Epistemic Infinite-Regress Logic

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Abstract

We present a logic called the epistemic infinite-regress logic EIRn for n players. It extends the epistemic logic KDn, by incorporating the operators expressing infinite regresses. Here, an infinite regress arises from the interdependent thinking of a player about the other’s thinking and vice versa. If we add Axiom T (truthfulness) for the belief operators to the logic EIRn, the concept of an infinite regress collapses into the common knowledge. However, we keep the subjective nature of the concept, avoiding Axiom T as well as Axiom 4. We prove the completeness theorem with respect to Kripke semantics and a certain restricted class of Kripke models. These lead to various meta-theorems useful for considerations of prediction/decision making by a player in a game. Using the meta-theorems, we show that a statement about n players can be decomposed into n independent statements, vice versa, and even that we can go back and forth from a statement for each player into its epistemic content.

Key words: Infinite regress, Common knowledge, Epistemic logic, Nash equilibrium, Epistemic separation

1 Introduction

We develop the epistemic infinite-regress logic EIRn, which is a fixed-point extension of (propositional) epistemic logic KDn with n players. The logic is motivated by studies of both ex ante prediction/decision making and ex post observations in a game; Hu-Kaneko [5] applied the logic EIR2 to study game-theoretic decidability/undecidability. We introduce new operators to express the concept of an (epistemic) infinite regress that naturally arises in prediction/decision making in a game. Because of interdependence of payoffs, for a player i to make his decision, i needs to make prediction about the decision of the other player, say, j. This prediction, however, also requires i’s belief about j’s predictions about i, and then the process continues ad infinitum. In the 2-person case, this infinite regress of beliefs can be represented as an infinite set of the following form:

\[ \{ B_i(A_i), B_iB_j(A_j), B_iB_jB_i(A_i), B_iB_jB_iB_j(A_j), \ldots \} \] (1)

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where $B_i(\cdot)$ and $B_j(\cdot)$ and the belief operators of players $i$ and $j$ ($i \neq j$). In the logic EIR$^2$, this regress is expressed as the fixed-point operator $\text{Ir}_i(A; A_j) := \text{Ir}_i(A_1, A_2)$; for the $n$-person case, it is expressed as $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$. Thus, the logic EIR$^2$ is a fixed-point extension of the epistemic logic KD$^n$ by adding one axiom schema and one inference rule for $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n), i \in N = \{1, ..., N\}$.

The concept of an infinite regress $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$ is closely related to that common knowledge. Indeed, it is shown in Section 2.3 that if we add Axiom T(truthfulness): $B_i(A) \supset A$, then the infinite regress $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$ collapses to the common knowledge of $A_1 \wedge ... \wedge A_n$ (Theorem 2.3), and the resulting logic is a common knowledge logic (cf., Fagin et al. [3] and Meyer-van der Hoek [14]). We also consider its status when we add Axiom 4 (positive introspection): $B_i(A) \supset B_iB_i(A)$. Nevertheless, we take the KD-type EIR$^n$ as our main logical system for our game-theoretic applications. Those meta-theorems reflect some fundamental principles relevant for a logical system describing players’ subjective thinking in a game, and based on them, we evaluate various epistemic axioms based on these meta-theorems. Our choice of KD$^n$ as our base logic is crucial to maintain those principles.

First, we should mention a significant difference in the formulations of the logic EIR$^n$ between the 2-person case and $n$-person case with $n \geq 3$. For the 2-person case, we can give essentially two different formulations for $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, A_2), i = 1, 2$. One formulation is adopted in Hu-Kaneko [5], but is not available if $n \geq 3$. In this paper, we give another formulation, which is available for either $n = 2$ or $n \geq 3$; and it is equivalent to the formulation given in [5] for $n = 2$. We evaluate these formulations, while developing our theory.

We show that the logic EIR$^n$ is complete with respect to the Kripke semantics (Theorem 3.1). For application purposes, we also present a variant of the completeness result (Theorem 3.2) such that we can restrict the class of models to that of rooted models. These completeness results enable us to develop various meta-theorems for our game-theoretic applications. Those meta-theorems reflect some fundamental principles relevant for a logical system describing players’ subjective thinking in a game, and based on them, we evaluate various epistemic axioms based on these meta-theorems. Our choice of KD$^n$ as our base logic is crucial to maintain those principles.

The completeness results show that the operator, $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$, fully captures the set in (1). By this fact, it is expected that $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$ is within the scope of the belief operator $B_i(\cdot)$, since every formula in (1) has the outermost $B_i(\cdot)$. Actually, $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$ can be expressed by another equivalent formula, $B_i[A_1 \wedge (\wedge_{j \neq i} \text{Ir}_j(A))]$, in EIR$^n$ (Theorem 2.2). This allows us to regard $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$ as a belief formula for player $i$, and also to consider the derivability of the epistemic content of the infinite regress in his logical inferences, even though $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$ is syntactically indecomposable.

One meta-theorem, called the Scope Theorem (Theorems 4.1), shows that $B_i(A) \vdash B_i(C)$ is equivalent to $A \vdash C$. This equivalence is also applicable to our infinite regress operators (Theorem 4.3). This theorem allows us to change the epistemic scope from player $i$’s subjective perspective to the analyst’s, and vice versa. This change of scopes is critical in studies of interdependent subjective inferences for prediction/decision making. The Scope Theorem is also needed to evaluate the two different formulations of EIR$^n$.

Another meta-theorem, called the Separation Theorem (Theorem 4.2), shows that $B_i(A_1) \wedge ... \wedge B_n(A_n) \vdash B_i(C_1) \wedge ... \wedge B_n(C_n)$ is equivalent to $B_i(A_1) \vdash B_i(C_i)$ for all $i$. Thus, a statement about prediction/decision making as a whole can be decomposed into individualistic statements, and vice versa. This theorem separates individual subjectivities, in the sense that players’ subjective beliefs are the only sources for their ultimate decisions. Thus, in our logic, we can explicitly distinguish the source of belief-changes. In particular, our formulation allows
for a meaningful interaction between subjective beliefs and objective observations.

In Section 5, we show applications of our theory on EIR\(^n\) to \textit{ex ante} prediction/decision making and their interactions with \textit{ex post} observations. The decidability/undecidability results given in Hu-Kaneko [5] are mentioned, which concern \textit{ex ante} prediction/decision making. While the analysis in Hu-Kaneko [5] is purely subjective and individualistic, our meta-theorems here allow us to decompose the entire situation that includes all players’ perspectives and the objective situation into subjective reasonings. Moreover, given this decomposition, we also consider the interaction between \textit{ex ante} subjective reasoning and \textit{ex post} observations, and show that Nash equilibrium describes the situation where players’ subjective inferences are consistent with observed behavior.

The scope theorem is newly given in this paper, while it is used in [5]. A primitive form of the separation theorem was proved in Kaneko-Nagashima [8] in an infinitary (predicate) epistemic logic (including Axiom 4) in a proof-theoretic manner, and a more sophisticated version was shown in a model theoretic manner in Kaneko-Suzuki [11] in an epistemic logic of shallow depths. The scope theorem crucially depends upon the choice KD\(^n\) as the base logic for EIR\(^n\); we provide counterexamples to show that theorem fails if we add either Axiom T or Axiom 4.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a Hilbert-style formulation of EIR\(^n\) and some basic lemmas, and some other variants. Then, Section 3 gives the Kripke semantics and the basic completeness (/soundness) theorem, the ep-rooted completeness theorem, and as an application, we prove scope lemma. Section 4 gives the epistemic separation theorem. Section 5 is a game theoretic application. Section 6 gives the proof of the basic completeness theorem.

2 \ Epistemic Infinite-Regress Logic EIR\(^n\)

Here we formulate the infinite-recess logic EIR\(^n\) as a fixed-point extension of epistemic logic KD\(^n\) with \(n\) players. In Section 2.1, we also mention an alternative formulation of EIR\(^n\) and that for 2 players given in Hu-Kaneko [5]. In Section 2.2, we give basic lemmas which we utilize for subsequent arguments; Theorem 2.2 (Epistemic content) is specific to the concept of an infinite regress, and plays crucial roles in subsequent arguments. In Section 2.3, we compare EIR\(^n\) with the common knowledge logic CKL\(^n\) with the presence of Axiom T or Axiom 4.

2.1 Formal system

The language for the infinite-regress logic EIR\(^n\) is as follows:

- \textit{propositional variables}: \(p_0, p_1, \ldots\); \textit{logical connectives}: \(\neg\) (not), \(\supset\) (imply), \(\land\) (and), \(\lor\) (or);
- \textit{unary belief operators}: \(B_1(\cdot), \ldots, B_n(\cdot)\);
- \textit{n-ary infinite regress operators}: \(Ir_1(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot), \ldots, Ir_n(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot)\); \textit{parentheses}: \((, )\).

We denote \(PV := \{p_0, p_1, \ldots\}\). The set of players, whose generic element \(i\) appears as the subscript of belief operator \(B_i(\cdot)\) and infinite regress operators \(Ir_i(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot)\), is denoted by \(N = \{1, \ldots, n\}\).

We define the sets of \textit{formulae}, denoted \(\mathcal{F}\), by the following induction: \((o)\): each \(p \in PV\)
is a formula; (i): if \( A, B \) are formulae, so are \((A \supset B), (\neg A), B_i(A)\) for \( i \in N \); (ii): if \( A = (A_1, ..., A_n) \) is a vector of formulae, then \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \) is also a formula for \( i \in N \); (iii): if \( \Phi \) is a finite (nonempty) set of formulae, then \((\wedge \Phi)\) and \((\vee \Phi)\) are formulae. The set of all formulae is denoted by \( \mathcal{F} \), and the set of all nonepistemic formulae, i.e., the ones with no occurrences of \( B_i(\cdot) \) and \( \text{Ir}_i(\cdot; \cdot) \) for \( i \in N \), is denoted by \( \mathcal{F}^0 \).

We abbreviate parentheses when no confusions are expected, and use different parentheses such as \([,] \) for convenience. Also, \( \wedge \{A_1, ..., A_n\} \) may be expressed as \( A_1 \land ... \land A_n \), etc. We also abbreviate \((A \supset B) \land (B \supset A)\) as \( A \equiv B \). We stipulate that when we talk about player \( i \), the other players are denoted by \(-i \). The formula \( \text{Ir}_i(A) = \text{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n) \) is also denoted as \( \text{Ir}_i(A; A_{-i}) \). When we refer to a contradictory formula, we will use \((\neg p) \land p\), where \( p \) is some propositional variable.

The base logic of \( \text{EIR}^n \) is classical logic, formulated by five axiom (schemata) and three inference rules: for all formulae \( A, B, C \), and finite nonempty sets \( \Phi \) of formulae,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{L1:} & \quad A \supset (B \supset A) & \text{L2:} & \quad (A \supset (B \supset C)) \supset ((A \supset B) \supset (A \supset C)) \\
\text{L3:} & \quad (\neg A \supset \neg B) \supset ((\neg A \supset B) \supset A) \\
\text{L4:} & \quad \wedge \Phi \supset A, \text{ where } A \in \Phi; \quad \text{and} \quad \text{L5:} & \quad A \supset \vee \Phi, \text{ where } A \in \Phi \\
\end{align*}
\]

Let \( A \supset B \) be a formula and \( \{A : B \in \Phi\} \) be a set of formulae.

Now, we add two epistemic axioms and one inference rule for the belief operators \( B_i(\cdot) \): for all formulae \( A, C \), and for \( i = 1, ..., n \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{K:} & \quad B_i(A \supset C) \supset (B_i(A) \supset B_i(C)); \quad \text{D:} & \quad \neg B_i(\neg A \land A); \\
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\frac{A}{B_i(A)} \quad \text{NEC.}
\]

Those axioms and inference rules constitute epistemic logic \( \text{KD}^n \).

The epistemic infinite-regress logic \( \text{EIR}^n \) is defined as the system by adding the following axiom schemata and rules to \( \text{KD}^n \) : for \( i \in N \), and any vectors of formulae, \( A = (A_1, ..., A_n) \) and \( D = (D_1, ..., D_n) \),

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{IRA}_i : & \quad \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_i(A_i) \land B_i[\wedge_{j \neq i}\text{Ir}_j(A)] \\
\text{IRI}_i : & \quad \{D_j \supset B_j(A_j) \land B_j(\wedge_{k \neq j}D_k) : j \in N\} \\
\end{align*}
\]

The names, IRA\(_i\) and IRI\(_i\), stand for “infinite regress axiom” and “infinite-regress inference”. Note that these are assumed for all \( i \in N \). Axiom IRA\(_i\) requires a fixed-point property for \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \) in the interactive fashion that it contains \( \wedge_{j \neq i}\text{Ir}_j(A) \) within the scope of \( B_i(\cdot) \). Rule IRI\(_i\) states that if \( D_1, ..., D_n \) share the property described by Axioms IRA\(_1\), ..., IRA\(_n\), then \( D_i \) implies \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \).

In fact, \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \) induces, with the help of the other \( \text{Ir}_j(A) \), \( j \neq i \), the following infinite set:

\[
\{B_{i_0}B_{i_1}...B_{i_k}(A_{i_k}) : (i_0, i_1, ..., i_k) \text{ is a sequence of any finite length in } N \quad (2) \text{ with } i_t \neq i_{t+1} \text{ for } t = 0, ..., k - 1 \text{ and } i_0 = i\}.
\]

This is the \( n \)-person version of (1). To see that each formula in (2) is logically implied by \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \), first note that Axiom IRA\(_i\) itself implies \( B_i(A_i) \) and \( B_i(\text{Ir}_i(A)) \). For player \( i \) to explicate his
belief \( B_i(\text{Ir}_j(A)) \), he needs \( B_i(\text{IRA}_j) \), which he has by Nec. Thus, we obtain \( B_i B_j(A_j) \) from \( B_i(\text{Ir}_j(A)) \) together with \( B_i(\text{IRA}_j) \). Repeating this argument, we obtain the whole set in (2) as logical implications of \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \).

The upper formulae of Rule \( \text{IRI}_i \) states that \( D_1, \ldots, D_n \) have the properties described by \( \text{IRA}_1, \ldots, \text{IRA}_n \). Rule \( \text{IRI}_i \) requires \( \text{Ir}_j(A) \) to be deductively weakest among such \( D_i \)'s. These rules, as shown later with the help of the completeness/soundness theorem, implies that \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \) is semantically determined by the set in (2).

A proof \( P = \langle X, \prec; \psi \rangle \) in \( \text{EIR}^n \) is constituted of a finite tree \( \langle X, \prec \rangle \) and a function \( \psi : X \rightarrow \mathcal{P} \) with the following three requirements: (i) for each node \( x \in X \), \( \psi(x) \) is a formula attached to \( x \); (ii) for each leaf \( x \) in \( \langle X, \prec \rangle \), \( \psi(x) \) is an instance of the axiom schemata; (iii) for each non-leaf \( x \) in \( \langle X, \prec \rangle \), the following is an instance of the above five rules:

\[
\{ \psi(y) : y \text{ is an immediate predecessor of } x \}.
\]

We call \( P \) a proof of \( A \) iff \( A \) is attached to the root of a proof \( P \). We say that \( A \) is provable, denoted by \( \vdash A \), iff there is a proof of \( A \). As stated in Section 1, we need nonlogical axioms for game theoretical applications. We introduce nonlogical assumptions in the following manner: For a set of formulae \( \Gamma \), we write \( \Gamma \vdash A \) if \( \vdash A \) or there is a finite nonempty subset \( \Phi \) of \( \Gamma \) such that \( \vdash \Phi \supset A \). We say that a set of formulae \( \Gamma \) is inconsistent iff \( \Gamma \vdash (\neg p) \wedge p \); and \( \Gamma \) is consistent otherwise.

As it stands, it may be difficult to interpret rule \( \text{IRI}_i \) as an inference rule from player \( i \)'s subjective perspective, because \( B_j[\wedge_k \neq j D_k] \), \( j \neq i \), appear in the upper formulae of \( \text{IRI}_i \). However, we can modify \( \text{IRI}_i \) as follows:

\[
\text{IRI}_{i}^{\text{Ind}} : D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \wedge B_i(\wedge_{j \neq i} D_k) \qquad \{ B_i[D_j \supset B_j(A_j) \wedge B_j(\wedge_{k \neq j} D_k)] : j \neq i \} \]

That is, it asserts that when \( D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \wedge B_i(\wedge_{j \neq i} D_k) \) and \( B_i[D_j \supset B_j(A_j) \wedge B_j(\wedge_{k \neq j} D_k)] \) are already proved, the lower formula \( D_i \supset \text{Ir}_i(A) \) is provable, too. This inference rule is purely subjective from player \( i \)'s perspective.

Note that Rule \( \text{IRI}_i \) is permissible in the system with the rule \( \text{IRI}_{i}^{\text{Ind}} \), and hence the later system is deductively stronger than \( \text{EIR}^n \). Actually, we have the converse, which is stated in Theorem 2.1.(i) below. We prove this converse using the soundness/completeness theorem for \( \text{EIR}^n \) in Section 4. Although the system with rule \( \text{IRI}_{i}^{\text{Ind}} \) is better interpreted than \( \text{EIR}^n \), they are equivalent and \( \text{EIR}^n \) is simpler. For this reason, we discuss mainly the logic \( \text{EIR}^n \).

Both Axiom \( \text{IRA}_i \) and Rule \( \text{IRI}_i \) (and \( \text{IRI}_{i}^{\text{Ind}} \)) are interactive in the sense that each includes \( \text{Ir}_j(A) \) or \( D_j \) for \( j \) different from \( i \). For \( n = 2 \), however, intrapersonal versions of the axiom and rule are given by Hu-Kaneko [5]: for \( i = 1, 2 \),

\[
\text{IRA}_{i}^{\text{HK}} : \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_i(A_i) \wedge B_i B_j(A_j) \wedge B_i B_j \text{Ir}_i(A);
\]

\[
\text{IRI}_{i}^{\text{HK}} : D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \wedge B_i B_j(A_j) \wedge B_i B_j(D_i) \]

\[
\text{IRI}_i(A) \]

Although the system with \( \text{IRA}_{i}^{\text{HK}} \) and \( \text{IRI}_{i}^{\text{HK}} \) is more appealing from the viewpoint of individual inference than \( \text{EIR}^2 \), only the 2-person version of such system is deductively equivalent to \( \text{EIR}^n \),

\[1\text{Given this definition, take } \Gamma \text{ as the set in (2), we do not have } \Gamma \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \text{. Hu-Kaneko-Suzuki (2014) permits infinite conjunction of the set in (2) in an infinitary logic.} \]
as stated Theorem 2.1.(ii). In the extension of IRA\(^{HK}\) and IRI\(^{HK}\) to the three player case, for example, \(B_1B_2B_1B_2(A_2)\) is not derived from \(I_{r_1}(A_1, A_2, A_3)\). The proof will be given in Section 3.3.

**Theorem 2.1.** (Equivalent formulations of EIR\(^n\)) (i): For any formula \(A \in \mathcal{F}, \vdash A\) in EIR\(^n\) if and only if \(\vdash A\) in the system with rule IRI\(^{HK}\) instead of IRI\(_i\).

(ii): Let \(n = 2\). For any formula \(A \in \mathcal{F}, \vdash A\) in EIR\(^n\) if and only if \(\vdash A\) in the system with IRI\(^{HK}\) and IRI\(^{HK}\) instead of IRA\(_i\) and IRI\(_i\).

### 2.2 Basic Properties of EIR\(^n\)

Here, we list some known facts on KD\(^n\), which will be used without referring. The first two are provable formulae in classical logic and the other three are provable in KD\(^n\). In the following, \(A, B, C\) are arbitrary formulae, \(\Phi\) an arbitrary finite nonempty set, and \(i = 1, \ldots, n\).

**Lemma 2.1.** (i): \(\vdash [A \supset (B \supset C)] \iff [A \land B \supset C]\); (ii): \(\vdash A \supset B\) and \(\vdash B \supset C\) imply \(\vdash A \supset C\); (iii): \(\vdash B_i(\neg A) \supset \neg B_i(A)\); (iv): \(\vdash \forall B_i(\Phi) \supset B_i(\forall \Phi)\); (v): \(\vdash B_i(\forall \Phi) \equiv B_i(\Phi)\).

As mentioned previously, \(I_{r_i}(A) = I_{r_i}(A_1, \ldots, A_n)\) intends to capture the set in (2), all formulae in which are within the scope of \(B_i(\cdot)\). We may then regard \(I_{r_i}(A)\) as having the outer \(B_i(\cdot)\), even though \(I_{r_i}(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot)\) is a primitive symbol. The following theorem formally justifies this interpretation. It states that \(I_{r_i}(A)\) is logically equivalent to another formula that begins with \(B_i(\cdot)\), and it gives the epistemic content of \(I_{r_i}(A)\). This theorem also justifies our claim that the operator is \(I_{r_i}(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot)\) captures player \(i\)'s subjective thinking.

**Theorem 2.2.** (Epistemic Content): \(\vdash I_{r_i}(A) \equiv B_i[A_i \land (\land_{j \neq i} I_{r_j}(A))]\).

**Proof.** The one direction \(\vdash I_{r_i}(A) \supset B_i[A_i \land (\land_{j \neq i} I_{r_j}(A))]\) follows from IRA\(_i\). Consider the converse. Let \(D_k = B_k(A_k) \land B_k(\land_{j \neq k} I_{r_j}(A))\) for \(k \in N\). We show \(\vdash D_k \supset B_k(\land_{j \neq k} D_j)\).

It suffices to show \(\vdash D_k \supset B_k(\land_{j \neq k} D_j)\). Let \(l \neq k\). By IRA\(_k\) (Nec and K), \(\vdash B_k(I_{r_k}(A)) \supset B_k(B_l(\land_{j \neq k} I_{r_j}(A)))\), i.e., \(\vdash B_k(I_{r_k}(A)) \supset B_k(B_l(A_l) \land B_l(\land_{j \neq k} I_{r_j}(A)))\), which is written as \(\vdash B_k(I_{r_k}(A)) \supset B_k(D_k)\). Since this holds for all \(l \neq k\), we have \(\vdash B_k(\land_{j \neq k} I_{r_j}(A)) \supset B_k(\land_{j \neq k} D_j)\). Thus, \(\vdash D_k \supset B_k(\land_{j \neq k} D_j)\); so \(\vdash D_k \supset B_k(A_k) \land B_k(\land_{j \neq k} D_j)\). Since this holds for all \(k \in N\), we can apply IRA\(_i\), and thus we have \(\vdash B_i(A_i) \land B_i(\land_{j \neq i} I_{r_j}(A)) \supset I_{r_i}(A)\).

Here, we state various basic properties of \(I_{r_i}(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot)\). We write \(A \supset B\) for \((A_1 \supset B_1, \ldots, A_n \supset B_n)\). We also write \(I_{r_i}(\Phi; A_{-i}) := \{I_{r_i}(C_i; A_{-i}) : C_i \in \Phi\}\). The properties (i)-(iv) are inherited from the belief operator \(B_i(\cdot)\) satisfying Axioms K and D and Rule Nec. In particular, (i) corresponds to Axiom K, (ii) corresponds to Lemma 2.1.(iii), (iii) corresponds to Lemma 2.1.(iv) and (v) and (iv) corresponds to the Rule Nec. Finally, (v) follows from the negation of the Axiom IRA\(_i\).

**Lemma 2.2.** (Basic properties of \(I_{r_i}(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot)\)): Let \(A, C\) be any \(n\)-tuples of formulae, and \(\Phi\) a finite nonempty set of formulae. Then,

(i): \(\vdash I_{r_i}(A \supset B) \supset (I_{r_i}(A) \supset I_{r_i}(C))\).

(ii): \(\vdash I_{r_i}(C^*) \supset I_{r_i}(C)\), where \(C^*_j\) is either \(C_j\) or \(\neg C_j\) for all \(j \in N\). Then, if \(C^*_j = \neg C_j\), then \(\vdash I_{r_i}(\neg C_j; C^*_j) \supset \neg I_{r_i}(C_j; C^*_j)\), and if \(C^*_j = C_j\) for some \(j \in N\), then \(\vdash I_{r_i}(C^*) \supset \neg I_{r_i}(C)\).

(iii): \(\vdash I_{r_i}(\forall \Phi; A_{-i}) \equiv \land I_{r_i}(\Phi; A_{-i})\); and \(\vdash I_{r_i}(\forall \Phi; A_{-i}) \supset I_{r_i}(\forall \Phi; A_{-i})\).
(iv): if $\text{Ir}_i(A) \vdash B_i(C_i) \land B_i[\land_{j \neq i} B_j(C_j)]$, then $\text{Ir}_i(A) \vdash \text{Ir}_i(C)$; particularly, if $\vdash C_j$ for all $j \in N$, then $\vdash \text{Ir}_i(C)$;

(v): if $\text{Ir}_i(A) \vdash \neg[B_i(C_i) \land B_i[\land_{j \neq i} B_j(C_j)]]$, then $\text{Ir}_i(A) \vdash \neg \text{Ir}_i(C)$.

**Proof.** Those can be proved by choosing appropriate formulae for $\{D_k\}_{k \in N}$ in $\text{Ir}_i$. We prove only (i) and (v).

(i): For each $j = 1, \ldots, n$, let $D_j = \text{Ir}_j(A \supset C) \land \text{Ir}_j(A)$. Then, by $\text{IRA}_j$, $\vdash D_j \supset B_j((A_j \supset C_j) \land A_j)$, which implies $\vdash D_j \supset B_j(C_j)$. Again by $\text{IRA}_j$, we have $\vdash D_j \supset B_j(\land_{k \neq j} D_k)$. Thus, $\vdash D_j \supset B_j(C_j) \land B_j(\land_{k \neq j} D_k)$; i.e., we get the upper formulae of $\text{Ir}_i$. Hence, $\vdash D_i \supset \text{Ir}_i(C)$. This implies (i).

(v): Suppose $\text{Ir}_i(A) \vdash \neg[B_i(C_i) \land B_i[\land_{j \neq i} B_j(C_j)]]$. This is equivalent to $\text{Ir}_i(A), B_i(C_i) \land B_i[\land_{j \neq i} B_j(C_j)] \vdash \neg p \land p$. By $\text{IRA}_i$, we have $\text{Ir}_i(A), \text{Ir}_i(C) \vdash \neg p \land p$. Thus, $\text{Ir}_i(A) \vdash \neg \text{Ir}_i(C)$.■

### 2.3 Common knowledge, and Axioms T and 4

The concept of infinite regress is closely related to common knowledge due to Lewis [13] and Aumann [1]. To discuss common knowledge in our logic, we add one unary operator symbol $C(\cdot)$ to the list of primitive symbols in Section 2 and extend the set of formulae by allowing $C(A)$. Then, we add Axiom CKA and Inference CKI to $\text{IR}^n$: for any formulae $A$ and $D$,

CKA: $C(A) \supset A \land (B_1(C(A)) \land \ldots \land B_n(C(A)))$;

CKI: $\frac{A \supset (B_1(D) \land \ldots \land B_n(D))}{D \supset C(A)}$

These also form a fixed-point definition of $C(A)$. The logical implications of $C(A)$ include all formulae in the following set:

$$\{A\} \cup \{B_{i_0}B_{i_1}...B_{i_k}(A) : (i_0, i_1, \ldots, i_k) \text{ is a sequence of any finite length in } N\}.$$ (3)

This is obtained by repeated uses of CKA. By the completeness/soundness theorem for CKL, in terms of semantics, this set is exactly captured by $C(A)$.

The set (3) makes it clear that $C(A)$ is formulated from the outside analyst’s perspective, as it includes all players’ subjective thinking as well as the objective situation. It therefore differs from the infinite regress, $\text{Ir}_i(A, \ldots, A)$, which is formulated purely from player $i$’s subjective perspective. However, this subjectivity would disappear if we impose the truth axiom that is typically assumed in CKL. To make this point formally, we suppose that the logic $\text{EIR}^n$ includes $C(\cdot)$ for Axiom CKA and Rule CKI as stated above. We denote by $\text{EIR}^n(T)$ by assuming Axiom T: $B_i(A) \supset A$ ($A \in F$). The following theorem shows that the infinite regress $\text{Ir}_i(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ collapses to the common knowledge $C(A_1 \land \ldots \land A_n)$ in the logic $\text{EIR}^n(T)$, and hence the subjectivity is destroyed.

**Theorem 2.3.** *(Collapse under Axiom T):* For any $i \in N$ and $n$-tuple $(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$ of formulae,

$$\text{EIR}^n(T) \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A_1, \ldots, A_n) \equiv C(A_1 \land \ldots \land A_n).$$ (4)

**Proof.** We prove $\vdash \text{Ir}_i(A_1, \ldots, A_n) \supset C(A_1 \land \ldots \land A_n)$. We have, from Axiom $\text{IRA}_i$, using Axiom T several times, that $\vdash \text{Ir}_i(A_1, \ldots, A_n) \supset (A_1 \land \ldots \land A_n) \land [\land_{j \in N} B_j(\text{Ir}_j(A_1, \ldots, A_n))]$. This and CKI imply $\vdash \text{Ir}_i(A_1, \ldots, A_n) \supset C(A_1 \land \ldots \land A_n)$. The converse is proved similarly.■
Without imposing Axiom T, a closely related formula to \( \text{Ir}_i(A, \ldots, A) \) by using the operator \( C() \) is \( B_i(C(A)) \), which also describes player \( i \)'s subjective perspective. The formula \( B_i(C(A)) \) then corresponds to the set of formulae in (3) but adding the operator \( B_i() \) before each of them. The key difference between the two, however, lies in the fact that \( B_i(C(A)) \) includes all formulae of the form \( B_{i_0}B_{i_1} \ldots B_{i_k}(A) \) for any finite sequence \( (i_0, i_1, \ldots, i_k) \) with \( i_0 = i \), while \( \text{Ir}_i(A, \ldots, A) \) only includes those with an alternating epistemic structure. In fact, our next theorem shows that the two formulae are equivalent if we add Axiom 4 (Positive Introspection), \( B_i(A) \supset B_iB_i(A) \) \( (A \in \mathcal{F} \text{ and } i \in N) \), to EIR\(^n\). We denote the logic obtained from EIR\(^n\) by EIR\(^n\)(4) by adding Axiom 4.

**Theorem 2.4.** (Belief of common knowledge under Axiom 4): for any formula \( A \) and \( i \in N \),

\[
\text{EIR}^n(4) \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A, \ldots, A) \equiv B_iC(A) 
\]  

**Proof.** We abbreviate \( \text{Ir}_i(A, \ldots, A) \) as \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \). Let us prove \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_iC(A) \). Consider the formula \( D = A \land \text{Ir}_1(A) \land \ldots \land \text{Ir}_n(A) \). Since \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \equiv B_i(A \land (\land_j \neg \text{Ir}_j(A))) \) by Theorem 2.2, we have \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_i(A) \), \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \equiv B_i(\land_j \neg \text{Ir}_j(A))) \), and finally \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_i(\text{Ir}_i(A)) \) by Axiom 4. By combining these three, we have \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_i(A \land (\land_j \neg \text{Ir}_j(A))) \), i.e.,

\[
\vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_i(D).
\]

Since this holds for any \( i \in N \), we have \( \vdash D \supset A \land (\land_j \neg B_j(D)) \), which is an upper formula of CKA. Hence, \( \vdash D \supset C(A) \). This implies \( \vdash B_i(D) \supset B_iC(A) \) by Nec and K. This together with (6) implies \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset B_iC(A) \).

The converse is simple: Let \( D = B_iC(A) \). Then, \( \vdash D \supset B_i(A) \land (\land_j \neg \text{Ir}_j(A)) \) by CKI. By IRI, we have \( \vdash D \supset \text{Ir}_i(A) \), i.e., \( \vdash B_iC(A) \supset \text{Ir}_i(A) \). □

Without Axiom 4, however, the two formulae \( B_iC(A) \) and \( \text{Ir}_i(A, \ldots, A) \) behave differently. For many applications, including our game theoretical ones given in Section 5, the infinite regress operator with its straightforward interpretation arises naturally in such a context and has a convenient mathematical structure. In contrast, it is difficult to interpret the arbitrary rounds of self-introspection involved in \( B_iC(A) \) in such contexts, and, without Axiom 4, they also bring in cumbersome epistemic structures that obscure the epistemic analysis in games.

## 3 Kripke Semantics and Completeness

We give the Kripke semantics for EIR\(^n\), which is the same as the semantics for KD\(^n\) with the additional valuation for \( \text{Ir}_i(\cdot, \ldots, \cdot) \) for \( i \in N \). In Section 3.1, we give the basic (soundness-) completeness theorem, and in Section 3.2, we give a restriction on the semantics to facilitate further discussions.

### 3.1 Basic completeness theorem

A Kripke frame \( F = \langle W; R_1, \ldots, R_n \rangle \) consists of a nonempty set \( W \) of possible worlds and an accessibility relation \( R_i \subseteq W \times W \) for player \( i \in N \). We say that a frame \( F = \langle W; R_1, \ldots, R_n \rangle \) is serial iff for \( i = 1, \ldots, n \) and for all \( w \in W \), \( wR_iu \) for some \( u \in W \). A truth assignment \( \tau \) is a
function from \( W \times PV \) to \( \{ \top, \bot \} \). A pair \( M = (F, \tau) \) is called a model. When \( F \) is serial, we say that \( M \) is a serial model.

To define the semantic valuation, we need the concept of an alternating chain. We call a sequence \( [(v_0, i_0), (v_1, i_1), ..., (v_m, i_m), v_{m+1}] \) a chain iff \( v_0, v_1, ..., v_{m+1} \in W, i_0, i_1, ..., i_m \in N \) and \( (v_t, v_{t+1}) \in R_i \) for \( t = 0, ..., m \). We say that a chain \( [(v_0, i_0), (v_1, i_1), ..., (v_m, i_m), v_{m+1}] \) is alternating iff \( i_t \neq i_{t+1} \) for \( t = 0, ..., m - 1 \).

The valuation in \( (M, w) \), denoted by \( (M, w) \models \), is defined over \( F \) by induction on the length of a formula as follows:

- **V0**: for any \( A \in PV, (M, w) \models A \iff \tau(w, A) = \top; \)
- **V1**: \( (M, w) \models \neg A \iff (M, w) \not\models A; \)
- **V2**: \( (M, w) \models A \lor B \iff (M, w) \not\models A \) or \( (M, w) \models B; \)
- **V3**: \( (M, w) \models \Phi \iff (M, w) \models A \) for all \( A \in \Phi; \)
- **V4**: \( (M, w) \models \forall \Phi \iff (M, w) \models A \) for some \( A \in \Phi; \)
- **V5**: \( (M, w) \models B_i(A) \iff (M, v) \models A \) for all \( v \) with \( wR_i v; \)
- **V6**: \( (M, w) \models \mathsf{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n) \iff (M, v_{m+1}) \models A_{i_m} \) for all alternating chains \( [(v_0, i_0), (v_1, i_1), ..., (v_m, i_m), v_{m+1}] \) with \( (v_0, i_0) = (w, i). \)

Definitions V0-V5 are standard, and V6 corresponds exactly to (2). The semantic valuation for the common knowledge operator in the common knowledge logic CKL is much simpler: it requires \( A_1 = ... = A_n = A \) and \( (M, v_m) \models A \) for all chains \( [v_0, v_1, ..., v_m, v_{m+1}] \) (cf., Fagin et al. [3]).

The basic completeness theorem is as follows:

**Theorem 3.1. (Basic completeness).** Let \( A \) be any formula. Then, \( \vdash A \) if and only if \( (M, w) \models A \) for any (finite) serial models \( M = ((W; R_1, ..., R_n), \tau) \) and any \( w \in W. \)

This theorem will be proved in Section 6. The proof guarantees the finite model property, i.e., we can restrict the latter part of the theorem to the finite models. Another restriction is to require each model to be connected, i.e., for any \( w, u \in W \), there is a chain from \( w \) to \( u \). In Section 3.2, we give further restrictions, which will be used in Section 4.

It follows from Theorem 3.1 that a set \( \Gamma \) of formulae is consistent if and only if for any finite nonempty subset \( \Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma \), there is a serial model \( M \) and a possible world \( w \in M \) such that \( (M, w) \models A \) for all \( A \in \Gamma' \).

We cannot extend Theorem 3.1 to strong completeness: \( \Gamma \vdash A \) if and only if \( (M, w) \models A \) for any serial models \( M \) of \( \Gamma \) and \( w \in W \). One counterexample for the “if” direction is to take the set in (2) as \( \Gamma \) and to take \( \mathsf{Ir}_i(A_1, ..., A_n) \) as \( A \) with \( n = 2 \). By V6, any model of \( \Gamma \) would satisfy \( (M, w) \models A \), but, in general, for any finite subset \( \Gamma' \) of \( \Gamma \), \( \forall \Gamma' \vdash A \) is not provable in EIR\(^n\).

The infinite-regress logic EIR\(^n\) is a conservative extension of KD\(^n\), i.e., for any formula \( A \) with no occurrences of \( \mathsf{Ir}_i(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot) \) for any \( i \in N, \vdash A \) in EIR\(^n\) \iff \vdash A \) in KD\(^n\). As a result, we can convert meta-theorems in KD\(^n\) (e.g., epistemic depth theorem in Kaneko-Suzuki [11]) into EIR\(^n\).

The proof of Theorem 3.1 given in Section 6 can be modified without difficulties to the logic
EIR^n with Axiom T, Axiom 4, and/or Axiom 5: \( \neg B_i(A) \supset B_i(\neg B_i(A)) \). In the corresponding cases, we need to add reflexivity, transitivity, and/or euclideaness on the accessibility relations \( R_i \). Necessary modifications on the proof will be mentioned in Section 6.3. However, certain meta-theorems given in Section 4 fail in the logic with Axioms T, 4, or 5.

### 3.2 Completeness with respect to ep-rooted models

Theorem 3.1 can be modified to a more convenient form that will become very useful in Section 4. Let \( (W; R_1, ..., R_n) \) be a Kripke frame. We use \( W_i(w) \) to denote the set of all possible worlds \( u \)'s that are accessible from \( w \) with the initial reference by player \( i_0 = i \), that is, \( u \)'s for which there is a chain \( [(v_0, i_0), (v_1, i_1), ..., (v_m, i_m), v_{m+1}] \) \( (m_0 \geq 0) \) with \( v_0 = w, i_0 = i \) and \( u = v_{m+1} \). Let \( w_0 \in W \). We say that a frame \( (W; R_1, ..., R_n) \) is ep-rooted at \( w_0 \) iff it satisfies

\[
\{w_0\}, W_1(w_0), ..., W_n(w_0) \text{ are mutually disjoint.} \tag{7}
\]

Note that if \( (W; R_1, ..., R_n) \) is ep-rooted at \( w_0 \), then \( w_0 \notin W_i(w_0) \) for all \( i \). The union \( \{w_0\} \cup W_1(w_0) \cup \ldots \cup W_n(w_0) \) consists of \( w_0 \) and the worlds accessible from \( w_0 \). It may be possible for \( w \) in this set to be accessible from some world \( w \in W - \{w_0\} \cup W_1(w_0) \cup \ldots \cup W_n(w_0) \). For semantic evaluations at \( w_0 \), however, it is more important that \( w_0 \) is not accessible from any \( w \in W_1(w_0) \cup \ldots \cup W_n(w_0) \) and each \( W_i(w_0) \) is separated from \( W_j(w_0) \) for \( i \neq j \). This enables to evaluate the truthfulness of any formula at \( w_0 \) by referring only to \( W_i(w_0) \cup \ldots \cup W_n(w_0) \).

An ep-rooted frame \( F \) at \( w_0 \) is denoted as \( F = (W; w_0; R_1, ..., R_n) \). The set of ep-rooted serial frames is a proper subset of the set of serial frames. Nevertheless, we have the following theorem, which will be proved in the end of this section.

**Theorem 3.2. (Completeness with respect to ep-rooted models).** Let \( A \) be any formula. Then, \( \vdash A \) if and only if \( (M, w_0) \models A \) for any ep-rooted serial models \( M = ((W, w_0; R_1, ..., R_n), \tau) \).

Although the semantic requirement here is weaker than in Theorem 3.1, this theorem asserts that validity remains equivalent. Here, the semantic valuation is stated only at the root \( w_0 \) for each root model \( M = ((W, w_0; R_1, ..., R_n), \tau) \). The other parts \( W_1(w_0), ..., W_n(w_0) \) are needed to evaluate \( B_i(\cdot), ..., B_n(\cdot) \) at \( w_0 \), and the remaining part \( W - \{w_0\} \cup W_1(w_0) \cup \ldots \cup W_n(w_0) \) is not used at all. For simplicity, we still allow this remaining part to be nonempty.

Theorem 3.2 fails with Axiom T, because reflexivity required for \( R_i \) is violated by (7). With Axiom 4, Theorem 3.2 remains if transitivity required for each \( R_i \) in \( M \) is compatible with (7).

The only-if part of Theorem 3.2 directly follows from Theorem 3.2. We prove the if part. First, let us prove the following lemma.

**Lemma 3.1.** Suppose that \( M = (F, \tau) = ((W; R_1, ..., R_n), \tau) \) is a serial model, and choose a fixed \( w \in W \). Then, there is an ep-rooted serial model \( M^* = ((W^*, w_0^*; R_1^*, ..., R_n^*), \tau^*) \) such that for any formula \( A \),

\[
(M, w) \models A \text { if and only if } (M^*, w_0^*) \models A. \tag{8}
\]

**Proof.** Let \( w_0^* \) be a new symbol. We define an ep-rooted model

\[
M^* = (F^*, \tau^*) = ((W^*, w_0^*; R_1^*, ..., R_n^*), \tau^*)
\]
as follows: for $i \in N$,
\[
W_i^* = \{(u,i) : u \in W\},
\]
\[
R_i^* = \{(w_0^*, (u,i)) : (w,u) \in R_i\} \cup \{[(v,k),(u,k)] : (v,u) \in R_i, k \in N\},
\]
and
\[
W^* = \{w_0^*\} \cup W_1^* \cup ... \cup W_n^*,
\]
\[
\tau^*(w_0^*, p) = \tau(w, p), \quad \tau^*((u,k), p) = \tau(u, p) \text{ for all } k \in N, \ p \in PV.
\]
Each $W_i^*$ is a copy of $W$ in that the restriction of $M^*$ to $W_i^*$ is essentially the same as $((W; R_1, ..., R_n), \tau)$. That is, we have a natural bijection $\psi_i$ between $W_i^*$ and $W_i$. This bijection preserves the structure of the accessibility relations $R_i$, $j \in N$ and also the truth assignment $\tau$. This preservation includes the fact that for $i \neq j$, $W_i^*$ and $W_j^*$ are entirely separated and also the fact that $w_0^*$ is not referred at all from $W_i^*$. This implies that for each $i \in N$ and each $u \in W$,
\[
(M^*, (u,k)) \models A \text{ if and only if } (M, u) \models A.
\]
(11)
On the other hand, at $w_0^*$, $(u,i)$ is referred by $R_i^*$ as $u$ is referred at $w$ by $R_i$. Thus, the new frame $F^*$ is ep-rooted and serial.

Let us see (8). Consider each $i \in N$. The accessibility relation $R_i^*$ at $w_0$ keeps the same structure of $R_i$ at $w$, while $(w,i)$ is used when $w$ is referred. Also, $\tau^*$ in $W_i^*$ preserves the same values as $\tau$ in $W_i$; and $\tau^*$ at $w_0$ coincides with $\tau$ at $w$. The equivalence (8) follows from these facts and (11).

**Proof of Theorem 3.2.** We show the contrapositive of the if part. Suppose $\not\models A$. Then, by Theorem 3.1, there is a KD-model $M = (F, \tau)$ such that $(M, w) \not\models A$ for some $w \in W$. By Lemma 3.1, we have an ep-rooted model $M^* = ((W^*, w_0^*; R_1^*, ..., R_n^*), \tau^*)$ so that $(M^*, w_0^*) \not\models A$.

**4 Metatheorems for subjectivity**

In this section we give few metatheorems that demonstrate the subjectivity of agents’ thinking in our EIR$^n$.

**4.1 A Scope Theorem**

One critical feature of EIR$^n$ is that each player enjoys the logical ability described by the classical logic, and their reasonings are purely subjective in the sense that they are independent of the objective situation. These features are captured by our next theorem, called the scope theorem, as it states that we may change the epistemic scope from the inside player to the outside analyst when making inferences in EIR$^n$. As shown below, such independence does not exit if we impose Axiom 4 or Axiom T, and hence the choice of KD$^n$ is crucial to maintain these features. Our proof utilizes the convenience of ep-rooted models. Scope Theorem is also crucial to our proof of Theorem 2.1, which is given right after it.
Theorem 4.1. (Scope Theorem 1): Let $i \in N$.

(i): Let $A, C$ be formulae. Then, the following statements are equivalent:

(a) $\vdash A \supset C$;  
(b) $\vdash B_i(A \supset C)$; and  
(c) $\vdash B_i(A) \supset B_i(C)$.

(ii): Let $A, C$ be formulae. Then, the following statements are equivalent:

(a) $\vdash A \supset \neg C$;  
(b) $\vdash B_i(A \supset \neg C)$; and  
(c) $\vdash B_i(A) \supset \neg B_i(C)$.

Proof. (i): It is easy to see $(a) \implies (b) \implies (c)$. Here, we show $(c) \implies (a)$, and prove its contrapositive. Suppose $\not\vdash A \supset C$. Then, by the completeness part of Theorem 3.2, there is an ep-rooted model $M = (F, \tau) = ((W, w_0; R_1, ..., R_2), \tau)$ such that $(M, w_0) \not\models A \supset C$, i.e., $(M, w_0) \models A$ and $(M, w_0) \not\models C$. We add a new element $w_0^*$ to $F$ as follows:

$$W^* = W \cup \{w_0^*\}; \quad \text{and} \quad R_j^* = R_j \cup \{(w_0^*, w_0)\} \quad \text{for} \; j \in N.$$  

This is a KD-frame (but not ep-rooted). Let $\tau^*$ be the assignment such that $\tau^*(w, \cdot) = \tau(w, \cdot)$ for all $w \in W$ and $\tau^*(w_0^*, \cdot) = \tau(w_0, \cdot)$. Let $M^* = ((W^*, R_1^*, ..., R_2^*), \tau^*)$. Then, $(M^*, w_0) \models A$ and $(M^*, w_0) \not\models C$, which imply $(M^*, w_0^*) \not\models B_i(A)$ and $(M^*, w_0^*) \not\models B_i(C)$. Hence, $(M^*, w_0^*) \not\models B_i(A) \supset B_i(C)$. Thus, $\not\vdash B_i(A) \supset B_i(C)$ by the soundness part of Theorem 3.1.

(ii): We show $(c) \implies (a)$. Let $\vdash B_i(A) \supset \neg B_i(C)$. Then $\{B_i(A), B_i(C)\}$ is inconsistent, so $\vdash B_i(A \land C) \supset B_i(\neg p \land p)$. By (1) above, we have $\vdash A \land C \supset \neg p \land p$; so $\vdash A \supset \neg C$.

Theorem 4.1 fails with Axiom 4 and/or with Axiom T. A counter example in EIR$^2$(4) is an instance of Axiom 4 itself: $\vdash B_i(p) \supset B_i(p)$ but $\not\vdash p \supset B_i(p)$. A counter example in EIR$^2$(T) is: $\vdash B_i(\neg B_i(p) \land p) \supset B_i(\neg p \land p)$ in EIR$^2$(T). Indeed, since $\vdash B_i(\neg B_i(p) \land p) \supset B_i(\neg B_i(p)) \land B_i(p)$ and then $\vdash B_i(\neg B_i(p) \land p) \supset B_i(p)$. Thus $B_i(\neg B_i(p) \land p)$ is contradictory; and so $\vdash B_i(\neg B_i(p) \land p) \supset B_i(\neg p \land p)$. On the other hand, $\not\vdash B_i(p) \land p \supset \neg p \land p$, which is obtained by constructing a counter model.

Proof of Theorem 2.1.(i): First, we see that Rule IRI is admissible in the logic EIR$^n$. Suppose the upper formulae of IRI are proved, i.e., $\vdash D_j \supset B_j(A_j) \land B_j(\land_{k \neq j} D_k)$ for all $j \in N$. Then, by Nec, we have $\vdash B_j(D_j) \supset B_j(A_j) \land B_j(\land_{k \neq j} D_k)$ for all $j \neq i$. Hence, All the upper formulae of IRI$^n$ are provable. Hence, by IRI$^n$, we have $\vdash D_i \supset I_{i^*}(A_1, ..., A_n)$. It is similar that Rule IRI$^n$ is admissible in the logic EIR$^n$. We use Theorem 4.1.(1) in the start.

(ii): Again, we show that IRI is admissible in EIR$^{HK,2}$, and that IRI$^{HK,2}$ is admissible in EIL$^2$. Suppose $\vdash D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \land B_i(D_i)$ and $\vdash D_j \supset B_j(A_j) \land B_j(D_j)$. The latter implies $\vdash B_i(D_j) \supset B_i(B_j(A_j) \land B_j(D_j))$. These imply $\vdash D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \land B_i(\land_{k \neq j} D_k)(A_j)$ and $B_i(\land_{k \neq j} D_k)(D_j)$. Hence, $\vdash D_i \supset I_{i^*}(A_1, A_2)$ by IRI$^{HK,2}$. Conversely, suppose $\vdash D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \land B_i(D_i)$ and $\vdash D_j \supset B_j(A_j) \land B_j(D_j)$. Then, let $D_j = B_j(A_j) \land B_j(D_j)$. Then, $\vdash D_j \supset B_i(A_i) \land B_i(D_i)$ and also $\vdash D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \land B_i(D_i)$.

4.2 Epistemic Separations and Disjunction Properties

This section presents several results, which illustrate that each player’s subjective inferences are independent from those of other players in EIR$^n$. This principle is formalized by our Separation
Theorem (Theorem 4.2). It also enables us to obtain the corresponding Scope Theorem for the infinite regress operators (Theorem 4.1). We also obtain a theorem on disjunction properties for the belief operator (Theorem 4.4). The first two theorems will be used in a game theoretic context in Section 5. Weaker forms of the first and the third theorems were given for the epistemic logic GL$_{EF}$ of shallow depths in Kaneko-Suzuki [11].

4.2.1 Epistemic separation theorem

First, let $PV_0, PV_1, ..., PV_n$ be a partition of $PV$, where some $PV_i$’s are allowed to be empty. For $i \in N$, we say that a formula $A$ is $i$-indecomposable if $A \in PV_i$ or the outermost symbol of $A$ is $B_i(\cdot)$ or $Ir_i(\cdot, ..., \cdot)$, and that $A$ is an $i$-formula if it is generated only from $i$-indecomposable formulae with the four logical connectives. A nonepistemic formula including only propositional variables in $PV_0$ is called a 0-formula. For example, $B_i(B_j(A) \supset p)$ is an $i$-formula, and so is $B_i(B_j(A) \supset p) \land p$ if $p \in PV_i$. Also, $Ir_i(A_1, ..., A_n)$ itself is an $i$-formula. We note that these $i$-formulae for $i \in N$ and 0-formulae are relative to the given partition $(PV_0, PV_1, ..., PV_n)$ of $PV$. For simplicity, we let $N^* = \{0\} \cup N$; a 0-formula is also expressed as an $i$-formula for $i \in N^*$.

The Separation Theorem below shows that we can discuss each player’s logical inferences independently of others’ beliefs and inferences in EIR$^n$. In our game-theoretical applications, this theorem is crucial to allow for a consistent framework of subjective beliefs and inferences where players may hold completely different views about the game situation. We take into account the partition of the propositional variables into $(PV_0, PV_1, ..., PV_n)$, which allow more freedom for game theoretical applications than in [11].

**Theorem 4.2. (Epistemic Separation for EIR$^n$):** Let $\Gamma_i$ be a set of $i$-formulae and $A_i$ an $i$-formula for $i \in N^*$. We let $\Gamma = \bigcup_{i \in N^*} \Gamma_i$. Then,

(o): $\Gamma$ is consistent if and only if $\Gamma_i$ is consistent for all $i \in N^*$.

(i): Suppose that $\Gamma$ is consistent. Then, $\Gamma \vdash \bigwedge_{i \in N^*} A_i$ if and only only if $\Gamma_i \vdash A_i$ for $i \in N^*$.

(ii): $\Gamma \vdash \bigvee_{i \in N^*} A_i$ if and only if $\Gamma_i \vdash A_i$ for some $i \in N^*$.

**Proof.** In the following, for any set $\Lambda$ of formulae, we abbreviate $(M, w) \models A$ for all $A \in \Lambda$ as $(M, w) \models \Lambda$. We stipulate $(M, w) \models \emptyset$.

(o): The if part is essential. Suppose the consistency of $\Gamma_i$ for all $i \in N^*$. Let $\Gamma'$ be a finite subset of $\Gamma$. We let $\Gamma'_i = \Gamma \cap \Gamma_i$ for $i \in N^*$. For each $i \in N^*$, there is an ep-rooted model $M = (F, \tau) = ((W^i, w_0^i; R_1^i, ..., R_n^i), \tau^i)$ such that $(M, w_0^i) \models \Gamma'_i$. Recall that each formula in $\Gamma'_i$ is an $i$-formula. For $i = 0$, only the valuations at the root $w_0^0$ is relevant; and for $i \in N$, only the valuations at the set $\{w_0^0\} \cup W_i(w_0^i)$ (recall $W_i(w_0^i) := \{w \in W^i : w_0^0 \in R_i^i w\}$) are relevant. These facts enable us to combine the sets $W_i(w_0^i), i \in N$ with $w_0^0$ and construct the truth valuations appropriately.

We define $M^* = (F^*, \tau^*) = ((W^*, w_0^*; R_1^*, ..., R_n^*), \tau^*)$ with $w_0^* = w_0^0$ as follows:

$$W^* = \{w_0^0\} \cup W_1^1(w_0^0) \cup ... \cup W_n^n(w_0^0),$$  \hspace{1cm} (12)

for $i \in N$, $R_i^* = \{(w_0^0, u) : (w_0^0, u) \in R_i^0\} \cup$

$$\{(u, v) : u \in W^*, u \neq w_0^0, \text{ and } (u, v) \in R_1^0 \cup ... \cup R_n^0\};$$  \hspace{1cm} (13)
\[ \tau^*(w^*_p, p) = \tau^i(w^*_p, p) \text{ if } p \in PV_i, i \in N^*; \]
\[ \tau^*(u, p) = \tau^i(u, p) \text{ if } p \in PV, u \in W^*_i(w^*_0), i \in N^*. \]

Thus, the new root, \( w^*_0 \), and the partial worlds, \( W^*_i(w^*_1), ..., W^*_n(w^*_1) \), are connected keeping the original accessibility relations by (13). Condition (14) makes \( \tau^* \) coincide with \( \tau^i(w^*_0, p) \) if \( p \in PV^i \) for \( i \in N^* \) and also \( \tau^*(w, \cdot) \) is the same \( \tau^i(w, \cdot) \) in \( W^*_i(w^*_0), i \in N \).

Now we show that \( (M^*, w^*_0) \models \Gamma' \). First, by (14), for any \( i \in N^* \) and \( p \in PV^i \), \( (M^*, w^*_0) \models p \) if and only if \( (M^i, w^*_0) \models p \). Because \( (M^0, w^*_0) \models \Gamma_0' \), it holds that \( (M^*, w^*_0) \models \Gamma_0' \). Let \( i \in N \) be fixed. Then, by an induction argument, it holds for any \( w \in W^*_i(w^*_0) \) and any \( C \), \( (M^*, w) \models C \iff (M^i, w) \models C \). This implies \( (M^*, w^*_0) \models B_i(C) \iff (M^i, w^*_0) \models B_i(C) \), and also \( (M^*, w^*_0) \models \text{Ir}_i(A) \iff (M^i, w^*_0) \models \text{Ir}_i(A) \). These facts imply that for \( i \in N^* \), if \( A \in \Gamma_i' \), then \( (M^*, w^*_0) \models A \). That is, \( M^* \) is a model for \( \Gamma' \). Because \( \Gamma' \) is an arbitrary finite subset of \( \Gamma \), this shows that \( \Gamma \) is consistent.

(i): It suffices to show the only-if part. We show its contrapositive: \( \Gamma \not\models A_i \) for some \( i \in N^* \) implies \( \Gamma \not\models A_0 \land A_1 \land ... \land A_n \), that is, for any finite subset \( \Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma \), \( \Gamma' \not\models A_0 \land A_1 \land ... \land A_n \).

Suppose \( \Gamma_i \not\models A_i \) for some \( i \in N^* \). Let \( \Gamma' \subseteq \Gamma \) be an arbitrary finite subset. Since \( \Gamma \) is consistent, we have an ep-rooted model \( M^* = (F^*, \tau^*) = ((W^*, w^*_0; R^*_1, ..., R^*_n), \tau^*) \) such that
\[ (M^*, w^*_0) \models \Gamma'. \]

First, suppose that \( \Gamma_0 \not\models A_0 \); hence \( \Gamma'_0 \not\models A_0 \), where \( \Gamma'_0 = \Gamma' \cap \Gamma_i \) for \( i \in N^* \). By Theorem 3.2, we have another ep-rooted model \( M^0 = (F^0, \tau^0) = ((W^0, w^*_0; R^*_1, ..., R^*_n), \tau^0) \) with root \( w^*_0 \) such that \( (M^0, w^*_0) \models \Gamma_0' \) but \( (M^0, w^*_0) \not\models A_0 \). We modify \( \tau^* \) as follows: for all \( w \in W^* \),
\[ \tau^{*o}(w, p) = \begin{cases} \tau^0(w^*_0, p) & \text{if } w = w^*_0 \text{ and } p \in PV_0 \\ \tau^*(w, p) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \]

Then, \( \tau^{*o} \) differs from \( \tau^* \) only in \( w^*_0 \) and in \( PV_0 \). Any formula in \( \Gamma_0' \cup \{A_0\} \) has only propositional variables in \( PV_0 \) and is non-epistemistic. Thus, \((F^*, \tau^{*o}), w^*_0) \models \Gamma'_0 \) but \((F^*, \tau^{*o}), w^*_0) \not\models A_0 \). Since the change in \( w^*_0 \) does not affect the other parts in \( M^* \), we have \((F^*, \tau^{*o}), w^*_0) \models \Gamma'_0 \land ... \land \Gamma_n' \). Hence, \( \Gamma' \not\models A_0 \land A_1 \land ... \land A_n \) by Theorem 3.2 (completeness part).

Now suppose that \( \Gamma_i \not\models A_i \) for some \( i \in N \); hence \( \Gamma'_i \not\models A_i \). Then, we have an ep-rooted model \( M^i = (F^i, \tau^i) = ((W^i, w^*_0; R^*_1, ..., R^*_n), \tau^i) \) such that \( (M^i, w^*_0) \models \Gamma'_i \) and \( (M^i, w^*_0) \not\models A_i \). Here, we can assume \( w^*_0 = w^*_0 \). Here we modify combine \( M^* = (F^*, \tau^*) \) into \( M^* = (F^*, \tau^*) \), so that only the part of \( M^* = (F^*, \tau^i) \) relevant to player \( i \) is taken into \( M^* = (F^*, \tau^*) \), as follows:
\[ W^{*i} = \{w^*_0\} \cup \bigcup_{j \in N^*, j \neq i} W_j^*(w^*_0) \cup W^*_i(w^*_0); \]
\[ R^{*i}_k = \begin{cases} R^*_k \cap \bigcup_{j \in N^*, j \neq i} (W^*_j(w^*_0) \cup \{w^*_0\}) \times W^*_j(w^*_0) & \text{for all } k \in N^*; \\ \end{cases} \]
\[ \tau^{*i}(w, p) = \begin{cases} \tau^i(w, p) & \text{if } w \in W^*_i(w^*_0) \cup \{w^*_0\} \text{ and } p \in PV_i \\ \tau^*(w, p) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \]

Since \( (M^i, w^*_0) \models \Gamma'_i \) by the choice of \( M^i \) and \( (M^*, w^*_0) \models \Gamma'_i \), we have \( (M^{*i}, w^*_0) \models \Gamma'_i \) and \( (M^{*i}, w^*_0) \models \Gamma'_j \) for any \( j \in N^* \) with \( j \neq i \). Hence, \( (M^{*i}, w^*_0) \models \Gamma' \). By \( (M^{*i}, w^*_0) \not\models A_i \), we have \( (M^{*i}, w^*_0) \not\models A_i \). By this and Theorem 3.2, we have \( \Gamma' \not\models A_0 \land A_1 \land ... \land A_n \).

\[ \text{14} \]
(ii): This can be proved in a similar manner to (i), without assuming the consistency of \( \Gamma \).

Theorem 4.2 states that the provability of a statement on the entire situation can be decomposed into each player’s subjective perspective as well as the objective situation, and the inference in each component is independent of the other. Given this decomposition, we can focus on each player’s provability and the objective situation separately. The choice of KD\(^n\) is crucial to obtain this separation result. Indeed, Theorem 4.2 fails with Axiom T, although it remains valid with Axiom 4. A counter example against (ii): This can be proved in a similar manner to (i), without assuming the consistency of \( \Phi \).

\[ \text{Proof} \]

Let \( \Theta \) be a \( \Phi \)-formula or a \( \Theta \)-formula, and since \( \Phi \) is consistent, then the following statements are equivalent:

\[ \{ \Phi \} \cup \{ (B_1(p)) \cup (B_2(p)) \} \vdash q \text{ holds under Axiom T but } p \supset q \not\vdash q. \]

We end this subsection with the Scope Theorem for the formula of the form \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset \text{Ir}_i(C) \), which also serves as an application of Theorem 4.2 because of the interactive nature of the infinite regress operator.

**Theorem 4.3. (Scope Theorem 2):** Let \( i \in N \). Let \( A_k, C_k \) be a \( k \)-formula or a \( 0 \)-formula for all \( k \in N \). Suppose that \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \) is consistent. Then, the following statements are equivalent:

\[ (a) \vdash (A_k \supset C_k) \text{ for each } k = 1, \ldots, n; \ (b) \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A \supset C); \ (c) \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset \text{Ir}_i(C). \]

**Proof.** It follows from Lemma 2.2(1) that \( (a) \implies (b) \). By Lemma 2.2, we have \( (b) \implies (c) \). Consider \( (c) \implies (a) \). Suppose \( \vdash \text{Ir}_i(A) \supset \text{Ir}_i(C) \). By Theorem 2.2, this is equivalent to \( \vdash B_i[A_i \land \Lambda_j \not\text{Ir}_j(A)] \supset B_i[C_i \land \Lambda_j \not\text{Ir}_j(C)] \). By (1) of Theorem 4.1, we have \( \vdash A_i \land \Lambda_j \not\text{Ir}_j(A) \supset C_i \land \Lambda_j \not\text{Ir}_j(C) \), i.e., \( \{A_i\} \cup \{\text{Ir}_j(A) : j \neq i\} \vdash C_i \land \Lambda_j \not\text{Ir}_j(C) \). Since \( \text{Ir}_i(A) \) is consistent, \( A_i \land \Lambda_j \not\text{Ir}_j(A) \) is also consistent by Axiom D. Then, since both \( A_i, C_j \) are either \( i \)-formulae or \( 0 \)-formulae, and since \( \text{Ir}_j(A), \text{Ir}_j(C) \) are \( j \)-formulae, we have, by Theorem 4.2.1, \( \vdash A_j \supset C_j \) for all \( j \neq i \). Now we repeat the same argument, we have \( \vdash A_j \supset C_j \) for all \( j \in N \).

### 4.2.2 Epistemic disjunction properties

In EIR\(^n\), we have various disjunction properties. Here, we mention the following theorem presenting two results. The first is an extension of the theorem given for the epistemic logic GL\(_{EF}\) in Kaneko-Suzuki [11] to the logic IRL\(^n\). The second is an extension to various players, which will be applied to game theoretic prediction/decision statement in Section 5. Here, let \( S \) be a nonempty subset of \( N \), and we denote \( \Lambda_j \in S B_j(C_j) \) by \( B_{ij}(C) \).

**Theorem 4.4. (Epistemic Disjunction Properties):** (i): Let \( i \in N \). Suppose that \( \Lambda^i \) and \( \Theta^i \) are both finite nonempty sets of formulae. Then,

\[ B_i(\Lambda^i) \vdash \forall B_i(\Theta^i) \text{ if and only if } B_i(\Lambda^i) \vdash B_i(C) \text{ for some } C \in \Theta^i. \]

(ii): Let \( \Phi^S = \Pi_{j \in S} \Phi^j \), where \( \Phi^j \) a finite nonempty set of formulae for \( j \in S \). Then,

\[ B_S(A) \vdash \forall C \in \Phi^S B_S(C) \text{ if and only if } B_S(A) \vdash B_S(C) \text{ for some } C \in \Phi^S. \]

**Proof.** (i): The only-if part is essential, and we prove its contrapositive. Let \( \Theta_i = \{C_1, \ldots, C_m\} \). Suppose \( B_i(\Lambda_i) \not\vdash B_i(C_i) \) for any \( t = 1, \ldots, m \). By Theorem 3.2, for each \( t = 1, \ldots, m \), we have an
ep-rooted KD-models $M^t = ((W^t; w^t_0, R^t_1, ..., R^t_k), \tau^t)$ of $B_i(\Lambda_t)$ with $(M^t, w^t_0) \neq B_i(C_t)$. We can assume without loss of generality that $W^t \cap W^{t'} = \emptyset$ for distinct $t$, $t'$. Let $w^*_0$ be a new symbol. Then, we replace each $w^t_0$ by the common $w^*_0$: That is, we let $W^* = (\bigcup_{t=1}^n (W^t - \{w^t_0\})) \cup \{w^*_0\}$, and define, for $k \in N$,

$$R^*_k = \bigcup_{t=1}^n \left\{ \left\{ (w^*_0, u) : (w^t_0, u) \in R^t_k \right\} \cup \left\{ (w^*_0, u) : (w^t_0, u) \in R^t_k \right\} \right\}. \tag{16}$$

Finally, for any $p \in PV$, we let $\tau^*(w, p) = \tau^t(w, p)$ if $w \in W^t - \{w^t_0\}$; and $\tau^*(w^*_0, p) = \tau^t(w^*_0, p)$.

This $M^* = ((W^*, w^*; R^*_1, ..., R^*_k), \tau^*)$ is a KD-model. We show that $(M^*, w^*_0) \models B_i(A)$ for any $A \in \Lambda_t$. Note that any $w \in W^* - \{w^*_0\}$ belongs to $W^t - \{w^t_0\}$ for some unique $t$. If $w^t_0 R^t_i w$, then $w^*_0 R^*_i w$, which implies that $(M^*, w^*_0) \models A$. Since this holds for any $w \in W^* - \{w^*_0\}$, we have $(M^*, w^*_0) \models B_i(A)$. In sum, $M^*$ is a model of $A$.

First, $(M^t, w^t_0) \not\models B_i(C_t)$ implies $(M^t, w) \not\models C_t$ for some $w$ with $w^t_0 R^t_i w$. Since $(M^t, w) \not\models C_t$ by (16), we have $(M^*, w^*_0) \not\models B_i(C_t)$. Since this holds for $t = 1, ..., m$, we have $(M^*, w^*_0) \not\models \forall B_i(\Phi)$. By soundness, we have $B_i(\Gamma) \not\models \forall B_i(\Phi)$.

(ii): The if part is straightforward. We prove the only-if part. Let $i \in S$. Suppose $B_S(A) \models \forall C_i \in \Phi \left[ \land j \in S \forall B_j(C_j) \right]$. Since $\models \forall C_i \in \Phi \left[ \land j \in S \forall B_j(C_j) \right] \supset \forall C_i \in \Phi \left[ \forall B_i(C_i) \right]$, we have $B_S(A) \models \forall C_i \in \Phi \left[ \forall B_i(C_i) \right]$. Let $T_j = B_j(p_0) \lor (\neg B_j(p_0))$ and $T_j = B_j(p_0) \land (\neg B_j(p_0))$ for $j \in N^* - S$, where $T_0 = p_0 \lor (\neg p_0)$ and $T_0 = p_0 \land (\neg p_0)$. Then, by $B_S(A) \models \forall C_i \in \Phi \left[ \forall B_i(C_i) \right]$, we have $B_S(A) \land (\forall j \in N^* - S \land T_j) \models \forall C_i \in \Phi \left[ \forall B_i(C_i) \right]$. Applying Theorem 4.2 (2) to this, we have $B_i(A_i) \models \forall C_i \in \Phi \left[ \forall B_i(C_i) \right]$. By (1) of this theorem, we have $B_i(A_i) \models B_i(C_i)$ for some $C_i \in \Phi$. Since $i$ is arbitrary in $S$, we have $B_i(A_i) \models B_i(C_i)$ for all $i \in S$. Hence, $\land j \in S B_j(A_j) \models \land j \in S B_j(C_j)$, i.e., $B_S(A) \models B_S(C)$ and $C \in \Phi^S$. ■

The above disjunction properties differ from those in intuitionistic logic, which require some sufficient conditions on the referred formulæ to satisfy the properties. Those formulæ are typically called Harrop formulæ (cf., Troelstra-Schwichtenberg [19]). In contrast, Theorem 4.4 only requires the formulæ to be within the scope of $B_i(\cdot)$.

Theorem 4.4.(i) remains with Axiom 4 but fails with Axiom T or Axiom 5. First we give a counterexample under Axiom T. Let $\Gamma = \{B_i(p) \lor B_i(q)\}$. Then, $B_i(\Gamma) \models B_i(B_i(p) \lor B_i(q))$; so $B_i(\Gamma) \models B_i(p) \lor B_i(q)$ by Axiom T. If Theorem 4.4.(i) holds, then $B_i(\Gamma) \models B_i(p)$ or $B_i(\Gamma) \models B_i(q)$. We can eliminate the outer $B_i(\cdot)$ from those two provability statements, which preserves provability, and then we have $p \lor q \models p$ or $p \lor q \models q$ in classical logic, which is impossible. Now we consider Axiom 5. By 5, we have $\models B_i(p) \lor B_i(\neg B_i(p))$. If Theorem 4.4.(i) holds, then $\models B_i(p)$ or $\models B_i(\neg B_i(p))$, but either is impossible.

5 Game Theoretic Applications

As mentioned in Section 1, the logic EIR" was motivated by prediction/decision making by an individual player facing a game situation. Here, we return to this game theoretic problem and discuss how we analyze the problem in EIR". In particular, using the meta-theorems given in the previous sections, we can go back and forth from inferences about the entire situation to the decomposed individual inferences. Although we consider the general $n$-person case here, we refer to Hu-Kaneko [5] for the basic game theoretic results in the 2-person case whenever those results apply to the more general case in a straightforward manner.
5.1 Basic game theoretic concepts

We consider an $n$-person strategic game $G = (N, \{S_i\}_{i \in N}, \{h_i\}_{i \in N})$, where $S_i$ is a finite nonempty set of strategies (actions) and $h_i : S := S_1 \times \ldots \times S_n \to \mathbb{R}$ is a (real-valued) payoff function for player $i \in N$. We write $h_i(s_i; s_{-i})$ for $h_i(s)$ when we focus on player $i$. We say that $s_i \in S_i$ is a best response to $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$ if $h_i(s_i; s_{-i}) \geq h_i(t_i; s_{-i})$ for all $t_i \in S_i$. A profile of strategies $s = (s_1, \ldots, s_n) \in S$ is a Nash equilibrium iff $s_i$ is a best response to $s_{-i}$ for each $i \in N$. For each player $i$, a strategy $s_i$ is a Nash strategy iff $(s_i; s_{-i})$ is a Nash equilibrium for some $s_{-i}$. Table 1.1 is a 2-person game with 3 strategies for each players, and has a unique Nash equilibrium, designated by the superscript $NE$, and Table 5.2 has two NE’s. We use $E(G)$ to denote the set of Nash equilibria in $G$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 5.1</th>
<th>Table 5.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$s_{21}$</td>
<td>$s_{22}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_{11}$</td>
<td>(2, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_{12}$</td>
<td>(4, 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_{13}$</td>
<td>(5, 5)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In a game such as Tables 5.1 and 5.2, each player’s payoff is interdependent in the sense that they depend not only upon his own choice but also upon other player’s choice. Thus, he makes a possible decision together with a prediction about the other’s possible decisions. This prediction/decision making is described as the two statements:

Na1: 1 chooses his best strategy against all of his predictions about 2’s choice based on Na2; Na2: 2 chooses his best strategy against all of his predictions about 1’s choice based on Na1.

A possible final decision for 1 is determined by Na1, but because Na2 is included in Na1 as his prediction criterion, 1 also needs to assume that 2 uses Na2 for his decision making. The symmetric form Na2 determines a decision for player 2 with predictions about 1’s decisions.

Player 1’s decision making is described by his belief $B_1(\text{Na}_1)$ in Diagram 5.1, and in his prediction making, 1 thinks about 2’s thinking by putting himself to 2’s shoe, which is expressed as $B_1B_2(\text{Na}_2)$ in Diagram 5.1. In fact, Na1 occurs again in this $B_1B_2(\text{Na}_2)$, which requires the third $B_1B_2B_1(\text{Na}_1)$, and so on. Taking Na$_i$ as $A_i$, the infinite sequence forms the set (1), which is captured by the formula $\mathcal{I}r_1(A_1, A_2)$ in the logic EIR$^2$. If we make no distinction between decisions and predictions, Diagram 5.1 collapses to $\text{Na}_1 \leftrightarrow \text{Na}_2$: Na1-Na2 is a circular definition of decisions and predictions, i.e., as an equilibrium. This is Nash’s [16] noncooperative theory. The logic EIR$^n$ facilitates a study of his theory in a manner faithfully to prediction/decision making.

Diagram 5.1

\[ B_1(\text{Na}_1) \rightarrow B_1B_2(\text{Na}_2) \rightarrow B_1B_2B_1(\text{Na}_1) \rightarrow B_1B_2B_1B_2(\text{Na}_2) \rightarrow \cdots \]

The concept of Nash equilibrium allows different interpretations. We follow the $\text{ex ante}$ approach to study decision making, due to Nash [16], in Section 5.2, and we also consider it from the $\text{ex post}$ perspective in Section 5.3. In the $\text{ex ante}$ approach, from player i’s subjective viewpoint, in a profile $(s_i; s_{-i})$, $s_i$ is interpreted as a possible final decision for $i$ and $s_{-i}$ is

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$^2$Here we only focus on Nash equilibria in pure strategies, and hence the set $E(G)$ may be empty.
interpreted as his prediction of possible decisions for the others. Following Nash [16], we say
that \( G \) is solvable iff \( E(G) = E_1(G) \times \ldots \times E_n(G) \), where \( E_i(G) = \{ s_i \in S_i : (s_i; s_{-i}) \in E(G) \) for some \( s_j \in S_j \} \) for each \( i \in N \). This condition captures independent decision-making by the
players, and we shall explain this formally later.

To express the game theoretical concepts in the language of EIR\(^n\), we adopt the following
atomic formulae for the propositional variables \( PV : \) For \( i \in N \),

2n-ary preferences; \( R_i(s; t) \) for \( s, t \in S \); unary decision symbol; \( I_i(s_i) \) for \( s_i \in S_i \);

ex post observation symbol; \( \pi_i(s) \) for \( s \in S \).

We denote the set of those atomic formulae for \( i \in N \) by \( AF \). Preference expressions \( R_i(s; t) \) are
used to express the payoff functions \( h_i \). Decision expressions \( I_i(s_i) \) are intended to mean that \( s_i \)
is a possible final decision for player \( i \). Ex post observations \( \pi_i(s) \) expresses the actions that are
observed by player \( i \) after the actual play of the game.

To define \( i \)-formulae, we choose a partition \( (AF_0, AF_1, \ldots, AF_n) \) of \( AF \) as follows:

\[
AF_0 : = \text{the set of all atomic preference and decision expressions; (17)}
\]

\[
AF_i : = \{ \pi_i(s) : s \in S \} \text{ for } i \in N.
\]

With this partition, we can talk about the subjective understanding of the game situation for
each player as well as his own prediction/decision criterion.

Let the objective game be \( G^0 = (N, \{ S_j \}_{j \in N}, \{ h^0_j \}_{j \in N}) \). Each \( i \in N \) has a subjective
perception about the game being played, and we use \( G^i = (N, \{ S_j \}_{j \in N}, \{ h^i_j \}_{j \in N}) \) to denote his
perceived game. We allow \( h^i_j \) to be totally different from the objective payoff function \( h^0_j \) for
\( j \in N \). In our formal language, for \( i \in \{ 0 \} \cup N \), the payoff function \( h^i_j \) for player \( j \in N \) in \( G^i \)
is expressed in terms of preferences:

\[
g^i_j : = \wedge \{ R_j(s; t) : h^i_j(s) \geq h^i_j(t), s, t \in S \} \cup \{ \neg R_j(s; t) : h^i_j(s) < h^i_j(t), s, t \in S \}.
\]

Here, \( N \) and \( \{ S_j \}_{j \in N} \) are assumed to be common, the game is identified by the profile of formulae
\( g^i := (g^i_1, \ldots, g^i_n) \) and \( g^0 := (g^0_1, \ldots, g^0_n) \).

We express “\( s_i \) is a best response to \( s_{-i} \)” as the formula \( \text{bst}_i(s_i; s_{-i}) := \wedge \{ R_i(s_i; s_{-i} : t_i; s_{-i}) : t_i \in S_i \} \). We may write \( \text{bst}_i(s) = \text{bst}_i(s_i; s_{-i}) \). We also express “\( s \) is a Nash equilibrium” by the
formula \( \text{Nash}(s) := \wedge \{ j \in N \} \text{bst}_j(s_j; s_{-j}) \). Note that those concepts are formulated without referring to
a specific game.

5.2 Ex ante prediction/decision making

In Section 5, we described the prediction/decision making criterion Na1 and Na2 by player 1 in a
2-person game in a non-formalized manner. Here, we give its \( n \)-person version in the formalized
language. Following Hu-Kaneko [5], we also introduce two auxiliary axioms. These axioms are
intended to be the contents of player \( i \)’s basic beliefs and hence they occur in player \( i \)’s mind,
i.e., in the scope of \( B_i(\cdot) \) (actually, \( I_{i_1}(\cdot) \cdot) ;

\[\text{N0}_i \ (\text{Optimization against all predictions}): \wedge_{s \in S} \{ I_i(s_i) \wedge (\wedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j))) \supset \text{bst}_i(s_i; s_{-i}) \} .\]

\[\text{N1}_i \ (\text{Predictions by the others}): \wedge_{s \in S} \{ I_i(s_i) \wedge (\wedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j))) \supset \wedge_{j \neq i} B_j(\wedge_{i \neq j} B_j(I_i(s_j))) \} .\]
N2i (Necessity of predictions): \( \land_{s_i \in S_i} [I_i(s_i) \supset \lor_{s_i \in S_{-i}} (\land_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j)))] \).

For each \( i \in N \), let \( N_i = N_0 \land N_1 \land N_2, \) and let \( N = (N_1, ..., N_n) \).

Axiom N0 translates Na into our formal language, taking the belief operators into account. The premises of Axioms N0, N1, and N2 are the same; \( I_i(s_i) \) is a possible final decision for \( i \), and \( \land_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j)) \) his predictions. Axiom N1 requires, in the mind of player \( i \), each \( j \neq i \) makes predictions in the same manner. Axiom N2 requires predictions for any possible final decision, and is assumed to separate \( I_i(s_i) \) from his predictions \( \land_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j)) \).

We assume the infinite regress \( I_{ri}(N) = I_{ri}(N_1, ..., N_n) \) of those axioms, which corresponds to Diagram 5.1 (adding \( N_1 \land N_2, i \in N \)). We take the infinite regress \( I_{ri}(N) \) as basic beliefs for player \( i \)'s prediction/decision making.

By Theorem 2.2, the epistemic content of \( I_{ri}(A) \) is \( A_i \land (\land_{j \neq i} I_{ri}(A)) \), which is denoted as \( I_{ri} \) \( (A) \). Using the expression \( I_{ri} \), we can write a candidate for \( I_i(s_i) \) as follows: for each \( s_i \in S_i \),

\[
A_i^*(s_i) := \lor_{s_i \in S_{-i}} I_{ri}[bst_n(s_1; s_{-1}), ..., bst_n(s_n; s_{-n})].
\]  

(18)

In the logic \( EIR^n(T) \), Theorem 2.3 implies that \( A_i^*(s_i) \) can be written as \( \lor_{s_i \in S_{-i}} C(nash(s_i; s_{-i})) \). However, we are interested in the case without Axiom T; the reason will be manifested presently.

First, we have the following result: For \( i \in N \),

\[
I_{ri}(N) \models B_i(I_i(s_i) \supset A_i^*(s_i)) \quad \text{for all } s_i \in S_i.
\]  

(19)

The 2-person version of (19) is given and proved in Hu-Kaneko [5]. Here, since it is slightly different and more general, a proof is given in the end of this section.

The result (19) gives a necessary condition for a possible final decision \( I_i(s_i) \). To have a full characterization, we add the infinite regress of payoff functions \( I_{ri}(g^i) := I_{ri}(g^i_1, ..., g^i_n) \). In fact, this is not enough: In classical mathematics, it is a standard practice to regard a given property as the largest set satisfying the property. The counterpart of this requirement in logic is to look for the deductively weakest families. In our case, we consider \( n \) families of formulæ as candidates for \( \{I_1(s_1)\}, ..., \{I_n(s_n)\} \) so that, is we consider \( A = (A_1, ..., A_n) \) so that we substitute \( A_i(s_i) \) for \( I_i(s_i) \) (\( s_i \in S_i, i \in N \)) in the above axioms N0-N2. We call \( A = (A_1, ..., A_n) \) a profile of candidate families iff \( A_i \) is a family of formulæ indexed by \( s_i \) in \( S_i \). The resulting axioms are written as \( N_0(A) \land N_1(A) \land N_2(A) \), and we let \( N_i(A) = N_0(A) \land N_1(A) \land N_2(A) \).

We formalize the choice of the deductive weakest families by the following axiom \( WF_i(A) \):

\[
(20)
\]

We use \( I_{ri}(WF) \) to denote the set of all formulæ of the form \( I_{ri}(WF_1(A), ..., WF_n(A)) \) for candidate families \( A \).

Then the basic beliefs for player \( i \) are given as:

\[
\Delta_i(g^i) := \{I_{ri}(g^i), I_{ri}(N)\} \cup I_{ri}(WF).
\]

The following theorem summarizes individual inferences involved in this decision making process given in Hu-Kaneko [5] for the 2-person case. Later on we examine these inferences from the perspective of our Scope Theorems and Separation Theorem. The proofs of the claims of Theorem 5.1 can be proved in, more or less, the same manner as in [5] and we skip them.
Theorem 5.1. Let $i \in N$. Let $G^i$ be a game belied by player $i$, and $g^i$ its formalized payoffs.

(o) $\Delta_i(g^i)$ is consistent for each $i = 1, \ldots, n$, and $\wedge_{j \in N} g^j$ is consistent.

(i) Let $G^i$ be a solvable game. Then,

$$\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i(I_i(s_i) \equiv A_i^*(s_i)) \quad \text{for all } s_i \in S_i, \quad (21)$$

$$\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i I_j(s_j) \equiv A_j^*(s_j)) \quad \text{for all } s_j \in S_j \text{ and } j \neq i, \quad (22)$$

for any $s_i \in S_i$, either $\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i I_i(s_i)$ or $\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i(\neg I_i(s_i)), \quad (23)$

for any $s_{-i} \in S_{-i}$, either $\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i[I_i(s_i) \lor \exists_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j))]$ or $\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i[I_i(s_i) \lor \exists_{j \neq i} B_j(\neg I_j(s_j))]. \quad (24)$

(ii) Let $G^i$ be an unsolvable game. Assume that it is generic in the sense that for all strategy profiles entail distinct payoffs for all players. Then, for all Nash strategy $s_i \in S_i$,

$$\Delta_i(g^i) \nvdash B_i I_i(s_i)) \quad \text{and} \quad \Delta_i(g^i) \nvdash B_i(\neg I_i(s_i)). \quad (25)$$

Claim (o) states that the individual belief set $\Delta_i(g^i)$ is consistent (contradiction-free) in EIR$^n$; game theoretical studies with $\Delta_i(g^i)$ could be meaningless without this consistency. Claim (i) states that when the game $G^i$ believed by $i$ is solvable, the decision $I_i(s_i)$ is characterized by the formula $A_i^*(s_i)$ given by (18), and also each strategy is decidable as a possible final decision or not in the mind of player $i$. In fact, $\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash A_i^*(s_i)$ if $s_i$ is a Nash strategy and $\Delta_i(g^i) \vdash \neg A_i^*(s_i)$ if $s_i$ otherwise (see Hu-Kaneko [5]). Claim (ii), however, states when $G^i$ is unsolvable and is generic, player $i$ cannot decide for any Nash strategy, whether it is a possible final decision or not. In fact, since (19) implies that $\Delta_i(g^i)$ entails any non-Nash strategy as a negative decision, he cannot reach a positive decision for any strategy.

Hu-Kaneko [5] concentrated on the game theoretic decidability/undecidability from the perspective of an individual player. Our various meta-theorems in Section 4 allows us to the entire situation via epistemic separation and, here, we analyze the relationships between different individualistic views and the objective reality. The entire situation may be described by

$$\Delta(g) := (\wedge_{j \in N} g^j) \cup \Delta_i(g^i) \cup \ldots \cup \Delta_n(g^n).$$

The set $\Delta(g)$ includes all players’ basic beliefs, as well as the objective description of the game. Theorem 5.1.(o) shows that each $\Delta_i(g^i)$, as well as $\wedge_{j \in N} g^j$, is consistent. Then, applying Theorem 4.2.(o), we have:

**Step 0 (Consistency):** The union of beliefs $\Delta(g)$ is consistent in the logic EIR$^n$.

Note that we allow $g^i \neq g^j$ for distinct $i$ and $j$ (and, perhaps, 0). Thus, each player may have completely different beliefs. However, as long as the differences are not revealed and only exist in their minds, the entire set $\Delta(g)$ is consistent. This would be inconsistent in the logic EIR$^n$(T) with Axiom T, which requires $g^i = g^0$ for all players. Instead of imposing Axiom T, we study such (in-)consistency from the ex post point of view.

Taking $\Delta(g)$ as given, we may ask what are the decisions made by players from the analyst’s perspective. When a player can make a decision on a strategy $s_i$, the statement $B_i I_i(s_i)$ or $B_i(\neg I_i(s_i))$ is provable. Let $I_i^*(s_i)$ be $I_i(s_i)$ or $\neg I_i(s_i)$ for $i \in N$. Then, by Theorem 4.2.(i), we can decompose this collective decision problem into individual ones:

---

Step 1 (Decomposition): \( \Delta(g) \vdash \land_{i \in N} B_i(A_i^*(s_i)) \) if and only if \( \Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i(I_i^*(s_i)) \) for all \( i \in N \).

This guarantees that an analysis of \( n \) players’ decidabilities together is decomposed to a study of each player’s, and vice versa. From Theorem 5.1.(i) and (ii), for each player \( i \), whether he can reach a possible final decision or not only depend on whether \( G^i \) is solvable (and with a Nash equilibrium) or not, independent of \( G^j \) and \( G^0 \) for any \( j \neq i \). Thus, by Theorem 5.1.(ii), if one of the perceived game \( G^i \) is unsolvable, the the whole situation is undecidable. For the remaining two steps we focus on the decidable case and discuss how to relate subjective inference to objective inference in the individualistic decision problem.

Focusing on individual inferences, (21) in Theorem 5.1.(i) shows that possible final decisions are fully characterized by the candidate formulae \( A_i^*(s_i) \). To discuss derivability of \( B_i(A_i^*(s_i)) \), we only need to refer to \( I_i(g^i) \) in player \( i \)'s basic beliefs. By Theorem 4.3, we have the following step:

Step 2 (Epistemic Reduction): \( I_i(g^i) \vdash B_i(A_i^*(s_i)) \) if and only if \( I_i^0(g^i) \vdash A_i^*(s_i) \).

Notice that the game \( g^i \) believed by player \( i \) appears in \( \land_{j \neq i} I_j(g^i) \), that is, player \( i \) believes that player \( j \) believes \( g^i \) is being played instead of \( g^j \); player \( j \) may hold a complete different belief from the outside analyst’s perspective.

For \( i \)'s predictions, (22) shows that his predictions about \( j \)'s decisions are fully characterized by the candidate formulae \( A_i^*(s_j) \). As in the previous step, to discuss derivability of \( B_iB_j(A_i^*(s_j)) \), we only need to refer to \( I_i(g^i) \) in player \( i \)'s basic beliefs. By applying Theorem 4.3 twice we have the following step:

Step 3 (Epistemic Reduction for Predictions): \( I_i(g^i) \vdash B_iB_j(A_i^*(s_j)) \) if and only if \( I_i^0(g^i) \vdash A_i^*(s_j) \).

In Step 3, the prediction problem for player \( i \) is reduced to his simulated inference for player \( j \). However, note that in his simulation, \( i \) assumes \( j \) also believes that the game being played is the same as \( i \)'s perception. In this sense, although inferences per se are purely objective and described by classical logic, players differ in their basic beliefs, i.e., the starting points of their inferences.

Proof of (19). Let \( i \in N \), and \( s \in S \) be fixed. First, we have the first claim, which corresponds to the content version of Rule IR1:

(0): for any formulae \( D_k, k \in N \) and \( A = (A_1, ..., A_n) \), if \( \vdash D_k \supset A_k \land (\land_{j \neq k} B_j(D_j)) \) for all \( k \in N \), then \( \vdash D_i \supset I_i(A) \).

This can be proved without much difficulty.

Now, the following step (1) is crucial and different from the corresponding step in [5].

(1): \( I_i^0[N01_1, ..., N01_n] \vdash I_i(s_i) \land (\land_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j))) \supset I_i^0[\text{bst}_1(s_1; s_{-1}), ..., \text{bst}_n(s_n; s_{-n})]; \)

(2): \( I_i^0[N1_1, ..., N_n] \vdash I_i(s_i) \supset A_i^*(s_i) \).

To prove (1), we let \( \theta_i(s) := I_i^0[N01_1, ..., N01_n] \land [I_i(s_i) \land (\land_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j)))]. \) We show that

\[ \vdash \theta_i(s) \supset \text{bst}_i(s_i; s_{-i}) \land (\land_{j \neq i} B_j(\theta_j(s))) \] (26)

Once this is proved, we have, by (0), \( \vdash \theta_i(s) \supset I_i^0[\text{bst}_1(s_1; s_{-1}), ..., \text{bst}_n(s_n; s_{-n})]. \) The first part of (26), \( \vdash \theta_i(s) \supset \text{bst}_i(s_i; s_{-i}), \) comes from \( N0_i \) and \( I_i(s_i) \land (\land_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j))) \). Consider
the second part. Let \( j \neq i \). By Theorem 2.2, we have \( \vdash \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n] \supset N_1 \). Hence, \( \vdash \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n] \wedge I_i(s_i) \wedge (\bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j))) \supset \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(\bigwedge_{l \neq j} B_l(I_l(s_l))). \) Hence,  
\[ \vdash \theta_i(s) \supset \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_i(s_i) \wedge I_j(s_j)). \]

This together with \( \vdash \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n] \supset \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_r^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n]) \) implies \( \vdash \theta_i(s; s_{-i}) \supset \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(\theta_j(s_j; s_{-j})). \)

Now we consider (2). It follows from (1) that  
\[ \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n] \vdash I_i(t_i) \wedge \left( \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(s_j)) \right) \supset \bigwedge_{t \in S_{-i}} \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[\text{bst}(t_1; t_{-1}), ..., \text{bst}_n(t_n; t_{-n})]. \]

This is equivalent to  
\[ \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n] \vdash \left( \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(t_j)) \right) \supset \left( I_i(s_i) \supset A_i^\circ(t_i) \right). \]

Hence \( \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n] \vdash \bigwedge_{t \in S_{-i}} \left( \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_j(I_j(t_j)) \right) \supset \left( I_i(s_i) \supset A_i^\circ(s_i) \right). \)

By adding \( N_2 \) to \( \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N01_1,...,N01_n] \), we delete the first disjunctive formula, i.e.,  
\[ \frak{Ir}_i^\circ[N1_1,...,N_n] \vdash I_i(s_i) \supset A_i^\circ(s_i). \]

### 5.3 Consistency between \textit{ex ante} predictions and \textit{ex post} observations

In our analysis of the \textit{ex ante} decision/prediction making, all interactions occur in each player’s mind but not among the players in the physical world. From this \textit{ex ante} viewpoint, we have used Separation Theorem to study each player’s subjective decision/prediction making. Here we introduce external interactions through actual plays and \textit{ex post} observations. Once the game is played and the actions taken are observed by the players, we can study the potential conflicts arising from a player’s \textit{ex ante} predictions about the others and his \textit{ex post} observations.

To connect \textit{ex ante} predictions to \textit{ex post} observations, we impose the following axiom:

\[ \text{EX}_i := \bigwedge \{ \pi_i(s) \supset B_i(I_i(s_i)) \wedge \bigwedge_{j \neq i} B_i(I_j(s_j)) : s \in S \}. \tag{27} \]

Recall that \( \pi_i(s) \) means that player \( i \) observes \( s \) as the actual play. \( \text{EX}_i \) states that if a profile \( s = (s_i; s_{-i}) \) is observed \textit{ex post}, then \( s_i \) becomes a possible final decision for \( i \) and \( s_{-i} \) becomes his predictions of others’ possible decisions.

Now, assuming that a particular outcome, \( s^o \in S \), is observed (by all players), and, for each player \( i \in N \), we consider the set  
\[ \hat{\Gamma}_i := \Delta_i(g^i) \cup \text{EX}_i \cup \{ \pi_i(s^o) \}. \tag{28} \]

In this case, the consistency of \( \hat{\Gamma}_i \) may be problematic. We have the following theorem.

**Theorem 5.2.** (\textit{Ex Post Consistencies})

(i): \( g^o \cup \hat{\Gamma}_1 \cup ... \cup \hat{\Gamma}_n \) is consistent if and only if \( \hat{\Gamma}_i \) is consistent for each \( i \in N \).

(ii): Suppose that \( G^i \) has generic payoffs\footnote{This result holds for nongeneric payoffs as well, but we assume genericity for simplicity.}. \( \hat{\Gamma}_i \) is consistent if and only if \( s^o \) is a Nash equilibrium of \( G^i \).

**Proof.** (i) is proved by Theorem 4.2.(i), just counting \( \pi_i(s) \), \( s \in S \) to be \( i \)-formulae as in (17).

(ii): The only-if part (the contrapositive) is proved by (19), which states that if \( s^o \) is not a Nash equilibrium, then either \( \Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i(-I_i(s^o)) \), or \( \Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_jB_j(-I_j(s^o)) \) for some \( j \neq i \). In either case, it is inconsistent with \( \text{EX}_i \cup \{ \pi_i(s^o) \} \), i.e., \( \hat{\Gamma}_i \) is inconsistent.
To prove the if part, we first claim that if $s^o$ is a Nash equilibrium, then
\[ \Delta_i(g^i) \not\subseteq B_i(-I_i(s^o_i)) \text{ and } \Delta_i(g^i) \not\subseteq B_iB_j(-I_j(s^o_j)). \]
When $G^i$ is solvable, this follows from Theorem 5.1 (i); when it is unsolvable but has generic payoffs, this follows from Theorem 5.1 (ii). It implies that we can construct a model such that $\Delta_i(g^i)$, $B_i(I_i(s^o_i))$, $B_iB_j(I_j(s^o_j))$ hold at a specific world. Since the truth value of $\pi_i(s^o)$ is independent of those formulae, we may add it to hold in that world. This gives a model for $\Gamma_i$.

Again, (i) states that the consistency of the whole statement is decomposed into that for each player. Assertion (ii) is more substantive: player $i$’s observations $\pi_i(s^o)$ are coherent with his ex ante basic beliefs if and only if the observed strategy profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium in his perceived game $G^i$. Theorem 5.2 shows that an observed strategy profile $s^o$ is stable in the sense that it does not bring in inconsistency in any player’s mind, if and only if $s^o$ is a Nash equilibrium for each player’s perceived game.

When the perceived game $G^i$ is solvable, we may restate (ii) as
\[ \Gamma_i \text{ is consistent } \iff \Delta_i(g^i) \vdash B_i(I_i(s^o_i)) \land [\land_{j \neq i}B_j(I_j(s^o_j))], \quad (29) \]
In this case, $\Gamma_i$ is consistent if and only if the observations are already positively predicted in in the ex ante stage. As long as the right-hand side of (29) holds (and hence $s^o$ is a Nash equilibrium of $G^i$), player $i$ can learn nothing from the ex post experience.

In contrast, if $G^i$ is unsolvable, $\Gamma_i$ can still be consistent unless the observed behavior is predicted not to be played in the ex ante stage, and hence, it can be consistent without the right-hand side of (29). However, in this case, $B_i(I_i(s^o_i)) \land [\land_{j \neq i}B_j(I_j(s^o_j))]$ are derived from EX$_i$ and $\pi_i(s^o)$. Then, player $i$ may include $B_i(I_i(s^o_i)) \land [\land_{j \neq i}B_j(I_j(s^o_j))]$, which is learned from the previous experience, into his basic beliefs for his ex ante decision in the next play. This introduces a two-way between ex ante decision making and ex post observations; a full development is beyond the current paper.

6 Proof of the Soundness-Completeness of EIR$^n$

The following proof of completeness is a variant of a known proof of common knowledge logic (cf., Fagin et al. [3] and Meyer-van der Hoek [14]). Nevertheless, since we need to take several new steps, we give a full proof.

Since the base logic of EIR$^n$ is classical logic, we use classical tautologies. Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 list a few basic properties on $B_i(\cdot)$, and $Ir_i(\cdot)$.

6.1 Soundness of EIR$^n$

It suffices to show that all logical axioms are valid, and the four inference rules preserve validity $\models$. Here, we consider these for Axiom IRA$_i$ and Inference IRI$_i$.

Axiom IRA$_i$. Suppose $(M, w) \models Ir_i(A_1, \ldots, A_n)$. By V6, $(M, u) \models A_i$ for any $u$ with $wR_iu$. Hence, $(M, w) \models B_i(A_i)$. We take an arbitrary $u$ with $wR_iu$. Let $j \neq i$, and $[(w_0, j_0), \ldots, (w_\nu, j_\nu), w_{\nu+1}]$
an alternating chain with \((w_0, j_0) = (u, j)\). Then, \([(w, i), (w_0, j_0), ..., (w_{\nu}, j_{\nu}), w_{\nu+1}]\) is alternating, too. By V6, we have \((M, w_{\nu+1}) \models A_i\nu\) because \((M, w) \models \text{IR}_i(A_1, ..., A_n)\). Since \([(w_0, j_0), ..., (w_{\nu}, j_{\nu}), w_{\nu+1}]\) is arbitrary with \((w_0, j_0) = (u, j)\), we have \((M, u) \models \text{IR}_j(A)\). Since \(u\) is arbitrary with \(w_R u\), we have \((M, w) \models B_i \text{IR}_j(A)\).

**Inference IRI**: Let \(D = (D_1, ..., D_n)\) be an n-tuple of formulae, and suppose that for all \(i \in N\),

\[
(M, u) \models D_i \supset B_i(A_i) \land B_i(\land_{j \neq i} D_j) \quad \text{for all } u \in W. \tag{30}
\]

Let \(w\) be arbitrary element in \(W\). If \((M, w) \not\models D_i\), we have \((M, w) \models D_i \supset \text{IR}_i(A)\). Now, let \((M, w) \models D_i\). Suppose that \([(w_0, i_0), ..., (w_{\nu}, i_{\nu}), w_{\nu+1}]\) is an alternating chain with \((w_0, i_0) = (w, i)\). Then, we prove by induction that \((M, w_{k+1}) \models A_{i_k} \land (\land_{j \neq i_k} D_j)\) for all \(k = 0, ..., \nu\). The induction base, i.e., \(k = 0\): Since \((M, w) \models D_i\), we have \((M, w) \models B_i(A_i) \land B_i(\land_{j \neq i} D_j)\) by (30). By \(wR w_1\), it holds that \((M, w_1) \models A_i \land (\land_{j \neq i} D_j)\). Suppose the induction hypothesis that \((M, w_{k+1}) \models A_{i_k} \land (\land_{j \neq i_k} D_j)\). This implies \((M, w_{k+1}) \models D_{i_{k+1}}\) since \(i_{k+1} \neq i_k\). It follows from this and (30) that \((M, w_{k+1}) \models B_{i_{k+1}} (A_{i_{k+1}}) \land B_{i_{k+1}} (\land_{j \neq i_{k+1}} D_j)\). Since \(w_{k+1}R_w w_{k+2}\), we have \((M, w_{k+2}) \models A_{i_{k+1}} \land (\land_{j \neq i_{k+1}} D_j)\). This completes the induction argument. Thus, \((M, w) \models D_i \supset \text{IR}_i(A)\). Since \(w\) is arbitrarily chosen, it holds that \(M \models D_i \supset \text{IR}_i(A)\).

### 6.2 Completeness for EIR

As is standard, supposing \(\not\models A\), we construct a (finite) model \(M = (F; \tau) = ((W; R_1, ..., R_m); \tau)\) so that \((M, w) \not\models A\) for some \(w \in W\). In the following, \(A\) is an arbitrarily fixed formula with \(\not\models A\).

We start with the following facts: Let \(A_m^n = \{A_0, ..., A_m\}\) be a finite set of formulae \((m \geq 0)\), and \(A_m = A_m^n \cup \{\neg A : A \in A_m^n\}\). Let \(W(A_m)\) be the set of maximally consistent subsets in \(A_m\). We can construct a maximally consistent in the standard manner; thus, \(W(A_m)\) is nonempty. We write \(\varphi_w = \land w\) for \(w \in W(A_m)\). We stipulate \(\land \emptyset\) to be \((\land p) \lor p\).

**Lemma 6.1.** (1) if \(w \in W(A_m)\) and \(t \leq m\), then either \(A_t \in w\) or \(\neg A_t \in w\);

(2) if \(w \in W(A_m)\), then \(w \cap A_{m-1} \in W(A_{m-1})\); and if \(w \in W(A_{m-1})\), then \(w \cup \{A_m\} \in W(A_m)\) or \(w \cup \{\neg A_m\} \in W(A_m)\);

(3) for any consistent \(v \subseteq A_m\), \(\vdash \land v \equiv \lor_{v \subseteq w \in W(A_m)} \varphi_w\);

(4) \(\vdash \lor_{w \in W(A_m)} \varphi_w\).

**Proof.** (1) is standard. (4) follows from (3) taking \(v = \emptyset\).

(2): Consider the former: Since \(w \in W(A_m)\), \(w \cap A_{m-1}\) is consistent. Also, \(w \cap A_{m-1}\) is maximal in \(A_{m-1}\) by (1). Now consider the latter: Let \(w \in W(A_{m-1})\). Then \(w \cup \{A_m\}\) or \(w \cup \{\neg A_m\}\) is consistent; in either case, it is maximally consistent in \(A_m\) by (1).

(3): Let \(v\) be a consistent subset of \(A_m\). Let \(A_m^n(v) = \{C \in A_m^n : C \not\in v\text{ and } \neg C \not\in v\}\). If \(A_m^n(v) = \emptyset\), then \(v\) is maximal; so \(\lor_{v \subseteq w \in W(A_m)} \varphi_w\) is written as \(\lor \varphi_v\) and is equivalent to \(\varphi_v = \land v\) itself. Let \(A_m^n(v) \neq \emptyset\). Take any \(C \in A_m^n(v)\). Let \(A'_m = A_m - \{C, \neg C\}\). We show

\[
\vdash \lor_{v \subseteq w \in W(A_m^n)} \varphi_u \equiv \lor_{v \subseteq u \in W(A_m^n)} (\varphi_u \land C) \lor (\varphi_u \land \neg C). \tag{31}
\]

Using this, we can eliminate, by induction, all such formulae \(C, \neg C\) from \(A_m\), and then the first formula in (31) becomes equivalent to \(\land v\). Let us prove (31). Now, we have

\[
\vdash \lor_{v \subseteq u \in W(A_m^n)} \varphi_u \equiv \lor_{v \subseteq u \in W(A_m^n)} (\varphi_u \land C) \lor (\varphi_u \land \neg C).
\]
Since $u$ includes $v$, one of the disjuncts of the latter is contradictory; a contradictory formula can be deleted from the disjunction. The them remaining one $u \cup \{C\}$ or $u \cup \{\neg C\}$ is consistent and also maximal in $\mathcal{A}_n$. Thus, the latter formula is equivalent to $\bigvee_{v \in \mathcal{W}(\mathcal{A}_n)} \neg v$.\[\]

Now, suppose $\not\models A$ throughout the following. Now, we construct a model $M = (F, \tau) = ((W; R_1, \ldots, R_n), \tau)$ so that $(M, w) \not\models A$ for some $w \in W$.

We denote the following set, by $\text{SI}(A)$,
\[\forall i \in \mathbb{N}\{B_i(C_i), B_i \text{Ir}_j(C), \text{Ir}_j(C) : \text{Ir}_i(C)\},\]
and we let $\text{Sub}^n(A) = \{C : C \text{ is a sub-formula of } A\} \cup \text{SI}(A)$. Then, let $\text{Sub}(A) = \text{Sub}^n(A) \cup \{\neg C : C \in \text{Sub}^n(A)\}$. Now, we denote, by $\text{Con}(A) := \mathcal{W}(\text{Sub}(A))$, the set of maximally consistent subsets of $\text{Sub}(A)$. Then, we can find a $w \in \text{Con}(A)$ so that
\[A \notin w.\] (33)
Indeed, the supposition that $\not\models A$ implies the consistency of $\neg A$; thus, we can find a $w$ for (33) by Lemma 6.1.(1).

The following lemma is standard.

**Lemma 6.2.** For each $w \in \text{Con}(A)$, we have

1: for any $\neg C \in \text{Sub}(A)$, either $C \in w$ or $\neg C \in w$;
2: for any $(D \supset C) \in \text{Sub}(A)$, $(D \supset C) \in w$ if and only if $\neg D \in w$ or $C \in w$;
3: for any $\land \Phi \in \text{Sub}(A)$, $\land \Phi \in w$ if and only if $B \in w$ for any $B \in \Phi$;
4: for any $\lor \Phi \in \text{Sub}(A)$, $\lor \Phi \in w$ if and only if $B \in w$ for some $B \in \Phi$.

We denote, by $u^{-B_i}$, the set $\{C : B_i(C) \in u\}$ for any set of formulae $u$. Now we define a model $M = (F, \tau) = ((W; R_1, \ldots, R_n), \tau)$ as follows:

M1: $W = \text{Con}(A)$;
M2: $R_i = \{(u, v) \in W^2 : u^{-B_i} \subseteq v\}$ for all $i \in \mathbb{N}$;
M3: for any $(w, p) \in W \times PV$, $\tau(w, p) = \top$ if and only if $p \in w$.

We show that $M = (F, \tau)$ is a model for the logic EIR$^n$.

**Lemma 6.3.** The relation $R_i$ is serial.

**Proof.** Let $u \in W$. Then, $u^{-B_i}$ is consistent; hence there exists some $v \in \text{Con}(A)$ such that $u^{-B_i} \subseteq v$, i.e., $(u, v) \in R_i$. Indeed, if $\vdash \land u^{-B_i} \supset (\neg C \land C)$ for some $C$, then by Nec and Axiom K, $\vdash \land u \supset B_i(\neg C \land C)$; so by Axiom D, $u$ is inconsistent, a contradiction to $u \in W = \text{Con}(A)$.\[\]

We claim that for any $C \in \text{Sub}(A)$ and any $w \in W$,
\[C \in w \text{ if and only if } (M, w) \models C.\] (34)
By (33), we have some $w \in W$ with $A \notin w$. Once (34) is shown, we have $(M, w) \not\models A$. Thus, it remains to show (34).

Now, (34) is shown by induction on the length of the formula $C$ in $\text{Sub}(A)$. By M3, (34) holds for any $p \in PV$. Let $C$ be not a propositional variable. Suppose that (34) holds for any
sub-formula of $C$. We consider three cases divided by the outermost connective of $C$.

(i) When $C$ is expressed as $\neg D$, $D \supset D'$, $\land \Phi$ or $\lor \Phi$, (34) follows from Lemma 6.2.

(ii) Consider $C = B_i(C')$. First, we show that $(M, w) \vdash B_i(C')$ implies $B_i(C') \in w$. Suppose $(M, w) \models B_i(C')$. We claim that $w^{-B_i} \cup \{\neg C'\}$ is inconsistent. Suppose it is consistent. Then there exists some $u \in W$ such that $w^{-B_i} \cup \{\neg C'\} \subseteq u$; so $C' \notin u$. By the induction hypothesis, $(M, u) \not\models C'$. Since $w^{-B_i} \subseteq u$, we have $w R u$, and hence $(M, w) \not\models B_i(C')$, a contradiction. Thus, $w^{-B_i} \cup \{\neg C'\}$ is inconsistent; so $\vdash \neg \land w^{-B_i} \supset C'$. This implies $\vdash \land \neg w \supset B_i(C')$. Thus, $B_i(C') \in w$.

Conversely, suppose that $B_i(C') \in w$. We have $C \in u$ for any $u$ with $w R u$, because $C \in w^{-B_i} \subseteq u$. By the induction hypothesis, $(M, u) \models C$. Hence $(M, w) \models B_i(C)$.

(iii) Here we show that (34) holds for the formula $C = \text{Ir}_i(C) = \text{Ir}_i(C_1, \ldots, C_n)$. The crucial part is the if statement, which is proved using Lemma 6.1.

(Only-if): Suppose $\text{Ir}_i(C) \in w$. Let $[(w_0, i_0), \ldots, (w_\nu, i_\nu), w_{\nu+1}]$ be an alternating chain with $(w_0, i_0) = (w, i)$. We show, by induction, that $A_{i_0}$ and $\text{Ir}_{i_k+1}(C)$ are in $w_{k+1}$ for all $0 \leq k \leq \nu$. This implies $(M, w) \models \text{Ir}_i(C)$ since the chain is arbitrary.

Let $k = 0$. Since $\vdash \text{Ir}_i(C) \supset B_i(C_i) \land B_i(C) \supset \text{Ir}_i(C_i)$ by IRA_i, we have $B_i(C_i), B_i \text{Ir}_j(C) \in w$ for all $j \neq i$. Because $(w, w_1) \in R_i$, $w^{-B_i} \subseteq w_1$; so $C_i \in w_1$ and $\text{Ir}_{i_1}(C) \in w_1$. Suppose that $C_{i_k}, \text{Ir}_{i_{k+1}}(C) \in w_{k+1}$. By IRA_{i_{k+1}}, we have $B_{i_{k+1}}(C_{i_{k+1}}), B_{i_{k+1}}(\text{Ir}_j(C)) \in w$ for all $j \neq i_{k+1}$. Again, since $(w_{k+1}, w_{k+2}) \in R_{i_{k+1}}$, i.e., $w_{k+1}^{-B_i} \subseteq w_{k+2}$, we have $C_{i_{k+1}} \in w_{k+2}$ and $\text{Ir}_{i_{k+2}}(C) \in w_{k+2}$. This concludes the induction argument. Thus, $C_{i_k} \in w_{\nu+1}$.

(If): Suppose $(M, w) \models \text{Ir}_i(C)$. We define $W_{C_j}^j = \{u : (M, u) \models \text{Ir}_j(C)\}$ for $j \in N$. Recall the definition $\varphi_u = \land u$ for $u \in W$. Let $\chi_{W_{C_j}^j} = \lor (\varphi_u : u \in W_{C_j}^j)$. We show that for $j \in N$,

$$\vdash \chi_{W_{C_j}^j} \supset B_j(C_j) \land B_j\left(\land_{k \neq j} \chi_{W_{C_k}^k}\right).$$

Once this is proved, using IRA_i, we have $\vdash \chi_{W_{C_j}^j} \supset \text{Ir}_j(C)$, which together with $\vdash \varphi_u \supset \text{Ir}_j(C)$, implies $\vdash \varphi_u \supset \text{Ir}_j(C)$. Thus, $\text{Ir}_i(C) \in w$. Now, we prove (35).

We first show that $\vdash \chi_{W_{C_j}^j} \supset B_j(C_j)$. Let $u \in W_{C_j}^j$. Since $(M, u) \models \text{Ir}_j(C)$, we have, by V6, $(M, u') \models C_j$ for any $u \sim u'$. By the induction hypothesis for (34), $C_j \subseteq u'$. Since $u^{-B_j} \subseteq u'$, $B_j(C_j) \in u'$; so $\varphi_u \supset B_j(C_j)$. Since this holds for any $u \in W_{C_j}^j$, we have $\vdash \chi_{W_{C_j}^j} \supset B_j(C_j)$.

Now we show that $\vdash \chi_{W_{C_j}^j} \supset B_j(\chi_{W_{C_k}^k})$ for any $k \neq j$. Let $u \in W_{C_j}^j$. It suffices to show that $\vdash \varphi_u \supset B_j(\chi_{W_{C_k}^k})$. This follows from Lemma 6.1.1 that $\vdash \varphi_v \supset \neg \varphi_v$ for any $v, v \in W$; this together with Lemma 6.1.3 implies that $\vdash \chi_{W_{C_k}^k} \equiv \neg (\forall v \in W - W_{C_k}^k \varphi_v)$. By this equivalence, it is enough to show

$$\vdash \varphi_u \supset B_j(\neg \varphi_v) \text{ for any } v \in W - W_{C_k}^k.$$

Suppose that (36) does not hold for some $v \in W - W_{C_k}^k$; that is, $\varphi_u$ and $\neg B_j(\neg \varphi_v)$ are consistent.

Now, we consider the two cases: (A): $u^{-B_j} \subseteq v$; and (B) $u^{-B_j} \not\subseteq v$. We show that neither is the case; so we would have (36), and (35), too.

Consider (A), i.e., $u \sim v$. We see $(M, v) \models \text{Ir}_k(C)$; indeed, let $[(w_1, i_1), \ldots, (w_\nu, i_\nu), w_{\nu+1}]$ be an alternating chain with $(w_1, i_1) = (v, k)$. Then, since $u \sim v$, $[(u, j), (w_1, i_1), \ldots, (w_\nu, i_\nu), w_{\nu+1}]$
is also an alternating chain. Since \((M, u) \models \text{Ir}_j(C)\), we have \((M, w_{j+1}) \models C_{j+1}\). This implies \((M, v) \models \text{Ir}_k(C)\), which is a contradiction to the choice of \(v\) from \(W - W_k\).

Consider (B). Then, \(C' \in u - B_j\) but \(C \notin v\) for some \(C\). Then, if \(\neg C \in \text{Sub}(A)\), then \(\neg C \in v\); and if \(\neg C \notin \text{Sub}(A)\), then \(C = \neg C'\) and \(C' \in v\). In either case, \(\vdash \varphi_u \supset \neg C\), equivalently, \(\vdash C \supset \neg \varphi_u\). Hence, \(\vdash B_j(C) \supset B_j(\neg \varphi_u)\). Since \(B_j(C) \in u\), we have \(\vdash \varphi_u \supset B_j(\neg \varphi_u)\), which implies that \(\varphi_u\) and \(\neg B_j(\neg \varphi_u)\) are inconsistent.

7 Conclusions

We have developed the theory of the epistemic infinite-regress logic \(\text{EIR}^n\). The logic \(\text{EIR}^n\) is built for studies of prediction/decision making in interdependent game situations. We gave the completeness theorems for \(\text{EIR}^n\) with respect to the Kripke semantics. Based on these completeness results, we presented various meta-theorems; the entire discourse is based on the choice of the KD-type epistemic logic, which allow us to treat subjective thinking separately for each player. We also showed applications to game theoretic prediction/decision making.

As expressed in (1) in Section 1, the epistemic infinite regress \(\text{Ir}_j(A_1, ..., A_n)\) is an infinitary concept, though in this paper it is captured as a fixed-point concept. Another way to capture epistemic infinite regresses is the infinitary logic approach. In this approach, logics are typically very large such as Karp [12] (see Heifetz [4] for infinitary epistemic logics). It would be informative to look at the infinite-regress logic \(\text{EIR}^n\) from the viewpoint of the infinitary logic approach, which leads to small infinitary logics. This will be discussed in another paper (Hu-Kaneko-Suzuki [6]), and its relationship to the \(\mu\)-calculus will be studied.

In Section 5, we showed applications of our theory on \(\text{EIR}^n\) to \textit{ex ante} prediction/decision making and their interactions with \textit{ex post} observations. The relationship between these two viewpoints should be studied in a more general manner including different prediction/decision criteria. This may give new insights to the game theory \textit{per se}, as well as logic in a wider sense including induction.

Our development raises many new questions; some questions such as a relationship to the infinitary logic are rather purely logical (or philosophical in the mathematical sense), and some others indicate interactive relations between subjective thinking and objective observations. Studies on these problems will help us better understand human rational thinking and behavior.

References


