the former communist countries in Eastern Europe in 1989. This use of nationalism as a political mechanism since the early 1990s has produced a new generation of younger Chinese fuelled by patriotism and embracing 'socialism with Chinese characteristics'. The majority of recent PRC migrants belong to this generation.

Conclusions

This research demonstrates a new way of studying the New Zealand Chinese migrant community by analysing the Chinese-language media which serve this community. This approach uses a wide range of theoretical and methodological elements from international migration studies and media studies.

The acceleration of China's economic growth since the mid-1990s has generated the primary source of the recent PRC immigrants to New Zealand. Given their socio-economic background in China, social and political contexts of the home country have had a significant influence on these recent PRC immigrants' perception of New Zealand and thus their corresponding behaviours within the host country.

New Zealand Chinese media depict a wide range of phenomena from Chinese activism in New Zealand ethnic politics to the prosperous community economy and cultural life of Chinese immigrants. These media play a significant role in shaping a Chinese socioeconomic space in New Zealand. The existence of these media may in consequence be perceived as an 'imagined Chinatown' in New Zealand.

Historically, a Chinatown in the West was a haven that provided protection, communal aid and ethnic solidarity for uprooted Chinese sojourners who could stay away from racial prejudice and discrimination, but that impeded them from integrating and acculturating into the host society. During the 2005 New Zealand general election, the role ethnic Chinese media played among recent PRC immigrants showed some of the historical features of ghettoised Chinatowns. More recently, a Chinatown has been a cultural icon for Chinese overseas to maintain their emotional connections with China, the homeland. The Chinese-language media in New Zealand also construct an imagined Chinatown in this sense.

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Opening Speech



Discussion at the workshop

